EPA hearing Page: 1 (1 - 4)

EP	A hearing		Page: 1 (1 - 4)
	UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY	1	PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):
		2	Speakers:
		3	YVETTE ARELIANO Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Services
		5	STEVE ARENDT ABS Group
		6	JORDAN BARAB Confined Space
	PUBLIC HEARING PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE	8	ALANA BYRD BlueGreen Alliance
	RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (RMP) RULE	9	RHETT CASH American Coatings Association
		10 11	RON CHITTIM American Petroleum Institute
		12	
		13	KATHY CURTIS
		14	-
		16	League of Conservation Voters
		17	OCTAVIA DRYDEN Delaware Concerned Residents for Environmental Justice
		18 19	KEN DRYDEN Minority Workforce Development Coalition
		20	BILL ERNY ACC
	Washington, D.C.	21	TIMOTHY GABLEHOUSE
	Thursday, June 14, 2018	22	
<u> </u>		L	Page 3
1	PARTICIPANTS:	l	PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):
	Panel 1:	2	Agricultural Retailers Association
3	JIM BELKE, Chair	3	STEWART HOLM American Forest and Paper Association
5	JON AVERBACK CRAIG HAAS	5	BANI HUDSON-HINES
1	Panel 2:	۱	REACT
7		7	CHARISE JOHNSON Union of Concerned Scientists
8	VANESSA PRINCIPE	8	JESSE MARQUEZ Coalition for a Safe Environment
9	JON AVERBACK	9	MILDRED McCLAIN
	Panel 3:	10	Harambee House
11 12	O DIN REGIVIT, CHAIL	11	LAURA MIRMAN-HESLIN New York State Office of the Attorney General
13	THE CHINESTON	13	MALIN MOENCH
	Panel 4:	14	MAYA NYE
15		15	People Concerned About Chemical Safety/Ohio
16		16	PATRICK O'CONNOR International Warehouse Logistics Association
17	JON AVERBACK	17	PAUL ORUM Self
18	Panel 5:	18	MICHAEL OVERTON
19	KATHY FRANKLIN, Chair	19	I .
20	JON AVERBACK	20	RICHARD PAVLAK Chemical Society Advocacy Group
21	THE CHIVINGS	21	LOWELL RANDEL
22		22	
1	Page 2	I	Page 4

EPA hearing Page: 2 (5 - 8)

comments on EPA's proposed reconsideration of PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D): MICHELE ROBERTS 2 amendments made to the Risk Management Program Environmental Justice Health Alliance for regulations. The RMP amendments were published in 3 Chemical Policy Reform 3 Federal Register registered on January 13th of ALEXANDRA M. ROMERO 4 4 Arent Fox, LLP 2017. The effective date of the amendments was 5 5 NICKY SHEATS delayed until February 19th of 2019, in order to NJ Environmental Justice Alliance 6 6 conduct a reconsideration proceeding. EPA is GORDON SOMMERS Earthjustice reconsidering the amendments in response to three 8 8 ELIZABETH SPIKE reconsideration petitions and also to consider 9 Resident of Houston, Texas 9 further regulatory action and other matters that 10 LARA SWETT 10 AFPM EPA believes will benefit from additional public 11 11 EAN TAFOYA comments. 12 Colorado Latino Forum 12 13 STEPHANIE THOMAS 13 On May 30, 2018, so just about two weeks Public Citizen ago, EPA published a notice to proposal rule 14 14 JAKE TYNER 15 U.S. Chamber of Commerce 15 making, which proposes changes to the final amendments. The proposed changes include 16 MICHAEL WILSON 16 BlueGreen Alliance rescinding some of the new provisions contained in 17 17 SAY YANG the amendments rules and retaining others with Center for Earth, Energy and Democracy 18 18 proposed modifications, provisions of the 19 19 amendments that would be rescinded under EPA's 20 current proposal include provisions for a 21 2.2 third-party audits, safer technologies, and Page 7 Page 5 PROCEEDINGS 1 alternatives analysis, instant investigation and (9:00 a.m.) root cause analysis, public information 2 MR. BELKE: Good Morning everyone. availability, and certain other minor changes. 3 3 4 are going to start the hearing now. Good Morning 4 Provisions of the amendments that would and welcome to the Public Hearing and EPA's be retained with modifications include: enhanced 5 5 proposal to reconsider the risk management program local emergency coordination provisions, emergency 6 6 amendments. My name is Jim Balke. I am a response exercise provisions, provisions for the 7 chemical engineer with EPA's Office of Emergency public meetings after accidents, and a few other 8 8 Management and I will be the Panel Chair for this 9 minor technical corrections. At this time, EPA is 9 first session of the public hearing. Thank you seeking comments on the proposed reconsideration 10 10 for being here today. 11 11 rule. Joining me on the panel this morning, to 12 Before we get started with hearing my left is Jon Averback, he is a senior attorney 13 testimony, I would like to go through some 13 with EPA's Office of General Counsel, Craig Haas house-keeping items and ground rules that will 14 14 to my right is an Environmental scientist with help make today's hearing run smoothly. 15 15 EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance First, please be sure that you have 16 16 Insurance. To his right, is Margaret Gerardin. checked in at the Registration Desk, even if you 17 Margaret is an Environmental Protection Specialist 18 are not planning to speak today, and if you did 19 with EPA's Office of Emergency Management and will 19 pre-register to speak but didn't sign in when you also service the time keeper for this session of 20 20 arrived, please do step out to the Registration 21 the Public Hearing. Desk, so that we can assign you a specific 2.1 22 We are here today to listen to your 22 speaking time. Page 6 Page 8 EPA hearing Page: 3 (9 - 12)

Page 9

If you remember the news media, there is 2 a separate Registration Desk in the vestibule that you should register at, and speaking of the news 4 media, for everyone's awareness, this hearing is open to the press and we do have members of the media present with us today. This event is open 6 to any form of recording, video, audio, photos. 8 For the members of the media, we ask that you not cause any disruption to those testifying or observing the hearing today. Please refrain from 10 interviewing in the public hearing area. If you 11 need interview space, please check in with our 12 13 press contacts on the vestibule and they'll provide you with a suitable area. 14

For people here to present testimony, it's up to you, whether or not, you want to be interviewed by a member of the press and we ask that the media members here today, please respect each individuals wishes on that subject.

15

16

17

18

19

20

1

3

4

5

9

11

13

I will call up speakers, generally two 21 at a time. When your name is called, please come 22 to the speaker's table at the front of the room

spoken for five minutes and it's time to stop.

We are here to listen to you today. We won't engage in discussion or debate about your 3 4 comments. However, a panel member may ask you 5 questions to clarify your testimony. If you have brought a written comment, a copy of your 6 comments, please give that to the staff at the 7 Registration Desk before you leave today and we 8 will enter any written comments into the public 9 10 docket for the proposed rule.

We also have comment forms available at 11 12 the Registration Desk if you would like to submit 13 written comments today. If you want to submit 14 written comments after today's hearing, 15 instructions for submitting those comments are also available at the Registration Desk. Comments 16 must be received by July 30th of this year. Even 17 if you are speaking today, you can still submit 18 additional public comments to the docket after 19 your testimony today, as long as they are received 21 by the public comment period deadline, and your comments will be considered. 22

Page 11

and I would just caution you, when you are approaching the podium that there is some steps to get over and there is a cover over some wires that could create a tripping hazard. So just be cautious when you are stepping onto the podium.

If I call two people to the speaker's 7 table, those speakers should stay at the table 8 until each has given comments, and I will then call the next two speakers and so on. When I call 10 you to speak, please state your name and spell it for the court reporter. Your comments will be transcribed and included in the record of comments on the proposed rule.

Each speakers will have five minutes to 14 give comments. We have a timer, with lights to 15 help you know how much time you have left to 16 speak. The way the timer works, when you start 17 speaking, your time begins and you will see a 19 green light. The light turns from green to yellow 20 after four minutes - that means you have one 21 minute left. And then when the light turns from 22 yellow to red, that's the signal that you have

Restrooms are available down the hallway 1 outside the hearing room. We are in a federal 2 building and therefore you need to be escorted to 3 4 those areas, and we have escorts out in the front that will help you with that. In the event of an 5 emergency or a fire drill, please exit the hearing 7 room, turn left, walk towards the main entrance, 8 walk outside, and move to a safe distance, and 9 then await further instructions. And then if you 10 have questions during the day, please see the staff at the Registration Desk and somebody will 11 12 assist you.

Again, thank you for taking your time 14 today to share your comments on EPA's proposal and let's get started. So our first two speakers are Jordan Barab and Lara Swett. And Jordan, you can go first.

