Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr.

This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals; Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

For related information, Open Docket Folder.

Comment

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission;

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atypical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, that's the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a

http://www.regulations.gov/
legal trading commodity, like it or not, its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease, with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABS or BARBS. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban, in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

Country/Year

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS

Attachments (1)


View Attachment:  PDF

http://www.regulations.gov/
SUNDAY, JANUARY 11, 201

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singe
city Submission
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products.

This Notice document was issued by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

Show agency attachment(s) DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

[Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107]

Notice of Request for Revision to and Extension of Approval of an Information Collection; Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products. Agency Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

Action Revision to and extension of approval of an information collection; comment request.

Summary In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this notice announces the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's intention to request a revision to and extension of approval of an information collection associated with the importation of animals and animal products of by products to protect against the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States.

Dates We will consider all comments that we receive on or before March 2, 2015.

Addresses You may submit comments by either of the following methods:


-Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: Send your comment to Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107, Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 3A-03-S, 4700 River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-1238. Supporting documents and any comments we receive on this docket may be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov/#/docketDetail?D=APHIS-2014-0107 or in our reading room, which is located in Room 1141 of the USDA South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue SW,
For Further Information Contact For information on the regulations for the importation of animals and animal products and byproducts to prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States, contact Dr. Langston Hull, Senior Staff Veterinarian, Veterinary Services, APHIS, 4700 River Road, Unit 39, Riverdale, MD 20737; (301) 851-3363. For copies of more detailed information on the information collection, contact Ms. Kimberly Hardy, APHIS Information Collection Coordinator, at (301) 851-2727.

Supplementary Information Title: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products.

OMB Control Number: 0579-0234.

Type of Request: Revision to and extension of approval of an information collection.

Abstract: Under the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture regulates the importation of animals and animal products into the United States to guard against the introduction of animal diseases. The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a chronic degenerative disease affecting the central nervous system of cattle.

To help ensure that BSE is not introduced into the United States, the regulations place specified conditions on the importation of certain live ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts. These requirements necessitate the use of several information collection activities, including Veterinary Services (VS) Form 16-3, permit application; certification statements for the importation of ruminants and ruminant products; certificate for inedible processed animal origin materials and products from BSE-free regions; cooperative service agreements with foreign facilities that process and store regulated materials and products destined for importation into the United States; VS Form 17-33, Animals Imported for Immediate Slaughter; the placing of seals on conveyances from the exporting region; agreement with slaughter facilities on use of seals on conveyances transporting animals from BSE minimal-risk regions; notification regarding conditions of sealed shipments; and notification of designated individuals authorized to break seals.

In addition to the above information collection activities, we are adding VS Form 17-130, Ruminants Imported to Designated/Approved Feedlots; and VS Form 1-27, Permit for Movement of Restricted Animals. As a result of adding these two activities and the increase in importations from Canada, the estimated annual number of responses has increased by 110,463, and the estimated total annual burden on respondents has increased by 160,983 hours.

We are asking the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to approve our use of these information collection activities, as described, for an additional 3 years.

The purpose of this notice is to solicit comments from the public (as well as affected agencies) concerning our information collection. These comments will help us:

(1) Evaluate whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Agency, including
whether the information will have practical utility;

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the burden of the collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

(4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, through use, as appropriate, of automated, electronic, mechanical, and other collection technologies; e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses.

Estimate of burden: The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response.

Respondents: Herd owners, U.S. importers of regulated animal products, salaried veterinarians in BSE-free regions and BSE-affected regions, foreign exporters of processed animal protein and other regulated materials and products, accredited veterinarians, feedlot managers, and slaughter facility managers.

Estimated annual number of respondents: 4,590.

Estimated annual number of responses per respondent: 52.

Estimated annual number of responses: 235,752.

Estimated total annual burden on respondents: 231,307 hours. (Due to averaging, the total annual burden hours may not equal the product of the annual number of responses multiplied by the reporting burden per response.)

All responses to this notice will be summarized and included in the request for OMB approval. All comments will also become a matter of public record.

