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businesses, housing, schools, and hospitals.

- (4) Any information regarding threats to the facility.
- (5) Other circumstances that indicate the potential risk of the receiver's facility does not warrant compliance with this section.
- (k) Terms used in this section. (1) As used in this section, a rail car is attended if an employee or authorized representative:
- (i) Is physically located on site in reasonable proximity to the rail car;
- (ii) Is capable of promptly responding to unauthorized access or activity at or near the rail car, including immediately contacting law enforcement or other authorities; and
- (iii) Immediately responds to any unauthorized access or activity at or near the rail car either personally or by contacting law enforcement or other authorities.
- (2) As used in this section, maintains positive control means that the rail hazardous materials receiver and the railroad carrier communicate and cooperate with each other to provide for the security of the rail car during the physical transfer of custody. Attending the rail car is a component part of maintaining positive control.
- (3) As used in this section, document the transfer means documentation uniquely identifying that the rail car was attended during the transfer of custody, including:
 - (i) Car initial and number.
- (ii) Identification of individuals who attended the transfer (names or uniquely identifying employee number).
 - (iii) Location of transfer.
- (iv) Date and time the transfer was completed.

[73 FR 72173, Nov. 26, 2008, as amended at 74 FR 23657, May 20, 2009]

§1580.109 Preemptive effect.

Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part preempts any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter, except an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order that is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local security hazard; that is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or

order of the United States Government; and that does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. For example, under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of §1580.107 of this subpart preempts any State or tribal law, rule, regulation, order or common law requirement covering the same subject matter.

§ 1580.111 Harmonization of federal regulation of nuclear facilities.

TSA will coordinate activities under this subpart with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) with respect to regulation of rail hazardous materials shippers and receivers that are also licensed or regulated by the NRC or DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to maintain consistency with the requirements imposed by the NRC and DOE.

Subpart C—Passenger Rail Including Passenger Railroad Carriers, Rail Transit Systems, Tourist, Scenic, Historic and Excursion Operators, and Private Cars

$\S 1580.200$ Applicability.

This subpart includes requirements for:

- (a) Each passenger railroad carrier, including each carrier operating light rail or heavy rail transit service on track that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, each carrier operating or providing intercity passenger train service or commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102), and each public authority operating passenger train service.
- (b) Each passenger railroad carrier hosting an operation described in paragraph (a) of this section.
- (c) Each tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion rail operator, whether operating on or off the general railroad system of transportation.
- (d) Each operator of private cars, including business/office cars and circus trains, on or connected to the general railroad system of transportation.
- (e) Each operator of a rail transit system that is not operating on track

that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, including heavy rail transit, light rail transit, automated guideway, cable car, inclined plane, funicular, and monorail systems.

§ 1580.201 Rail security coordinator.

- (a) Applicability. This section applies to:
- (1) Each passenger railroad carrier, including each carrier operating light rail or heavy rail transit service on track that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, each carrier operating or providing intercity passenger train service or commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102), and each public authority operating passenger train service.
- (2) Each passenger railroad carrier hosting an operation described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
- (3) Each operator of a rail transit system that is not operating on track that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, including heavy rail transit, light rail transit, automated guideway, cable car, inclined plane, funicular, and monorail systems.
- (4) Each operator of private cars, including business/office cars and circus trains, on or connected to the general railroad system of transportation, when notified by TSA, in writing, that a security threat exists concerning that operation.
- (5) Each tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on or off the general railroad system of transportation, when notified by TSA, in writing, that a security threat exists concerning that operation.
- (b) Each person described in paragraph (a) of this section must designate and use a primary and at least one alternate RSC.
- (c) The RSC and alternate(s) must be appointed at the corporate level.
- (d) Each passenger railroad carrier and rail transit system required to have an RSC must provide to TSA the names, titles, phone number(s), and email address(es) of the RSCs, and alternate RSCs, and must notify TSA within 7 calendar days when any of this information changes.

- (e) Each passenger railroad carrier and rail transit system required to have an RSC must ensure that at least one RSC:
- (1) Serves as the primary contact for intelligence information and security-related activities and communications with TSA. Any individual designated as an RSC may perform other duties in addition to those described in this section.
- (2) Is available to TSA on a 24-hours a day, 7 days a week basis.
- (3) Coordinate security practices and procedures with appropriate law enforcement and emergency response agencies.