MR. BARAB: Okay. My name is Jordan 19 Barab and the last name is B-A-R-A-B. From 2009 20 to 2017, I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor 21 for OSHA. I also worked for four years at the 22 Chemical Safety Board. I am testifying today in Page 12

Page 10

13

16

17

EPA hearing Page: 4 (13 - 16)

3

4

5

6

14

16

17

18

19

21

8

15

16

17

19

strong opposition to the proposed Risk Management program reconsideration rule.

3

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

1

3

4

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

2.1

22

Repeal of the 2017 rule of weakened 4 protections for emergency responders, chemical plant workers, and millions of people living in the vicinity of chemical plants. I am going to 6 oppose to all the provisions weakened in this proposal. I will focus my comments on the unsubstantiated allegations of the fire at the West Fertilizer plant which was deliberately set 10 and how those allegations effect this proposal.

The tragic facts of the West Fertilizer explosion are well known, so I won't go into them 14 here except to note that twelve of the fifteen people killed in that explosion were emergency responders. In May 2016, the BATF shocked the country by announcing that they had determined that the fire that led to the explosion was deliberately set and was a criminal act. EPA used these findings as one justification for repealing the 2017 regulation.

There were several problems with the

Page 13

BATF finding. The first of which is that they used negative corpus. The only evidence presented in the past two years of the fire at the West Fertilizer Plant that it was a criminal act, came from a short press conference BATF held in Texas. 6 The ATF never stated that they had evidence that 7 the fire was started intentionally. They stated only that 'we have eliminated all the reasonable accidental and natural causes and that includes smoking'. 'We came to the conclusion after we ruled out all reasonable accidental and natural causes', and several other quotes in that nature.

I understand that the proposal states that the BATF told EPA that did not rely on negative corpus but the BATF's explanation of their conclusion is a text book definition of negative corpus. The process of the National Fire 18 Protection Association has declared to be 'not consistent with the scientific method 20 inappropriate and should not be used'. Given these facts, I strongly question the EPA's

decision to 'defer' to the BATF's expertise.

Even if the fire was started 2 intentionally, the catastrophic explosion was caused by improper management of hazardous materials. Ultimately, for the purposes of chemical plant safety, it doesn't matter what or who started the fire, the problem is not the ignition source or even the fire itself. Ignition sources are notoriously difficult to identify 9 after a catastrophic explosion because there are 10 often lots of possibilities and the evidence may 11 have been destroyed. But fires don't lead to catastrophic explosions unless the fuel is present 12 13 and in this case, improperly stored or contained.

The Chemical Safety Board found that if 15 the ammonium nitrate of the West Fertilizer Plant had been stored in metal instead of wooden bins, and if contaminants like nearby seeds had not been stored nearby, the fire likely would have burnt itself out, without causing the ammonium nitrate to detonate. In addition, the presence of sprinklers could have controlled the fire. If the ammonium nitrate or any hazardous chemical is 22

Page 15

properly stored and handled, you don't have to worry much about fires and the ignition sources. Proper storage and management of flammable and 3 4 explosive materials is the difference between a fire that makes the front page of the West Texas 5 6 News and a catastrophic explosion that makes the 7 front page of every newspaper in the world.

Even if the fire was started 9 intentionally, that had no effect on the lack of 10 training and communication, lack of knowledge about the materials stored in the plant that led 12 to the death of the responders. Note that there 13 were houses, schools, apartment buildings, and 14 nursing homes located too close to the plant. The only conclusion therefore is that the BATF's questionable finding, even in the unlikely event that it's true, should have no relevance on the 18 fate of this regulation, nor should it inform this deliberations in any way.

Finally in response to the specific 20 21 questions asked in this proposal, namely, does the 22 BATF finding provide additional justification for Page 16

EPA hearing Page: 5 (17 - 20)

5

6

7

12

13

15

EPA rescinding the STAA, third- party audit incident investigation and information availability provisions? The BATF finding, if 3 true, should make STAA, third-party audits at 4 incident investigations and information availability even more important. Regarding STAA, 6 if we assume the fire was intentionally started by a terrorist, that should strengthen the need to reduce the amount of how we have these hazardous materials and chemical facilities so as to reduce 10 the target that might attract terrorist. 11 Enhanced incident investigations and 12

third-party audits would help discover the root causes of these incidents and prevent future incidents and more information available to emergency responders in the public might have saved the lives lost. Look at this in reverse, none of these provisions would have made it more likely for someone to intentionally start a fire in such facility but would have significantly contributed to reducing the impact of that fire.

To the EPA's proposed changes to the

Page 17

emergency response coordination provisions, preserve the agency's goal of a better

coordination between facility staff and local

emergency responders. It was precisely the lack

5 of coordination between facility staff and local

6 emergency responders that caused thirteen

7 unnecessary deaths. Does the BATF's finding is of

8 any significance for EPA's proposed revisions of

9 the emergency exercise, provisions of alternative

bear decision? Again, the BATF finding, if true, 10

makes emergency response exercise provisions even

12 more important.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

1

3

4

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

In conclusion, the BATF finding with the fire was started intentionally is most likely not accurate. Even if it were accurate, it should neither have been used as an excuse to reopen this rule-making, nor as an excuse to weaken any of the

18 provisions of January 2017 regulation. Thank you. MR. BELKE: Thank you. Jordan, just one 20 clarifying question. You said, I think at the 21 beginning that you opposed all provisions that we

22 are proposing in that rule including -- I mean we

Page 18

are proposing to retain the emergency coordination and exercise provisions.

MR. BARAB: I am sorry. There is a lot 3 4 of echo in here. I didn't quite --

MR. BELKE: I thought at the beginning of your testimony, you said that you opposed all the provisions of the proposal.

8 MR. BARAB: All the weakening 9 provisions.

MR. BELKE: All the weakening -- okay. 10 Understood. Thank you. Okay. Lara. 11

MS. SWETT: Thanks. My name is Lara Swett, S-W-E-T- T and I am a Senior Director of the Health and Safety for the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturer's Association.

AFPM is a trade association whose 16 members encompass virtually all US refining and 17 petrochemical manufacturing capacity. Our members 18 work in environments that involve both complex 19 equipment and hazardous materials that are subject to EPA's Risk Management Program and OSHA's 22 Process Safety Management Regulations both of

Page 19

Page 20

which have overlapping program elements. members invest significant resources in our people, equipment, procedures, and management 3 systems to drive continuous improvements in our process safety performance that goes above and 5 beyond basic compliance with the process safety elements of RMP and PSM regulations. This is 8 essential to the safety of our employees, 9 facilities, and communities in which we operate. 10 We support EPA's newly proposed rule to enhance an 11 already effective Risk Management Program

RMP and PSM are regulations that have 14 proven track records of ensuring safety and driving continuous improvement. Let me emphasize that the existing program is not static. This performance standard requires facilities to 18 continually examine their processes, identify 19 means to reduce risks, and then, audit those 20 processes to ensure they are working as intended.

EPA has owned and confirmed that 21 22 correctly implemented Risk Management Programs

12 Regulation.

13

16

EPA hearing Page: 6 (21 - 24)

5

6

16

17

18

19

have been effective in identifying and reducing risks and improving offsite impacts. In fact, between 2004 and 2017, the number of RMP 3 recordable events has been halved. 4

AFPM supports EPA's proposal by proven 5 improving elements of the 1996 rule resulting in 6 improved safety and emergency response. These proposed changes will improve EPA regulations of 8 offsite issues to complement OSHA's regulations on onsite worker safety. Additionally, these 10 provisions will allow EPA to avoid security 11 vulnerabilities and bring clarity to the regulated 12 13 community, the public, and emergency response personnel. The proposal will lead to consistent 14 compliance requirements across regulatory agencies 15 and harmonized record- keeping environments 16 between the RNP and PSM regulations. 17

Finally, EPA's proposal will allow it to appropriately balance the need to provide emergency responders and the surrounding community with useful information in the event of an emergency while reducing the risk of highly

Page 21

sensitive information reaching bad actors. Increasing the security of workers, local communities, and the general public.

18

19

21

2.2

1

3

4

11

13

EPA's action with respect to the RNP don't exist in a vacuum. As I mentioned, OSHO's 6 Process Safety Management Regulations mirror RNP's 7 program three Prevention Program elements. 8 Congress designed the RNP to follow the OSHA's 9 process. EPA's proposal to remove requirements redundant with other federal regulations will 10 promote industry compliance, conserve federal and state resources, and help first responders focus on the information relevant to emergency response.