Done in Washington, D.C., this 22nd day of December 2014. Kevin Shica, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 2014-30501 Filed 12-29-14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P

http://www.regulations.gov/#searchResults;rpp=25;po=0;se=Docke t%2520No.%2520APHIS-2014-0017;dp=true;en=true

http://www.ofr.gov/05/whitericeelgeycf6ms1pply7)/OPRUpload/OPRData/2014-30501_PI.pdf

http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006.4819068c8cb&disposition=attachment&contentTy pe=pdf

submit here;

http://www.regulations.gov/#isubmitComment;D=APHIS-2014-0107-0001
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singelhary Submission;

Greetings APHIS et al.,

I would kindly like to comment on the following docket;

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

My comment as follows;

This would be comical if not so serious, the USDA and the OIE shoved this BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR policy, the legal trading of mad cow type TSE prion disease around the globe, down the throats of every Country around the world, after that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USDA et al lost it’s BSE FREE gold card, then they went and changed science, and now APHIS/USDA et al are worried about getting BSE really $

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I don’t think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days), and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they don’t look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented, then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), CBBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atypical Ho type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast, sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD/TSE prion in the Cervid populations. In my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost it’s gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, that’s the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not, it’s all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE.
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for this very reason I believe the BSE MRK policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

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Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease, with the highest year confirming about 323 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2015, to a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BAV's or BARD's, a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper. Where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA, this is 10 years post feed ban. In my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

Country/Year

snip... please see:


2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST


Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meal and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE: 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997.976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm104445.htm

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION


Sunday, December 15, 2013

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

http://madcowusa.blogspot.com/2013/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html

Thursday, July 24, 2014

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2014/07/protocol-for-further-laboratory.html

*** Single copy reply, Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Single copy reply:
Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglass represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of Agriculture (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska ranches, cattle, and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as "Mad Cow Disease". Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his reports were fraudulent, and that he had fabricated the reports and feed samples he submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 3 years probation, a 3-year term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.


The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that one of the top USDA animal scientists for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated; Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to test the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

see:


CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory for Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05,...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
"Actually, Terry. I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found:

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain


IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason, and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scapie, and all strains of CWD, and human TSE, there from, spreading around the globe. I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS I said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call for this organization to be dissolved....

Monday, May 05, 2014

Member Country details for listing OIE CWD2013 against the criteria of Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2014/05/member-country-details-for-listing-oie.html

Friday, December 5, 2014

SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance worldwide

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/12/special-alert-oie-recommends.html

IN A NUT SHELL: (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006) 
1. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau.

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lagan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Hersog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Béringer,5 & Olivier Andréoleletti, Affiliations Contributions
Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications
Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published: 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions
Article metrics

Abstract

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human prion protein (IgHa) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of scrapie prions transmit to several IgHa mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

Subject terms: Biological sciences- Medical research At a glance

http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2014/141116/ncomms6821/full/ncomms6821.html

Suspect symptoms

What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?

28 Mar 01 Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singhorely thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners’ fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.

"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission’s medical research laboratory in Fontenay-sous-Bois, south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to travel back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...
Suspect symptoms

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28 Mar 01

Like lambs to the slaughter

31 March 2001

by Deborah MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.

FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

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Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.

Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.

As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.
The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys. 'You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie,' In the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were dissimilar.

But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. 'You would not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.

People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously deforms to produce sCJD.

But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as it is in vCJD. 'If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, 'that could mean they were caused by infection.'

There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US and a similar incidence elsewhere. Singularity and other US activists think that some of these people died after eating contaminated meat or 'nutritional' pills containing dried animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singularity if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.

Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16062840.300-like-lambs-to-the-slaughter.html

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $5.

A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

snip...

R. BRADLEY


1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

PMID: 6997404


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77) "the problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias".

Whether true or not, the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the scrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vaculation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v236/56344/abs/236073a0.html


Monday, December 1, 2014

Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review December 1, 2014

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2014/12/germany-bovine-spongiform.html

Friday, November 28, 2014

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE AKA MAD COW DISEASE PORTUGAL CONFIRMED


Sunday, October 5, 2014

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

http://transmissiblepongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/10/france-stops-bse-testing-for-mad-cow.html
Monday, May 5, 2014

Brazil BSE Mad Cow disease confirmed OFF 02/05/2014

http://boxingupr.blogspot.com/2014/05/brazil-bse-mad-cow-disease-confirmed.html

Sunday, December 28, 2014

*** Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014 ***


Wednesday, December 31, 2014

NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014


Sunday, December 28, 2014 CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISEASE USDA USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014


*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE mCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC ***

Sunday, November 23, 2014

*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient's infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.


