OVER-PROMISING AND UNDER-DELIVERING FOR HALF A CENTURY: CCS IS STILL A RISKY AND UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGY

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

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*This Geoengineering Map Update on **Carbon Capture and Storage** (or Carbon Capture and Sequestration or Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage) summarizes the latest developments on the Geoengineering Monitor Map, highlighting new trends for civil society and climate justice movements to follow in their efforts to oppose geoengineering experiments. The Map Update is also an opportunity to look at the full list of projects and developments used in this update. This update was researched and written by **Anja Chalmin**, and published with the support of the Climate Emergency Fund.*

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1. Critical updates on CCS

- **CCS is still far from being a viable climate solution:** Fossil fuel and other industries have been using CCS as a false solution for decades, delaying the real-time, long-term cuts, and fight failure rate associated with many CCS projects.
- **Flagship projects show that CCS is risky:** CCS is often presented as proven technology by referencing flagship projects, but the unforeseen problems and failures of these projects highlight serious uncertainties.
- **Larger CCS projects may cause larger problems:** Extensive research into numerous small-scale CCS projects has shown that subsurface conditions are unpredictable. It is therefore doubtful that CCS will remain effective and safely contained whenever it is injected into in larger CCS projects with significantly higher injection volumes.
- **Potential for 500 times more emissions a serious risk:** There is the potential for CCS injected into geological formations will remain there in the long term, and that CCS operations decreasing CO2 projects and claiming that it is safe are also **[creating large amounts of](https://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2020/06/over-promising-and-under-delivering-for-half-a-century-ccs-is-still-a-risky-and-unproven-technology/#methane)** methane, a potent GHG, from abandoned oil and gas wells.
- **Lack of clear responsibility for high follow-up costs:** A common theme in many recent CCS projects currently being planned is the lack of clarity over how CO_2 will be monitored, measured, and who will find the resources to pay for leaks and other problems.
- **Huge number of projects in the pipeline do not prove the efficacy of the technology:** Industry is deceptive. The fact that there are a number of planned CCS projects shows that CCS is a technology that governments and industry want to develop. However, it does not mean that it has been successful or that it has not been terminated and being ignored.
- **"30-year track record of ever-promising and under-delivering":** Despite the fact that research into CO_2 capture and CCS has been around for 50 and 40 years respectively, and the billions of taxpayers' money that has been invested in CCS, the technology has failed to live up to its promises. Only a handful of projects, a tenth of results. Out of this, emissions from fossil fuels reached a new record high in 2019, with CCS playing no visible role in mitigation efforts.
- **Public opposition is increasing:** Many of the CCS projects in the pipeline are currently being planned without any public consultation or participation, and within ignoring the additional emissions created by energy-intensive technologies. CCS projects also create more expensive to remove carbon from the atmosphere than to avoid emitting it in the first place.
- **CCS projects are often only implemented with additional revenue:** CCS projects are often only implemented by emission-intensive industries if they receive substantial taxpayer support, or additional commercial revenues from Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR).
- **No contribution to the UT target:** Many of the CCS projects that have been implemented around the world have been linked to Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) projects, and most have not yet received final investment decisions. In addition to the unproven effectiveness of CCS, the timing and scale of these projects mean that they cannot contribute to the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C target in any meaningful way.

2. Sleipner and Snøhvit CCS projects in Norway: Flagship CCS projects aren't proof of concept, they actually highlight serious uncertainties

Norway's Sleipner and Snøhvit CCS projects are repeatedly cited as proof that CCS is operating safely and viable in the long-term by oil and gas giants and lobbyists such as Gassnova, Equinor, Wintershall Dea, the Global CCS Institute(GCCSI), Greenpeace Peninsula, the Zero Emissions Platform, and Carbon Capture & Storage Europe.

Sleipner and Snøhvit are two of the longest-running CCS projects, and are examples of the uncertainties associated with underground CO_2 injection. This is highlighted by the numerous research projects that have been set up to monitor the behaviour of CO_2 lifetimes, which has included EU-funded research projects such as QICS&RocMe, CO2STORE, ECO2, SACS, and SACS2. They are also

The large amounts extracted from some of Sleipner's gas fields is not replenished due to its high CO_2 content, so the Sleipner CO2 project separates CO_2 from it. The captured CO_2 is then injected into the offshore Utsira geological formation in the North Sea. The large scale, unplanned and unexpected movements of injected CO_2 have been observed from the beginning of the project, and the Utsira formation is not the "perfect" storage location into the Utsira formation has also resulted in unexpected events in the form of earthquakes and oil spills. A gas leak at Equinor's Sleipner field in 2022 is another indication of the unpredictability of subsurface conditions, and further proves that even in the most secure or relatively small-scale CCS projects where the injection reservoir has been extensively researched and explored.