Expansive redundant reporting 14 requirements that go beyond the information 15 necessary to respond to emergency pose dangerous 16 risks that essential information will be lost or missed when it is needed most benefiting no one. 18 19 AFPM's members continue to invest in these 20 important goals and appreciates EPA holding a public hearing on this important issues. We all 2.1 address these issues in greater detail in our 22

written comments. 1

2 MR. BELKE: Thank you. Any questions? Okay. Thank you. The next two speakers will be 3 4 Tim Gablehouse and Ron Chittim.

Tim, you can go first. Go on.

MR. GABLEHOUSE: Thank you. My name is 7 Tim Gablehouse. I am here on behalf today of the National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials known affectionately as NASTTPO. It is 9 10 an organization of local Emergency Planning Committees and State Emergency Response 11 Commission. I sit on the State Emergency Response 12 13 Commission for the state of Colorado. I chair local Emergency Planning Committee in the west metro area of Denver. 15

Within the planning district of that LAPC are several facilities currently subjected to RMP, several facilities currently subjected to the chemical facility anti-terrorism standards of 20 Homeland Security as well. And the LAPC works in cooperation with all of those facilities as well 22 as the 26 various response organizations within Page 23

Page 24

that area, some of which are large paid departments and many of which are volunteer organizations. 3

4 Primary point I want to make today has to be with the ability of the LAPC's response 5 6 organizations to request information from 7 reporting facilities. That is a critical feature 8 of the RMP rule. At a minimum, we would ask EPA 9 to adopt the alternative language as is proposed 10 about the authority of LAPC's response organizations to request information. To a very 11 12 substantial degree, we believe that many of the security concerns raised by some of the 13 14 (commoners) are not very appropriate to the circumstance. LAPC and the first responders care 15 little about employee betting procedures. They 16 care little about locks and doors except to the 17 extent that the first responders can actually 18 safely get out of that facility if something is 19 20 going south during response. But the bigger problem has to do with 21

22 the mission of the local Emergency Planning

EPA hearing Page: 7 (25 - 28)

18

19

21

22

Page 25

Committees. They are very much trying to do whole of community preparedness planning consistent with FEMA's document called Community Preparedness 3 4 Guide 101. In other words, the entire community is responsible for preparedness to deal with 5 incidents. That means the entire community needs 6 to understand the capabilities, and more importantly, they need to understand the risks that are present in the community and the implications of those risks to the ability of the 10 community to prepare itself. 11

12

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

21

It is important to have a perspective a 13 little beyond the idea of simply response only. The problem does not begin at the 911 call. The success of a response requires preplanning. The success of a response and the ability of the responders to come home safely, and the ability to minimize the impact of an incident on the community at large depends on the ability to prepare and preplan. That requires close cooperation between facilities of all (strikes) and the community planners. One size does not fit 22

all. Every community is a bit different whether they are rural and small, whether they are highly urbanized and industrial.

Because the capabilities vary, the tasks of an LAPC is to try to fill those capability 6 gaps. Those capability gaps cannot get filled on 7 the backs of the First Response Agency. They cannot get filled on the backs of the facilities that bring hazardous materials to the community. It is a community-wide problem. And if you do not have fulsome conversations occurring between facilities, responders, and planners, then you cannot possibly do adequate preparedness.

Many LAPCs have chairs and members that have confidential vulnerability information, verifications from the CFATS programs. There is no incident of which I am aware of in which LAPC or First Response Agency has improperly released 18 information obtained under the Chemical Facility 20 Anti-Terrorism Program.

Likewise, vast bulk of RMP facilities 22 are subject to EPCRA, a special provision

recording (303D), three of the statute to request 2 information relevant. To emergency planning, I have no information that there has ever been an 3 improper release of information by an LAPC 4 5 requesting information under that provision. In fact, most facilities cooperate readily with LAPCs 6 and first responders. Quite honestly, I do not understand the hesitancy to promote that kind of 8 9 cooperation.

We will submit other written comments 10 covering a variety of other issues but I wanted to 11 12 be clear today that primary point is you need to 13 specify the information requesting authority of the LAPCs and responders and to the minimum, the 15 proposed alternative languages necessary. The other provisions of Section 93 are inadequate. 16 17 Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Thanks. Did your comment on the proposed alternative language for 6893 also pertain to this similar alternative language we proposed for the public meeting provision?

MR. GABLEHOUSE: Yes.

Page 27

Page 28

MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Any other questions for Tim? Okay, Ron. 2 MR. CHITTIM: Good morning. My name is 3

4 Ron Chittim, C-H-I-T-I-M as in Mary. I am the Manager of the Refining Program at the American 5 6 Petroleum Institute. API represents 620 oil and 7 natural gas companies, leaders of the technology-driven industry that supplies most of 8 9 America's energy, supports 10.3 million US jobs, 10 and is backed by a Growing Grassroots Movement of more than 45 million Americans. API members are significantly impacted by the RMP regulations and I will cover some of the highlights this morning. 13

In 2013, the citizens of West Texas lost family members, neighbors, and friends to an explosion of an ammonium nitrate storage facility. In response, President Obama issued an executive order requiring federal agencies including EPA to investigate means for improving chemical 20 facilities safety and security. Soon thereafter, 21 EPA advanced a set of regulatory provisions that 22 were not responsive to the West Texas tragedy. In

Page 26

14

15

16

17

18

EPA hearing Page: 8 (29 - 32)

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

12

Page 29

an effort to finalize the new RMP rules, before a change in administration, EPA failed to contemplate all the implications and the 3 underlying consequences of the final rule being 4 now considered. 5

6

10

11

12 13

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

API supports and thanks EPA for re-examining the impractical modifications of the 8 RMP rule adopted under the prior administration. I will now provide some examples of such modifications and why API supports the current EPA proposals.

The provisions requiring safer technology and alternatives analysis by a process hazard team would have imposed a big and significant burden on a facility to demonstrate that it has identified and considered alternatives in the absence of any findings by EPA that the site has not adequately managed the existing risks. The alternatives analysis requirement would have also distracted the PHA team from identifying and addressing potential hazards of existing processes. Furthermore, the requirement 2.2

would have placed the burden of assessing alternative technologies on individuals who are not necessarily experts on the operability and 4 hazards of those alternative technologies. 5 Thankfully, the current EPA proposal rescinds the 2017 requirements.

6 In another example, compliance audits would have suffered as a result of the 2017 final rule. API believes that while the third party compliance audits maybe helpful from time to time, facility-made audits and second-party audits have many safety benefits that are lost to third-party audits. Company- made audits can be far more effective in addressing issues covered during an audit to impart to the company's auditors into the knowledge of process technology and of the company organization and how it functions. Conversely, 18 there was no evidence provided that supported the 19 notion that third-party audits result in superior 20 process safety performance. Again, EPA has wisely 21 proposed that the third-party audit requirements 22 be rescinded.

Lastly, the 2017 final rule required audits of each covered process which would not have had the intended effect of improving overall safety. API members view the primary purpose of RMP compliance audits as a review of the safety management systems and processes by which RMP has implemented is at the site. These systems and processes are applied in the same fashion across all covered process units creating commonality 10 between the covered units. The identification and corrections of concerns in one process unit will 11 address those concerns in all other covered 13 process units at the facility.

Employing the sampling approach as part 14 of the RMP audit process is a 15 scientifically-proven and robust method of 16 demonstration with a higher degree of confidence 17 that the compliance audit results for the sample 18 represent the compliance posture of all covered 19 process. Given that the safety management systems and process reviews, coupled with the robustness 22 of statistically sampling, are effective, API Page 31

believes an audit of each covered process would not only be a waste of time and resources, it could create operational disruptions and will fail 3 4 to provide meaningful improvement on the effectiveness of duplication of compliance audits. 5

API and its member companies support

7 performance-based RMP regulations that are 8 reasonable and that are applied in a force in a 9 manner that is consistent with the applicable 10 statutory scope. We believe that both EPA RMP and OSHA's PSM regulations have been successful in 12 incident prevention over the past two decades. API appreciates EPA's efforts to provide an 13 opportunity to engage in this dialogue and we will 14 be submitting detailed comments by the deadline. 16 Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. All right. 17 18 Thank you both. Go on.

MR. AVERBACK: You had mentioned that --19 20 you had spoken in support of allowing for more 21 sampling in identifying in the audit provisions. 22 Are all provisions of the RMP Prevention Programs

Page 32

Page 30

EPA hearing Page: 9 (33 - 36)

for sampling approach? I mean is there enough comparability between your processes to say that 3 4 selecting one for an intense audit can really inform you about your other processes? 5 MR. CHITTIM: Yeah, I didn't take time 6 to get into the remarks but we, in our comments, we can provide for the details of some things you would consider to make up that representative sample. I think OSHA has some rules and there are 10 professional journals, you know, existing 11 literature that describes what that sampling might 12 13 look like.

suitable for auditing or are some more suitable

MR. AVERBACK: Thank you.