Sunday, December 14, 2014

ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease mCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/12/alert-new-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)

TO: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html

Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website:


Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:


Tuesday, December 30, 2014

TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2014/12/tseac-usa-reason-for-recalls-blood.html

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM

Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 TSS SUBMISSION

snip...
ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BSE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep, all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.

These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the unknown theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species...

Terry S. Singelary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

snip... 48 pages...

http://www.regulations.gov/FRd劈gublic/ContentViewer?objectID=0900000638019413&disposition=attachment&contentTyp e=pdf

Wednesday, October 17, 2007

TSEAC MEETINGS

----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singelary Sr.

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM

Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSSSU/MISSION]November 29, 2006

Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,

a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all. I kindly wish to submit the following to the TSE Advisory Committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human plasma-derived antihemophilic factor (FVIII)
products manufactured from U.S. plasma donors and related communication material;

http://2257.a.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jna200661800/edocket_access.apo.gov/2006/F6-20251.htm

I see the media picked up on this as a 'low risk,' from what the gov. agency perceived to be to them;


However, I seem to disagree. From my primitive ciphering, I see it another way. This is a huge catastrophic risk. 3 in 160 is 1.9%, so call that 2% which is 1 in 50 or twenty per thousand or 20,000 per million. Also, what about the mixed genotypes/mixed susceptibility?

What about the silent carrier that donated tainted blood?

What about the sporadic CJDs of UNKNOWN strain or phenotype?

This risk assessment is just more BS to me. Just another in a long line of industry fed crap. I pray that my assessment is the one that is wrong, but it is THEY who roll the dice with your life. It is THEY who refuse to regulate an industry that has run amok, just from are call aspect of potentially tainted blood, and these are just recent recalls:

PRODUCT

Source Plasma, Recall # B-0054-TCODE Units: 03MMNC3465, 03MMNC3360, 03MMNC8801, 03MMNC310, 03MMNC7891, 03MMNC8252, 03MMNC8061, 03MMNC9144, 03MMNC1122, 03MMNC478, 03MMNC969, 03MMNC2359, 03MMNC2825, 03MMNC3011, 03MMNC7087, 03MMNC1988, 03MMNC8351, 03MMNC3290, 03MMNC8719, 03MMNC698, 03MMNC6683, 03MMNC1228, 03MMNC7950, 03MMNC821, 03MMNC8562, 03MMNC195, 03MMNC6683, 03MMNC3854, 03MMNC8397, 03MMNC1979, 03MMNC2644, 03MMNC6064, 03MMNC7707, 03MMNC8122, 03MMNC4750, 03MMNC5080, 03MMNC6756, 03MMNC6218, 03MMNC7557, 03MMNC8027, 03MMNC8645, 03MMNC6929, 03MMNC9641, 03MMNC979, 03MMNC491, 03MMNC0585, 03MMNC9537, 03MMNC1260, 04MMNA0351, 04MMNA0767, 04MMNA1241, 04MMNA1650, 04MMNA2911, 04MMNA2846, 04MMNA3340, 04MMNA3719, 04MMNA4312, 04MMNA4683, 04MMNA5298, 04MMNA5750, 04MMNA4407, 04MMNA6816, 04MMNA7482, 04MMNA7913, 04MMNA8632, 04MMNA9076, 04MMNA9723, 04MMNB0634, 04MMNB0696, 04MMNB1100, 04MMNB454, 04MMNB2285, 04MMNB935, 04MMNB4185, 04MMNB2115, 04MMNB4672, 04MMNB841, 04MMNB5652, 04MMNB1662, 04MMNB5930, 04MMNB8453, 04MMNB239, 04MMNB7477, 04MMNC0456, 04MMNC931, 04MMNC1578

RECALLING FIRM/ MANUFACTURER


Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

89 units

DISTRIBUTION

CA and Austria

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR October 25, 2006

***

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00975.html

SNIP...