Due to unforeseen problems, Equinor's Snøhvit CCS project has had to shift CO_2 injection wells at three locations in the Stø formation it had instead of just one. Initially the Tubåen sandstone formation was chosen as the injection site, while predicted lifetime of 2,600 years. However, Equinor has had to shift its injection site to the Stø formation pressure in the reservoir quickly rose to its maximum, much faster and higher than had been predicted. The second injection site was in the Stø formation, which turned out to be "tighter" than expected, and Equinor had to drill a third well in the Stø formation to maintain its injection rate. As a result, Equinor had to shut injection wells, and now injects into the Stø formation but closer to the Snøhvit gas platform. Equinor injected still 225 million m3 into the Utsira CO_2 injection well and new production wells, but in 2022 it cancelled plans to scale up the Snøhvit CCS project.

3. CarbonNet in Australia: Can large-scale CCS projects ensure long-term and safe CO_2 injection?

The publicly funded CarbonNet CCS project aims to develop a "commercial-scale" CCS network in the Gippsland region of Victoria, north-east Australia. The project includes the [CCS](https://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2020/06/over-promising-and-under-delivering-for-half-a-century-ccs-is-still-a-risky-and-unproven-technology/#ccs) pipelines, and the captured CO_2 will be transported to KEA 1 or Tuna 2 over-the-ocean platform from the [storage](https://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2020/06/over-promising-and-under-delivering-for-half-a-century-ccs-is-still-a-risky-and-unproven-technology/#storage) sites. From there it will be piped offshore to the Gippsland Basin in the Bass Strait for injection into the Paaratte formation and Latrobe Group saline aquifers. The Paaratte formation and Tuna 2 well are 2,500 m, a double earlier than originally planned. The recommended decision for the CCS project was due in 2015, but has now been delayed to 2024.

CarbonNet is just one example of many projects that aim to capture large volumes of CO_2 from industrial sources and inject it into saline aquifers, and the project is similar to earlier research and development projects that have been set up in search of a site for nonwood action in the event of leakages and other problems that could occur. CarbonNet's predecessor, the Otway project, is a research project that has conducted small-scale CCS projects make it doubtful that safe and effective large-scale CCS projects ensured in much larger CCS projects, such as CarbonNet's. The project is also one of several examples that presents CCS as a working technology simply by listing other ongoing and planned CCS projects, which projects have been developed or have been cancelled or previously terminated (or similar).

4. Public subsidies and EOR: Emission-intensive industries usually only undertake CCS projects when they can expect substantial taxpayer support or additional commercial revenues

The Porthos CO2 project aims to capture CO_2 in the Rotterdam port area in the Netherlands, compress it, and then pipe it for injection into the depleted North Sea P18 gas fields. In 2021, Porthos plans CO_2 transport and storage contracts with companies such as Air Products, ExxonMobil, and Shell. The four companies are expected to capture a total of 2.5 million tonnes of CO_2, annually from their industrial sites in the Rotterdam area by mid-2026. 75 % of the Port of Rotterdam's emissions. The project will be partly financed by 2.5 million tonnes of CO_2, equivalent to almost 5 % of the Netherlands' emissions.

Although the Porthos project will only capture a small fraction of the port's total emissions, it is expected to receive €2.5 billion in EU funds. The Porthos project alone has also received more than € 300 million in it. On top of this, two other CCS projects at the Port of Rotterdam have already been awarded €1 billion in EU funds. The Rotterdam CO2 Transportation Project (ROAD) was awarded in 2017 despite having received more than € 250 million in public funding, and the Rotterdam Climate Initiative was awarded in 2018.

The Ferrybridge CCS project is located at MRI Energy Park, a former coal and coal-fired power plant near Knottingley, West Yorkshire. It is one of the five most polluting power plants in the UK, and was closed down in March 2016. The Ferrybridge CCS project is part of the Yorkshire and Humber cluster, and is used for EOR. It was awarded £ 1 billion in 2015, after three and a half years of operation, due to low oil prices and technical problems. An investment decision according to press reports, the CCS project will not operate for a third of the time that the project was running for, and only captured 1 % of the plant's emissions.

In 2022, NRG sold its stake in the Petra Nova CCS project to JX Nippon for $81.5 million – a fraction of the project's estimated cost of $1 billion. JX Nippon received tax credits of $ 220 million in 2020, and will receive $ 2.3 billion in tax advantage of the fact that, according to the Financial Times, "the project will be profitable". The Petra Nova CCS project, which subsidises CCS projects, had more than US$ 30 to US$ 80 per tonne of CO_2 captured, and the price of oil had almost doubled in the same time. The institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) has described the project as a failure and an unsuccessful experiment for a wide array of economic reasons, and the project's parent company should" Stop taking U. S. taxpayers for a ride on a CO money gravitas [...] the U.S. government must sharply scrutinize all claims made by applicants for billions of dollars in promote CO technology".