MR. CHITTIM: Yeah.

14

15

16

18

19

21

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.1

22

MR. BELKE: Okay, Our next two speakers would be Rhett Cash and Stewart Holm. You can go 17

MR. CASH: Good Morning. My name is Rhett Cash. First name R-H-E-T-T, last name C-A-S-H. I serve as counsel on the Government 22 Affairs Division at the American Coatings

Page 33

Association. This is a voluntary non-profit trade 1 association working to advance the needs of the 3 paint and coatings industry and the professionals 4 who work in it. ACA servers as an advocate, an 5 ally for paint coatings industry members for 6 legislative, regulatory and judicial issues. 7 Several of our member companies are subject to the current RMP regulations. On behalf of the ACA, I 8 9 want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on EPA's proposed rules to consider the 10 final RMP amendments that were issued back on 11 12 January 13, 2017.

First and foremost, ACA would like to thank EPA for all the hard work it has put into the Risk Management Program amendments since 2016. ACA has been involved in this amendment process from the very beginning and we appreciate the effort that EPA has undertaken in ensuring that these amendments are properly written and are 20 reasonable and appropriate for all stakeholders involved.

Of note, ACA submitted a series of

Page 34

comments throughout 2017 that expressed its concerns and issues with various provisions of the 2017 RMP amendments. We appreciate EPA's response 3 to our comments, and its decision to issue this 4 proposed rule to reconsider certain aspects of the RMP amendments, including the third-party 6 7 compliance audits, safer technology and alternatives analysis, information availability 8 9 requirements, the incident investigation 10 requirements, and the local emergency co-ordination and exercise requirements. ACA 11 12 looks forward to submitting more substantive 13 comments and data regarding EPA's reconsideration of the final 2017 RMP amendments by July 30th.

Thanks again for the opportunity to 16 testify today. The paint coating industry has always prided itself on being pro-safety and security and supports fair & reasonable regulations that enhance safety and security for the public and the environment. We look forward to working with the EPA on the further development & reconsideration of the RMP amendments. Thank

Page 35

You.

15

17

18

19

22

2

3

4

MR. BELKE: Thanks. Can you tell me approximately how many members you have that are subject to the RMP regs?

5 MR. CASH: I don't have that data right 6 now but I'll make sure to include it in our comments. Thank you. 7

MR. BELKE: Any Questions? Okay 8 9 Stewart.

MR. HOLM: Thanks. Good Morning. Thank 10 11 you for the opportunity to speak today. My name 12 is Stewart Holm. H-O-L- M. I am chief scientist 13 at the American Forest & Paper Association. AF & 14 PA supports the EPA's proposed rule to rescind or modify certain provisions of the Risk Management 15 16 Program rule.

18 members is very important to AF & PA and its 19 member companies. Americans paper and wood 20 products manufacturing industry is firmly committed to operating safe facilities. AF & PA 21 22 however believes that the January 2017 changes to Page 36

The safety of employees and community

EPA hearing Page: 10 (37 - 40)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

13

the RMP rule are unnecessary to promote safety and they are overly burdensome and were adopted in a flawed procedural process. Air Force & PA joined 4 several other industry associations that be in the RMP coalition in petitioning the EPA to reconsider the final RMP rule.

3

1

3

6 The petition focused on procedural 8 deficiencies that precluded in effective notice and comment on rulemaking in violation of 9 Administrative Procedures Act in addition to the 10 West Texas incident that motivated the amendment 11 and strongly influenced to the Executive Board of 12 13 13650, was proven to be arson which is not an event to be affected by the rule. The proposed rule that is the topic of this hearing would 15 rescind these elements including third-party 16 audits, accident investigation, root cause 17 analysis, say for information technology and 18 alternative analysis, and several other relatively 19 minor regulatory changes. While AF & PA supports the goal of the RMP, we believe the proposed rule 22 would eliminate the unnecessary and overly Page 37

burdensome requirements without sacrificing safety. An example here would be the requiring third-party audits undermines companies' strong commitment to the effective internal audits.

4 In conclusion, AF & PA members are committed to minimizing and safeguarding the use 6 7 of hazardous chemicals. AF & PA members have 8 achieved our Better Practices, Better Planet 2020 9 goal of the 25 percent improvement in safety incident straight from 2006 to 2020. In fact, the 10 2014 member company recordable case incident rate 11 was 41 percent lower than in 2006. Our members accomplished this by implementing innovative and 13 comprehensive safety programs that include worker 14 training, increased automation, preventative 15 measure and safeguards to ensure that we are doing 16 the most we can to protect our workers. Although 17 18 we have met the goal to reduce recordable 19 incidents, we continue to look for new ways to 20 achieve our aspirational goal of zero workplace injuries. Thank you for your time and 2.1 consideration of these comments. 22

MR. BELKE: Thank you both. The next two speakers are Charise Johnson and Bill Ernie. Go over there, yeah, and be careful of the steps over there. It's a little bit -- Charise, you can go first.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you for this opportunity to speak on the proposed amendments to the Risk Management Plan. My name is Charise Johnson, that is C-H-A-R-I-S-E. I am here on the 10 behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists with 11 more than 500,000 members and supporters across 12 the country. We are a non-partisan, non-profit group dedicated to improving public policy through rigorous and independent science.

This proposed rule rolls back many of 15 the critical public safeguards implemented into 16 2017 chemical disaster rule. Just last year, I 17 was in this building along with many other 18 partners and friends in our community groups 19 asking EPA to end its dangerous delay of the 2017 chemical disaster rule. Those updates to the 21 original RMP were hard thought and deliberated by 22 Page 39

various stakeholders including multiple agencies and took several years to finalize. I am here today to ask the EPA to rescind these dangerous 3 4 rollbacks.

This rule is particularly important to 5 the health and safety of fence line communities, 6 7 first responders, and workers in the facilities. 8 The Husky energy oil refinery explosion was 9 constant, the Valero refinery explosion of fire in 10 Texas, and the Chevron Richmond refinery clearing of at least 500 pounds of sulphur dioxide in 12 California are a few examples just in the past two months of how chemical facilities need to better 13 co-ordinate with first responders, offer more 14 direct access to information to communities to 15 plan for evacuation and assessment of safer 16 practices that could make workers and surrounding 18 communities safer in case of an accident.

And with the strengthening of severe 20 weather events such as intense hurricane seasons 21 in the gulf region, the frequencies of chemical 22 disasters like the Arkema explosion will become Page 40

Page 38

EPA hearing Page: 11 (41 - 44)

21

Page 41

more common place for neighboring communities. The modest common sense requirements that the EPA is aiming to roll back include a requirement that 3 4 industrial facilities presenting the highest risk undertake a safer technology alternative assessment. Safer technology alternative 6 assessment is the best business best practice. Industries should be looking at ways to make their 8 practices and technology safer for their facility, workers, and surrounding communities. 10

11

1

2

3

11

15

A requirement that an incident analysis include determining the root cause of the incident 12 13 to avoid such incidents in the future. Root-cause analyses are necessary to determine what the cause of an incident or near-miss is, so the facility 15 can fix the problem and prevent a future disaster. 16 A requirement that qualified independent third-17 party audits be conducted when a facility has an 18 incident to ensure the cause of the incident is 19 addressed. In the case of the highest risk facilities and extreme incidents of third- party 22 audits of the facility should be necessary to gain

an objective view and assessment of the safety of the facility.

Next, a requirement that facilities 4 provide the public with information critical to 5 the surrounding communities understanding of the 6 potential risk from these facilities including, 7 how to protect themselves should a release occur 8 and what potential health risk they might face 9 from a recent release incident. Information sharing should be a basic tenet of this rule. The 10 EPA requires individuals travel to their respective state's federal reading room to acquire 13 information on facilities, yet not every state has a reading room and some must travel great 14 distances.

Communities and first responders deserve 16 to have better access to basic info about 17 facilities in their community such as 5-year 18 accident history, safety data sheets, planned 19 20 emergency exercises, and evacuation information. These provide basic access to information that the 22 public has a right to know and hampers the ability Page 42

of affected communities to know and prepare for 2 chemical risks.