Greetings again Dr. Freas et al at FDA,

WITH new atypical TSE in the bovine, in the sheep, goat, and humans, and the fact that the new BASE TSE in cattle being very very similar to sporadic CJD, rather than the nvCJD, the fact that now science showing the TSE agent of the atypical cattle in Japan showing infectivity other than CNS tissue, the fact that the latest Texas mad cow and the recent Alabama mad cow both being of the atypical strain, it would seem prudent to include all human TSE in the blood ban, in my opinion, with sporadic CJD, you have many strains and or phenotypes, some of which are 'UNKNOWN', so we do not know how this will transmit, what tissues are infectious and or if blood transmits; that's the bottom line, however it has been reported that the BASE is more virulent to humans. With this, and the fact that sporadic CJD has tripled in the past few years or so, I see it's being prudent to take serious and immediate action;


2001 Singeltary Submission to FDA on blood risk factors from TSE prion aka mad cow type disease

PDF JFreas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1, J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08, 2001 3:03 PM freas...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/368162_05.pdf

Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011

The risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease among UK patients with bleeding disorders, known to have received potentially contaminated plasma products


BSE INQUIRY DFA's

http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/

Sunday, May 18, 2008

BSE Inquiry DRAFT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DFA

BSE Inquiry DRAFT FACTUAL ACCOUNTS DFA's

http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/2008/05/bse-inquiry-draft-factual-account-dfa.html

Sunday, May 18, 2008

*** BSE, CJD, and Baby foods (the great debate 1999 to 2005)


Sunday, May 18, 2008

*** MAD COW DISEASE BSE CJD CHILDREN VACCINES


Sadly, HOW ALL THIS MAD COW MADNESS GOT STARTED, was importing and exporting these TSE mad cow type prions all over the globe. NOW, thanks to the CIE and the USDA inc. et al, they just made it all legal now $$$$  

UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion aka Mad Cow Disease
Subject: UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD

UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD


OTHERS

BEEF AND VEAL


LIVE CATTLE


FATS


EMBRYS


GELATIN ETC


SEmen
MEAT

when sound science was bought off by junk science, in regards to the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease, by the USDA, CIA, WHO, OIE, et al. $$$

when the infamous, and fraudulently USDA, FSIS, APHIS, FDA, gold card was taken away that infamous day in December of 2003, all cards were off the table, it was time to change the science, and change they did....tas

snip...please see full text;

Thursday, June 6, 2013

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013


Saturday, August 30, 2014

Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease


Friday, December 19, 2014

Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2014/12/rancho-alleged-cancerous-eyeball-case.html

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistrating Cows


seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER
COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens), these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD 777

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Westland/Hallmark 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT


DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE 777? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)


try this link ;

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2013/09/school-food-authorities-affected-by.html

Sunday, November 13, 2011

*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock


Thursday, February 13, 2014

HSUS VS USDA ET AL BAN DOWNER CALVES FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (*veal) and potential BSE risk factor there from

http://madcowsusa.blogspot.com/2014/02/hsus-vs-usda-et-al-ban-downer-calves.html

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE


Sunday, October 18, 2009

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009


Thursday, October 15, 2009


Thursday, June 26, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs


Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941.271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed


Saturday, April 5, 2008

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings


Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings


Friday, October 15, 2010

BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle


SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs


Thursday, May 30, 2013

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has upgraded the United States' risk classification for mad cow disease to "negligible" from "controlled", and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease

U.S. gets top mad-cow rating from international group and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease

http://madcowusa.blogspot.com/2013/05/world-organization-for-animal-health.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/05/statement-from-agriculture-secretary.html

Tuesday, July 2, 2013
APHIS USDA Administrator Message to Stakeholders: Agency Vision and Goals Eliminating ALL remaining BSE barriers to export market

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/07/aphis-usda-administrator-message-to.html

Monday, June 18, 2012

R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking "Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products"

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-submits-incomplete-comments.html

Tuesday, July 17, 2012


Thursday, December 20, 2012

OIE GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT SCRAPE PRION DISEASE BE DELISTED AND SAME OLD BSE WITH BOVINE MAD COW DISEASE

http://transmissiblespontaneousencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/12/oie-group-recommends-that-scrape-prion.html

Monday, November 30, 2009

*** USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE, DOES NOT SURPRISE ME ***


Saturday, July 6, 2013

*** Small Ruminant Nor98 Prions Share Biochemical Features with Human Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease and Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy

Research Article

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2013/07/small-ruminant-nor98-prions-share.html

Sunday, December 7, 2014
Scientific update on the potential for transmissibility of non-prion protein misfolding diseases PRIONOIDS

http://prionoid.blogspot.com/2014/12/scientific-update-on-potential-for.html

Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease

Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3, 2014

Singeltary comment:

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=82860

Saturday, December 13, 2014

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease


snip...

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/12/terry-s-singeltary-sr-publications-tse.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., at 9:39 AM

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