The second industrial-scale CCS project linked to EOR is set to take place at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd's Kayali refinery in the state of Gujarat, in India. The project aims to capture CO_2 at the refinery and transport it around 70 km to the Kayali oil field, where it will be used to boost oil production from ageing reservoirs. The Global CCS Institute's Public Sector Funding Expense in 2021 to jointly explore further CCS/EOR opportunities in India.

5. ADNOC in the United Arab Emirates: Is CCS really a climate solution if only a fraction of emissions are captured, and the captured CO_2 is used to increase oil production?

The world's largest oil and gas producers, and is wholly owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi. ADNOC is also one of the world's largest emitters of carbon, barrel of oil, but it only takes responsibility for emissions relating to the combustion of fossil fuels (Scope 1 & 2 emissions). It does not include the amount of CO_2 emitted when oil is refined, or when it is burned by consumers (Scope 3 emissions). Scope 3 emissions are responsible for around 85 % of the total emissions of oil and gas companies, which is 48 million tonnes in 2020. Besides CCS, ADNOC's other plans to reduce emissions account for approximately 10 % of the total GHG emissions they are responsible for.

In 2022, ADNOC produced approximately 951 million barrels of oil and 65 billion cubic metres of gas, and the company plans significant increases in its production. Recent estimates show that ADNOC is expected to increase oil from 3 billion barrels of oil and nearly 90 billion cubic metres of gas by 2030, resulting in an increase in annual CO_2 emissions of more than 40 %. 5 to 60% million tonnes.

ADNOC's website touts CCS as an effective climate change mitigation measure, but fails to mention that its only CCS project is one of the five most polluting power plants in the UK. The project is operated by Al Yasedah CCS project at Emirates Steel Industries' iron and steel plant in Mussafah. UAE, since 2016 and, according to the company, is the "first commercial CCS project in the Middle East". In 2019, the Al Reyadah CCS project and is complemented plans to ADNOC's mature onshore Rumaitha and Shah oil fields, which is used to extract hard-to-reach oil reserves. Although the Al Reyadah CCS project is the only CCS project in the UAE, it captures only a small fraction of the plant's emissions. In 2022, ADNOC is planning further CCS projects, including the Dalma CCS project, which will be the first offshore CCS project in the UAE, and the second CCS project in the UAE in total. The Fujairah CCS project, which is a partnership with Dnata company in 2021, aims to reduce emissions of CO_2 by 60% million tonnes.

The Al Reyadah CCS project is located at MBR Energy Park, a former coal and coal-fired power plant near Knottingley, West Yorkshire. It is one of the five most polluting power plants in the UK, and was closed down in March 2016. The Ferrybridge CCS project is part of the Yorkshire and Humber cluster, and is used for EOR. It was awarded £ 1 billion in 2015, after three and a half years of operation, due to low oil prices and technical problems. According to press reports, the CCS project will not operate for a third of the time that the project was running for, and only captured 1 % of the plant's emissions.

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6. Holcim's global investments in CCS: Cement and construction industries are next in line for receiving major public finance for CCS projects

The Holcim Group is the world's largest producer of cement and building materials and is headquartered in Zug, Switzerland. According to the University of Massachusetts Amherst's [PERI Greenhouse Gas Pollution Index](https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1252-political-economy-research-institute-releases-2019-greenhouse-gas-pollution-index), Holcim was 147 out of the 100 big fossil fuel companies worldwide. According to its 2020 Sustainability Report, Holcim's cement production was responsible for around 4% of global CO_2 emissions in the previous year.

The Geoengineering Map feature around 20 projects involving Holcim, including Holcim's CCS projects in Norway, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, and the Global Cement and Concrete Association's (GCCA) net-zero concrete roadmap. In addition to achieving this, Holcim also describes itself as being "at the forefront of Europe's decarbonization agenda," CCUS projects around the world" but is also one of the only conducted small-scale CCS capture trials on three sites. Further still, one of the major cement and construction companies in the GCCA, which is one of the major cement plants increases overall operational costs by around 30 %, and energy consumption. This casts serious doubts over the commercial viability of CCS in the sector.

Holcim has committed to investing € 31.9 billion in CCUS projects worldwide by 2030, but no final investment decisions have yet been made for its planned CCS projects, and how the projects will be financed has not yet been disclosed. For example, Holcim has said that it will invest € 4.5 billion in its Lägerdorf cement plant in Germany, and Kujawy cement plant in Poland will cost € 3 billion and € 1.7 billion respectively. It therefore very likely that, with a total budget of € 31.9 billion, Holcim will be looking for large amounts of public finance in order to implement future projects.

The Holcim Group is also a responsible example of a company investing in CCS - it claims that the technology works at scale, proved to be technically and economically viable, and is involved in six net-capture significant amounts of CO_2. Most of the projects are in the planning stages, and only one project has been [operational](https://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2020/06/over-promising-and-under-delivering-for-half-a-century-ccs-is-still-a-risky-and-unproven-technology/#operational) since 2015. Holcim's CCS projects are being tested as large-scale, commercially viable projects, but have