Next, a requirement that the facilities 3 4 provide emergency planners and first responders 5 with additional information needed for responding to a chemical release. The proposal would return 6 7 to the status quo where the companies have more leeway to refuse to share relevant safety 8 information with first responders. 9

EPA's own rule making states that the 10 11 proposed changes to this rule would impact low-income communities and communities of color 12 the hardest. We are here in solidarity with our 13 environmental justice community partners including the Environmental Justice Health Alliance and 15 Texas Environmental Advocacy Services partners 16 among countless others, who among the few 17 community voices able to make it all the way to DC 18 to make sure the EPA considers vulnerable 19 communities over industry profits.

Since the delay of 2017 chemical 22 disaster rule, there have been at least 45 known Page 43

incidents at chemical facilities, that is at least 45 incidents too many. For 2017 finalized amendments are common sense protections that could 3 have helped prevent and medicate the harm of those chemical disasters and prevent us from future 5 ones. EPA needs to put the health and safety of the public first and not move forward with this proposed rule. 8

9 MR. BELKE: Thank you. If I could just 10 ask you to clarify. You mentioned several specific accidents including the superior refinery 12 in Husky that was in the last month, right? Then 13 you mentioned ARCAMA which we are familiar with, the other two you mentioned were Valero. 14

MS. JOHNSON: Yes, the Valero refinery explosion that was in Texas.

MR. BELKE: That was in Texas? Okay. MS. JOHNSON: And Chevron refinery in 19 Richmond.

MR. BELKE: Richmond? Okay. You said 21 that you were referring to the recent Chevron. MS. JOHNSON: Yes, so that one was I

Page 44

15

16

17

18

20

EPA hearing Page: 12 (45 - 48)

7

8

9

16

17

18

19

21

2

3

5

10

11

13

16

17

19

think about two months ago, yeah, April-May. MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. MR. AVERBACK: Charise, you had 3 4 mentioned that you have identified several states that don't have access to the reading room. To 5 some extent our proposal sides information that is 6 alternative ways to getting the same information. In your final comments, if you could identify some 8 specific areas or states where you have had 9 problems accessing the information. 10 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. Absolutely. 11 MR. AVERBACK: That would be helpful. 12

MR. BELKE: Go ahead Bill.

13

14

15

17

1

3

8

11

12

13

14

15

16

19

Thank you.

MR. ERNY: Thank you. Okay I apologize upfront I have got kind of a rusty voice here 16 today, a little bit of cold. But anyway, Good Morning. My name is Bill Erny, that's E-R-N-Y. I 18 am a senior director for the American Chemistry 19 Counsel here in Washington. And I want to thank EPA for providing us and all stakeholders today this opportunity to address the recent release of 2.2 Page 45

your RMP reconsideration proposal.

First and foremost, I would like to commend EPA for your leadership in reconsidering the 2017 amendments based on the new information related to the West Texas event as well as the 6 numerous concerns raised regarding the security of 7 sensitive chemical facility information. Furthermore, I would like to comment EPA for 9 reconsidering its economic analysis based on the wealth of the RMP data which shows that the RMP rule has been an effective prevention program that continues to drive down accidental releases.

Since, 2004 the RMP database shows that the reported accidents have steadily declined from a 197 in 2004 to the most recent report cited in your RIA of 99 in 2016. This trend represents an annual decline of three and a half percent per year and total reduction of 45.5 percent over the 13-year period.

Moreover, based on the ACC's analysis 20 21 from 2004 to 2013, the data shows that a small 22 minority of RMP facilities were responsible for Page 46

all of the RMO recorded accidents. In fact, ACC found that only 8 percent of the total RMP population was responsible for all reported 4 accidents during that time. Said another way, 92 5 percent of the RMP population did not have a recordable accident over that 10 year period. 6

Based on the data, ACC supports a targeted approach and emphasizes EPA enforcement to address those areas and operators that need the 10 most attention. Facilities that have been in 11 compliance and continue to operate safely should 12 not be subject to new brought up political/federal 13 mandate that simply add burden, create paper, and take attention away and resources from productive activities. 15

ACC supports the 2018 reconsideration proposal, which we believe is a well-balanced and objective approach to advancing Chemical Accidental Prevention. This approach is consistent with the current administration policy, is outlined in the various executive orders on 22 regulatory efficiency and with sound regulatory

Page 47

analysis is outlined in the RMP guidance.

I would like to conclude by asking the EPA consider making the RMP accident database more easily accessible. In a way that it can be used as a technical resource to help advance Chemical 6 Accident Prevention. We plan to offer some specific suggestions in our written submission to the docket on this and I look forward to any 8 9 future dialogue. Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Thank you.

MR. HAAS: Thank you. Yeah one 12 question. You were mentioning that a very small percentage of the RMP regulative facilities are 14 responsible for the accidents. When you were 15 doing that analysis, did you look more finely at that information? Were there commonalities among those facilities? Certain industry sectors that 18 may have been more likely than not.

MR. ERNY: Right. So, we never got to 20 that point. That would be sort of a next phase 21 where we will be able to do that kind of analysis. 22 Let me step back a second. We did look at some of Page 48 EPA hearing Page: 13 (49 - 52)

the NAICS codes and we did present some of that information to you last time that looks at, you know, our NAICS code and the chemical sector. And 3 the results in those sectors were consistent with 4 this, that there is a very small minority of folks in those sectors that are responsible for the 6 accidents reported in those sectors.

Clearly the odds as I have mentioned, I mean this broad mandates that you know implied or imposed across a very large sector of the 10 regulative community, just doesn't -- you are just 11 punishing people for good behavior. So, we 12 strongly like I said, we strongly support this enforcement approach targeted to bad apples. 14

8

15

16

17

18

19

12

13

14

15

16

17

2.1

MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. Thank you both. The next two speakers would be Richard Gupton and Lowell Randel.

MR. GUPTON: Good Morning. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today for this public hearing on the reconsideration of RMP amendments from 2017. I am Richard Gupton, Senior 22 Vice President Public Policy and Counsel for the

Page 49

3

Agricultural Retailers Association. We represent 1 the nation's agricultural retailers and distributors that are also referred to as farm 3 4 supplied dealers. Our members are located throughout the United States and range in size 6 from family and businesses to farmer co-operatives 7 to large national companies with multiple outlets 8 across the country. Our members play an important 9 role in providing farmers with essential crop inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and 10 equipment. 11

Anhydrous Ammonia is one of those products which is regulated by the RMP program. It's an efficient widely used source of natural fertilizer. It's used on crops like corn which is essential. The reason for importance is its most concentration of nitrogen at 82 percent. It could 18 be applied before the crops are even planted and 19 it usually represents the less expensive source of 20 nitrogen. However, it is a hazard material toxic on the toxic inhalation hazard and needs to be stored, handled, and transported with care and we 22 Page 50

support regulations to make sure that takes place like the RMP regulations as it existed before 2017 of January 13th. 3

4 They are also regulated by OSHA's 1910.111 for the source of handling of anhydrous ammonia. There's approximately 3,000 retail 6 facilities that store and handle it that are believed to be covered under the program. So we 9 are fully committed to making sure these products 10 are stored safely and in a secure way.

We have our members, we communicate with 11 12 them, and they gauge their employees, the local 13 first responders community on all environmental health, safety and security matters. ARA and the 15 Fertilizer Institute has established a non-profit compliance assistance training program called 16 'Responsible Ag' that was done back in 2014 after 17 the West Fertilizer explosion and accident and the 18 tragedy that happened that did kill individuals 19 that Joe Barrett said but we started that process well before that had taken place. That program 22 promotes public welfare by assisting agro bills as Page 51

they seek to comply with federal regulatory requirements like the RMP regulations.

There's a training facility for auditors

in Owensboro, Kentucky that I know that several EPA, OSHA, DSH officials and others have also 5 visited. It provides regulatory compliance 6 training. There are auditors who will take new 8 audits at facilities. There's a robust 9 information on the website as well for the 10 industry and for help with the compliance assistance measures as well. To date from that program, just over 2,500 facilities have registered and joined Responsible Ag. Of those, 13 14 911 facilities have been certified. Currently, there are 185 independent trained auditors and of 15 those 115 are credential. There's been 1,921 16 completed audits. And they found 68,577 risks 17 18 have been identified. Of those, 42,672 risks have 19 been mitigated. The most serious risk found from 20 the RMP program was paperwork. Paperwork 21 violations were the most serious. And of all the 22 audits, only 0.4 percent of the issues resolved

EPA hearing Page: 14 (53 - 56)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

15

16

17

18

3

4

5

13

14

15

16

17

20

Page 53

were of any significance.

3

5

6

10

11

1

9

11

13

15

16

17

19

As we have indicated in our public comments, both written and verbal, some of the other groups have said it today, we believe the 4 current regulations are working very well. The data by Responsible Ag and the data that EPA has that Bill Erny talked about clearly show that's the case. We agree with the proposal to mitigate like the public disclosure information that may be security issues and DHS, I think, it raised it as well.