§ 1580.203 Reporting significant security concerns.

- (a) Applicability. This section applies of:
- (1) Each passenger railroad carrier, including each carrier operating light rail or heavy rail transit service on track that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, each carrier operating or providing intercity passenger train service or commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102), and each public authority operating passenger train service.
- (2) Each passenger railroad carrier hosting an operation described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
- (3) Each tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion rail operator, whether operating on or off the general railroad system of transportation.
- (4) Each operator of private cars, including business/office cars and circus trains, on or connected to the general railroad system of transportation.
- (5) Each operator of a rail transit system that is not operating on track that is part of the general railroad system of transportation, including heavy rail transit, light rail transit, automated guideway, cable car, inclined plane, funicular, and monorail systems.
- (b) Each person described in paragraph (a) of this section must immediately report potential threats and significant security concerns to DHS by telephoning the Freedom Center at 1–866–615–5150.

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- (c) Potential threats or significant security concerns encompass incidents, suspicious activities, and threat information including, but not limited to, the following:
- (1) Interference with the train or transit vehicle crew.
- (2) Bomb threats, specific and non-specific.
- (3) Reports or discovery of suspicious items that result in the disruption of rail operations.
- (4) Suspicious activity occurring onboard a train or transit vehicle or inside the facility of a passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system that results in a disruption of rail operations.
- (5) Suspicious activity observed at or around rail cars or transit vehicles, facilities, or infrastructure used in the operation of the passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system.
- (6) Discharge, discovery, or seizure of a firearm or other deadly weapon on a train or transit vehicle or in a station, terminal, facility, or storage yard, or other location used in the operation of the passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system.
- (7) Indications of tampering with passenger rail cars or rail transit vehicles.
- (8) Information relating to the possible surveillance of a passenger train or rail transit vehicle or facility, storage yard, or other location used in the operation of the passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system.

- (9) Correspondence received by the passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system indicating a potential threat to rail transportation.
- (10) Other incidents involving breaches of the security of the passenger railroad carrier or the rail transit system operations or facilities.
- (d) Information reported should include, as available and applicable:
- (1) The name of the passenger railroad carrier or rail transit system and contact information, including a telephone number or e-mail address.
- (2) The affected station, terminal, or other facility.
- (3) Identifying information on the affected passenger train or rail transit vehicle including number, train or transit line, and route, as applicable.
- (4) Origination and termination locations for the affected passenger train or rail transit vehicle, including departure and destination city and the rail or transit line and route.
- (5) Current location of the affected passenger train or rail transit vehicle.
- (6) Description of the threat, incident, or activity.
- (7) The names and other available biographical data of individuals involved in the threat, incident, or activity.
- (8) The source of any threat information.

[73 FR 72173, Nov. 26, 2008, as amended at 74 FR 23657, May 20, 2009]

APPENDIX A TO PART 1580—HIGH THREAT URBAN AREAS (HTUAS)

| State | Candidate urban area | Geographic area captured in the data count | Previously des- ignated urban areas included |
|-------|---------------------------------|---|--|
| AZ | Phoenix Area* | Chandler, Gilbert, Glendale, Mesa, Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale, Tempe, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | Phoenix, AZ. |
| CA | Anaheim/Santa Ana Area. | Anaheim, Costa Mesa, Garden Grove, Fullerton, Huntington Beach, Irvine, Orange, Santa Ana, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | Anaheim, CA; Santa Ana, CA. |
| | Bay Area | Berkeley, Daly City, Fremont, Hayward, Oakland, Palo Alto, Richmond, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Clara, Sunnyvale, Vallejo, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Oakland, CA. |
| | Los Angeles/Long Beach Area. | Burbank, Glendale, Inglewood, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Santa Monica, Santa Clarita, Torrance, Simi Valley, Thousand Oaks, and a 10- mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | Los Angeles, CA; Long Beach, CA. |
| | Sacramento Area* | Elk Grove, Sacramento, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | Sacramento, CA. |
| | San Diego Area* | Chula Vista, Escondido, and San Diego, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | San Diego, CA. |
| CO | Denver Area | Arvada, Aurora, Denver, Lakewood, Westminster, Thornton, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | Denver, CO. |
| DC | National Capital Region. | National Capital Region and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area. | National Capital Region, DC. |