As Jordan Barab pointed out, I would 12 like to talk about West fertilizers. He talked about the ATF rule that West Fertilizer was a criminal act. He failed to mention what the 15 product was that exploded. That was ammonium 16 nitrate fertilizer, which is also hazard material 17 but it's not regulated by the RMP regulations. We 18 think that is significant that ATF, under the 19 previous administration that made that determination. Again he was the head of OSHA at 22 the time but there was another federal agency

within the previous administration.

In addition, the ammonium nitrate is 3 regulated already by OSHA 1910 109(i) for the 4 storage and handling. So, during that time frame, 5 OSHA never updated those regulations. They didn't 6 make any attempt to update the regulations for 7 ammonium nitrate, the storage and handing of it 8 even to make it updated with the current industry consensus standards. They didn't make an effort to update the anhydrous ammonia storage and 10 handling regulations. None. No efforts in that regard. We had asked and tried to work with them on that issues. I'll submit the rest of our info for public consumption. 14

In closing, I will say for recommendation of changes, they should update the Tier 2 reporting to make that easier for local and 18 first responders to address. Also update some of these other regulations. The last thing I'll say 20 is having better co-ordination between our 21 industry and look for short responders is a 22 priority and something that we continually work on

and look forward to work with EPA on. MR. BELKE: Thank you. Richard, you mentioned that your auditors are finding a lot of paperwork violations. Can you clarify that a little paperwork could mean that the I's aren't dotted and the T's aren't crossed. It could also mean that you haven't done a PHA which is a core part of the prevention program. So I am not clear what point you are trying to make there.

MR. GUPTON: Well, some of it -- I can 11 get you that data. I have asked for that from 12 responsible -- I wasn't able to get that this 13 morning. But I'll get that to you. It can provide that more specifics to the agency in that regard.

MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. Randel? MR. RANDEL: Good Morning. My name is Lowell Randel. L-O-W-E-L-L R-A-N-D-E-L. I am 19 here on behalf of the global cult chain alliance in the International Institute of Ammonia 21 Refrigeration. These two partnering associations 22 are very interested in this process and we Page 55

appreciate the agency holding this meeting and proposing the reconsideration rule. This is an important issue for our members because the vast majority use Anhydrous Ammonia as their industrial refrigerant.

They do this at because it is the most 7 efficient and effective refrigerant for industrial 8 use and it is a natural refrigerant. With that 9 said, it is a toxic chemical subject RMP and many 10 of our members do have over 10,000 pounds of 11 ammonia at their facility. So, this is a critical 12 issue for us and we appreciate the opportunity to work with the agency on these issues.

We do strongly support the agency's proposal to rescind accident prevention program provisions such as the third-party audits, safer technology analysis, and incident investigation 18 root-cause analysis. I'll touch on those in a 19 little bit more detail in just a moment.

We believe that there were some 21 procedural challenges, very speedy process last 22 time, maybe some data gaps or opportunities to Page 56

EPA hearing Page: 15 (57 - 60)

5

6

20

21

10

12

13

14

15

16

Page 57

generate and use more data as has been discussed previously. Some of the security issues with the information provisions. We support the 3 4 reconsideration because of some of those areas. We also continue to have substantive concerns with some of the provisions, in particular, things like 6 third-party audits.

8

1

3

4

11

15

As we have communicated in previous comments, we believe that facilities should be allowed to use whatever qualified auditor that 10 makes the most sense to them. In some cases, 11 that's going to 'independent auditors'. And in 12 some cases, that may be someone from within their 13 corporate structure, or someone that they are 14 currently doing other business with that are 15 providing services to their company. The 16 independence requirement as currently included in 17 the final amendments rule, we believe will put a 18 real strain, in particular, on our small 19 businesses and our rural facilities in struggling to find qualified auditors who know not just RMP 22 but also know about industrial refrigeration

systems using anhydrous ammonia. So we believe that rescinding that provision is very

appropriate. We also support the rescinding of public 5 information availability provisions. We agreed 6 that there are some security concerns. I do want

7 to touch on the public meeting provision. We

8 tried these public meetings in the past. Our

9 member experiences have been that they were not very effective. And they were costly not just 10 with the financial resources but with the human resources and with very little participation from

the public. We are afraid that that will happen 13

again. So, we appreciate some of the 14

modifications in this rule, but we would ask that

you even reconsider whether there is ultimate 16

value in that public meeting. 17

18 We do appreciate the alternative 19 suggested to confine the public meeting

20 requirements to 'major incidents'. We think that

bears more consideration if there will remain a

22 public meeting requirement. And we would

Page 58

reiterate that 90 days should be a minimum. 2 Certainly, we would not support shortening that length as is discussed in the proposed rule as a potential consideration. 4

Well, the safer alternatives analysis does not apply to our membership at this point in time. We do support the rescinding as proposed.

8 Finally, on the issue of emergency response coordination, this is critical. This is 9 10 something that we talk to our members about continually. We fully support the process that 11 should be in place to facilitate that 12 13 coordination. We think that the proposed rule has a nice balance there, offers some flexibility while maintaining the importance of that 15 coordination which we absolutely agree with. With 16 that said, we will be providing additional written 17 comments for the record and we appreciate the 18 opportunity to comment. 19

MR. BELKE: Thanks Lowell. I do have one question for you. I know that your membership 22 includes a pretty good number of small businesses.

Page 59

When we had the $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$ as per panel for the amendments rule -- small businesses on that panel expressed a lot of concerns over the cost of the amendments. 3 One provision that the agency's proposal would retain is the emergency exercise provision and I 5 just wanted to know if you had any feedback on 6 whether the proposed changes to that provision 8 would benefit your membership and meeting those 9 provisions or not.

MR. RANDEL: Yes I think some of the 11 additional flexibility as proposed would ease some of those burdens on our members. We have talked a lot with our membership about the exercises and I think that there is a recognition that some level of exercise and testing whether it's a table top or a full exercise has some value. But having additional flexibility on timelines and how those 18 are carried out would be of value to our 19 membership.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. Anything? 20 MR. AVERBACK: Actually as long as 21 22 Richard is still on the table, Lowell mentioned Page 60 Page: 16 (61 - 64)

EPA hearing that his sector wasn't directly affected by STAA. MR.BELKE: Okay. 1 MR. GUPTON: Yeah, I believe how it is 2 MR. BELKE: Okay. Our next two speakers 3 now, ours is program too so it wouldn't be will be Laura Mirman-Heslin and Steve Arendt. 3 4 impacted either. 4 Laura, you can go first if you are ready. MR. AVERBACK: Okay. 5 5 MR. GUPTON: It would have been, but 6 6 because she tried to do that through enforcement guidance document that was an illegal and we won 8 8 in court, but there are now so programs too. 9 9 MR. AVERBACK: So in terms of the 10 11 prevention program changes that were proposed, which ones would affect your sectors? As it's 12 13 written, I think it's only after accidents. 13 regulated facilities. MR. GUPTON: Sure. If there is anything 14 14 like, the Responsible Acts Program has a 15 credential of a lot of auditors. Again how it --16 our understanding of even the final rule, how it 17 17 was drafted would make it overly restrictive and 18 amendments. 18 not allow for those types of qualified industry 19 19 third-party auditors to even be able to 20 participate how the regulations were and so you 21 22 are cutting out a whole number of qualified Page 61 individuals that do conduct that third-party audit. So that is one of the things that impacted 3 if there's an incident at the facility. And yes, 3 4 I would mention that West fertilizer did have 4 5 anhydrous ammonia at their location. But that's 5

 $6\,\mathrm{l}\,\mathrm{my}$ understanding is they had submitted their RMP 7 updated plans that were in compliance related to that regulation.

8

9

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

MR. AVERBACK: Yes, I believe in our 10 proposal, we ask for comment on, in addition to rescinding the third-party audit provision, we also ask comment on if we were to keep it, what about the qualifications? It sounds like you have some concerns. If you could put those into written comments.

MR. GUPTON: Sure, I mean, again, we have a program. There would be a lot of qualified third-party auditors available if the program is less restrictive and there's some more 20 flexibility, I think the members would probably be open to that. Thanks.

MR.AVERBACK: Thanks. Anything?

Page 62

MS. MIRMAN-HESLIN: Good morning. My name is Laura Mirman-Heslin. That M-I-R-M-A-N -H-E-S-L-I-N. And I am an Assistant Attorney General in New York Attorney General Barbara Underwood's office. We partnered with ten other 10 states in opposing EPA's unlawful delay of its 11 Accident Prevention amendments which amended the 12 risk management program to improve safety at

Thank you both.

As New York is home to more than a 150 15 facilities regulated under the program, Attorney 16 General Underwood strongly opposes EPA's proposal to largely eviscerate the Accident Prevention

Today I will highlight two of the reasons for our opposition. First, EPA failed to adequately consider the impacts of the proposed 22 rollbacks on public health and the environment.

Page 63

Second, EPA is wrong that enforcement can effectively replace the requirement that facilities improve their accident prevention practices across the board.

To my first point, EPA enacted the 6 Accident Prevention amendments after a series of 7 catastrophic chemical incidents underscoring the 8 pressing need for improved safeguards and after 9 President Obama issue an Executive Order directing 10 Federal agencies to improve their chemical safety 11 regulations.

EPA concluded that it needed to do more 13 under the Clean Air Act to further protect human 14 health and the environment from chemical hazards. And that specific regulatory improvements could reduce the probability and severity of chemical accidents. EPA's proposed rollback will largely 17 18 rescinds these critical protections, yet fails to 19 examine the health and environmental consequences 20 of the rescission.

For example, in the one year and several 21 22 months that the Accident Prevention amendments Page 64

12

EPA hearing Page: 17 (65 - 68)

3

4

8

19

20

21

22

4

Page 65

have been delayed, at least 45 publicly known accidents have occurred at facilities in 20 states. Seven employees have been killed, 58 3 4 others have been hospitalized. Nearby residents have been forced to shelter in place. Schools and hospitals have been evacuated. 6

These accidents reinforce the 8 determinations that underpin the urgent need for the amendments. Despite this EPA's proposal did 9 not consider whether the regulation it seeks to 10 eliminate could have prevented or mitigated these 11 or other accidents. In addition, EPA's proposed 12 13 rollback ignores the Chemical Safety Board's finding about the increasing risk severe weather poses for chemical facilities. 15

In its report on the 2017 disaster at the Arkema chemical facility in Texas, the Board found that Arkema had not adequately analyzed the hazards posed by flooding. The Board noted that in recent years, flooding from extreme rainfall events has increased and that a 2015 EPA report 22 found that this trend is projected to continue as

16

17

18

19

1

2

3

4

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

2.1

22

low-income populations. Nonetheless, the agency failed to consider the consequences of its action on those communities and populations. Its failure to do so is unjust and unlawful.

Regarding my second main point, EPA 5 erroneous contends an enforcement against what it 6 characterizes as a few bad apples in the industry can effectively replace a requirement that facilities improve their accident prevention 9 10 practices across the board. In New York's experience, in order to sufficiently protect 11 12 public health and the environment, a successful 13 regulatory program requires both adequate prevention and robust enforcement. Indeed the Clean Air Act requires that EPA's regulations 15 provide to the greatest extent practicable for the prevention of accidental releases of regulated 17 substances. 18

The factual predicate for EPA's new position that chemical accidents are only attributable to a few bad apples is also questionable. Even if the industry data that EPA

Page 67

a result of climate change increasing the flood risk in many parts of the country.

The Board recommended that chemical manufacturing, handling, or storage facilities perform analyses to determine their susceptibility 6 to these extreme weather events and evaluate the 7 adequacy of relevant safeguards. Instead of 8 rolling back the Accident Prevention amendments, EPA should act on the Board's recommendation that facilities consider increased accident risks from severe weather.

This issue is especially important to New York as it is experiencing threats from flooding worsened by sea level rise and from more extreme storms. Extreme weather events have a disproportionate impact on New York's vulnerable communities. Approximately 15 percent of New York's risk management program facilities are located in environmental justice communities. EPA 20 acknowledged that its planned rollback may have disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority and/or

relies on is taken at face value, it still shows that accidents occurred at over 1,200 facilities resulting in 19 deaths and almost 17,000 injuries. 3

Moreover enforcement only serves as a

5 deterrent to violations of law if it perceived by the industry as credible. On that front, EPA has 7 low credibility. According to a recent analysis 8 for NBC News, the past fiscal year marked a 9 historic low for EPA enforcement actions across 10 the board. In addition, the Trump administration 11 has proposed to significantly cut EPA's enforcement budget for fiscal year 2019 and called for elimination of the Chemical Safety Board which 13 would make EPA efforts to enforce even more 14 difficult. 15

We urge EPA to abandon this dangerously misguided proposal and promptly move forward with 18 the implementation of the 2017 rule. Thank you 19 for the opportunity to testify today.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. Just one 20 21 question. You referred to the Arkema incident and 22 I think you are drawing a connection there between Page 68

Page 66

16

Page: 18 (69 - 72) EPA hearing

15

17

18

19

21

22

the -- but I don't want to put words in your mouth -- between the Arkema incident and the provisions that are proposed to be rescinded. Could you 4 clarify which provision are you seeing in the proposal that would have helped with the Arkema incident?

3

6

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

4

9

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

MS. MIRMAN-HESLIN: We think that the 8 root cause analysis provisions could help determine, you know, if there is a flooding risk for accidents. So, we think that, that could affect severe weather analyses. And we also think that the Chemical Safety Board has presented new information that EPA should consider as part of this reconsideration.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. The CSB just sent the report within the last few weeks to EPA. We will respond to those recommendations.

MS. MIRMAN-HESLIN: Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Anybody else? Okay, Steve.

MR. ARENDT: Thank you, panel. My name

is Steve Arendt. I am Vice President for Global 22 Oil, Gas and Chemicals for ABS Group,

Page 69

1 headquartered in Houston, Texas. But I am here today representing myself as a citizen. I have got over 40 years in process safety. 3

About 30 years ago, I worked with a 5 number of individuals to help propose rules for 6 OSHA to consider in as process safety management 7 regulations. And I have been involved with the 8 RMP rule makings through the years over that time. I have written over 12 guidelines for CCPS, API, and ACC. Investigate many major accidents. I led the evaluation of BP for Secretary Baker. And so, I have quite a bit of experience to lay the foundation for my comments.

Let me say that I support EPA's modifications to its originally proposed changes to the RMP rule. I think that they will be effective in addressing many of the root causes of the accidents that they cited as a part of their 18 economic impact analysis and basis in the original 20 rule that was proposed. I do believe that there are some possibilities for improvements over the 22 years that you could consider but they need to be

data-driven.

And so, I would recommend, for example, 2 in the state of California now, both OSHA and 3 4 CalARP has new provisions in their rule which 5 companies are now having to apply. And so, we have a perfect opportunity to get real data on 6 7 costs and benefits as opposed to theoretical rejections of costs and benefits as you had to deal with in earlier parts of your rule making. 9 10 So, I would take advantage of that. So, even once 11 this rule making is finished, you still have opportunities to collect real data to be able to 12 13 address what real changes need to be made to address root causes. 14

The provision for a public meeting --16 the reconsideration proposal is a good one. Unfortunately, back when your RMP rule was first put out, there were a lot of organizations, a lot of communities, a lot of companies banded together to communicate RMP information to the communities through emergency response organizations. And there was a lot of activity. Unfortunately, after

Page 71

9/11 and because of a lot of regulatory enforcement activities, the relational bank account between the communities and the people and 3 the companies has waned. And more effort needs to 4 be put in for communicating that risk information to the communities. 6

And so, for example, for your new 8 proposal, I would recommend that you have a new 9 initial meeting requirement. Not just one for 10 ones that are done after accidents. One time, 11 just like it was done before. Yeah, some of them will be done in a perfunctory fashion but many of 12 them could be effective in reestablishing the relationship that's needed.

I would like to also mention that if you look towards trying to improve any of the other requirements, think about that there are four 18 kinds of companies that you address with your 19 rule. Companies that know what the rule is about 20 and try to do a good job and do a really good job. 21 And that's a vast majority, I think, of the various industries and the SIC codes that are 22 Page 72

Page 70

13

14

15

16

EPA hearing Page: 19 (73 - 76)

13

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

3

4

5

6

7

10

11

15

16

there. Then you have some companies that try but they occasionally fail. And you are able to tackle those with enforcement programs and 3 4 citations. There are some though that are still confused but a smaller number every year. And 5 there are some that intentionally don't do it. 6 Those are the criminals. They don't raise their hand and they are hard to find. 8

Probably the best anti-bang for the buck that you could get is by investing in better enforcement, more competent enforcement, and to seek the assistance of industry in helping to target those parts of industry and companies where that enforcement is most needed. If you do that and you invest in a local emergency planning and response in a way that's never been done before, then we will have huge improvements in the prevention of major accidents. Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. Steve, at the beginning of your remarks, you were talking about 21 the root cause provisions and I am just -- want to 22 clarify. Are you opposed to the rescission of

Page 73

them?

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

19

MR. ARENDT: As an individual, root cause analysis is an effective or best practice that many many companies apply. And so, the current regulations for a variety of reasons use 6 different wording and that's gotten in the way 7 sometimes. But I think through your ability to enforce, recognized in generally accepted 9 practices in the industry, if a company does not do root cause analysis, you could probably do something about that even without the language being in the rule.

MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. Thank you both. Does anybody have any other -- Hold on a second, Steve. Jon --

MR. AVERBACK: Again, it's useful to 17 have both of you at the panel at the same time. 18 The current incident investigation provisions require the factors that contributed to the 20 incident.

MR. ARENDT: Contributing factors, 21

22 right?

Page 74

MR. AVERBACK: Contributing factors. 2 your view, does that encompass root cause? MR. ARENDT: So, there are -- no it does 3 4 not. A root cause could be a contributing factor 5 but they are not -- it's not the same thing. So, many companies that do investigations, sometimes 6 they don't do them to the level what root causes 7 are. But industry best practice now is to be able to do that. Nearly all of the industry guidelines 9 10 talk about investigation, talk about using root cause analysis tools. And that's generally the 11 way that it's done. 12

MR. AVERBACK: Where would root cause 14 come in through our current rules or do they not come in through our current rules?

MR. ARENDT: So, it's not specifically in a rule but if you were doing an NIST investigation using appropriate techniques then as the industry techniques advanced because of new techniques that have been developed or whatever, then root cause analysis would be one of those new techniques and frankly, it's been in place for Page 75

almost 20 years, I think, probably the initial chemical industry guidance was about 23 years ago. 2

MR. AVERBACK: Thank you.

MR. CASH: Yeah. I have a follow up question on that. You are talking about root cause analysis as a best practice. Would you characterize it now as recognized in generally 8 accepted good engineering practice? Is it at that 9 level now or is it still a best practice in your mind?

MR. ARENDT: I need to be careful. The 12 phrase recognized in generally accepted good engineering practice is the one that's been both 13 14 the ESM standard and in your prevention rule. But that's not exactly what we are talking about here. We are talking about a slightly more vague term of recognized industry practice. I do believe that 18 root cause analysis would be a recognized industry 19 best practice.

MR. BELKE: Okay. Anything else? Thank 20 21 you very much. Okay. Our next two speakers will 22 be Paul Orum and Kathy Curtis. Paul, you can go Page 76

Page: 20 (77 - 80) EPA hearing

13

18

19

21

7

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

18

19

21

Page 77

first.

18

19

22

1

2

3

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

MR. ORUM: Good morning. My name is Paul Orum. That's O-R-U-M. So, EPA is proposing 3 4 to fully repeal the chemical incident prevention requirements of the agency's Risk Management 5 Planning amendments of 2017. This repeal will 6 undermine chemical security. I will address one specific aspect. EPA's cost analysis of the 8 repeal fails to account for the chemical security 9 benefits of the prevention program elements. The 10 most effective way to reduce terrorism at chemical 11 facilities is to implement not repeal the 12 prevention program. Rescinding the prevention 13 program requirements for safer technology assessments, third-party audits, and root cause 15 incident investigations will contribute to future 16 chemical emergencies at RMP facilities. 17

Repealing the safer technology assessment provisions in particular will perpetuate unnecessary terrorist targets that would otherwise be removed as a result of an alternatives assessment. EPA must account for the

increased risk of terrorism associated with perpetuating avoidable chemical hazards.

Safer technology assessments reveal 4 fool-proof ways of preventing chemical terrorism. 5 For example, by improving plant design to remove 6 chemicals that could be targeted. EPA must fully 7 account the foregone prevention benefits of improved chemical security that would result from alternatives assessments.

In its regulatory analysis, EPA estimates that repealing the prevention program will save about 88 million a year. These savings are more than offset by estimated potential losses of up to 270 million each year from foregone prevention benefits, such as increased damages.

Under EPA's analysis, net incurred costs 16 from a rollback could be up to 182 million each 17 year, not even counting costs such as 18 19 contamination, lost productivity, emergency 20 response, property value impacts, and health 21 problems from chemical exposures. Actual losses may be many times larger than EPA's monetized 22

estimates.

2 The Center for Chemical Process Safety states major industrial incidents cost an average 3 4 of 80 million each for property damages alone and 5 losses from business interruption can amount to four times the property damage. These are among 6 other losses to life, health, market share, reputation, litigation, insurance, investigations, 8 9 and penalties. One insurance industry analysis of 10 a major industrial chlorine spill scenario, showed 11 insurance claims to cover casualties could exceed 7 billion. 12

The Marsh Insurance largest losses report includes a 100 major incidents of property 14 damage losses over a 100 million. 20 of these, 15 had property damage over 500 million and some 16 topped 1 billion. Again the report covers only 17 property damage. Actual losses are much higher including liabilities, penalties, shareholder value, business interruption, and reputation.

A single incident, ExxonMobil refinery 22 in California, cost California drivers 2.4 billion Page 79

based on prolonged increased gas prices and cost macro-economic losses of 6.9 billion, according a Rand study. Again these figures are incomplete. 3 They do not include facility and community losses associated with emergency services, healthcare, 5 property values, and local tax revenue. 6

A study of terrorism insurance found 8 that a chemical agent attack in a big city roughly analogous to a major industrial toxic gas release could involve property and worker compensation losses ranging up to 25 billion. Explosion at 12 West Fertilizer, 247 million.

Point is, EPA's RMP amendments develop credible methods to avoid such losses by removing, reducing, or better managing chemical hazards. In contrast, EPA's proposal to reduce information are not a credible and realistic means to prevent terrorism especially given that entire categories of chemical hazard facilities are generally known 20 or readily discoverable.

The cost of industrial chemical 22 emergencies, whether from terrorist attack or Page 80

EPA hearing Page: 21 (81 - 84)

9

18

19

21

22

other release, could be very high to businesses and communities. EPA must account for the impacts of its policies in perpetuating such avoidable 3 4 hazards. There is a saying sometimes found in retail stores, little cards. If you break it, you 5 6 bought it. Well, repealing these credible prevention requirements means owning the next major incident. 8 MR. BELKE: Okay. Thank you. Any 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

4

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

2.1

questions? MR. AVERBACK: Paul, in your comments, 12 you mentioned the 270 million as the high end estimate of the costs of accidents as we have put the numbers together. Do you have any suggestions as to how we could come up with a rate for $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$ accidents prevented? I mean, that's the, you know, we don't -- we have noted in our proposal that we don't predict a number of accident prevented by the original rule. We just acknowledged that what would have been prevented

Page 81

information is there -- if in your final comments you have some suggestions on the methodology for making the estimate, it would be useful. 3

will not be prevented by the reconsideration. So,

22 you know, that -- we have asked for that

MR. ORUM: I would just say that predicting a terrorist incident based on accidents 6 would not be a reliable way. You can't really 7 tell. Second, I think that it's incomplete to 8 base you cost estimates on accidents alone. I think you have to look at the inherent hazards and the inherent magnitude of a worst-case release, when you are looking at cost information.

MR. AVERBACK: Thank you.

MR. BELKE: Kathy.

MS. CURTIS: Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today to voice my concerns about EPA's proposal to weaken risk management programs under the Clean Air Act. My name is Kathleen Curtis and I am the Executive Director of Clean and Healthy New York, a premier 20 state-level environmental health organization working to promote safer chemicals, a sustainable economy, and a healthier world. I also co-lead 22

The JustGreen Partnership, a coalition of over 50 community, labor, environmental justice, health 2 effected, healthcare business and other 3 4 organizations representing over a million New Yorkers, working for environmental health and justice for New York's people and communities. We 6 co-lead this coalition with WE ACT for Environmental Justice, a nationally recognized

community organization in West Harlem.

I also serve on the Board of Directors 10 11 and steering committee of the Alliance of Nurses 12 for Health Environments, a national organization 13 representing thousands of nurses, promoting 14 healthy people and healthy environments by educating and leading the nursing profession, 15 advancing research, incorporating evidence-based 16 practice, and influencing policy. 17

Sorry for the long-winded introduction but I am -- the constituencies that I represent 20 have numerous grave concerns about both the delayed implementation and the proposed reconsideration of improvements to risk management

Page 83

programs under the Clean Air Act.

First, EPA must not repeal disaster 2 prevention measures. Thorough investigations of 3 4 chemical releases will prevent deaths, injuries, and long-term health impacts, which, I as a nurse, 5 6 am very concerned about. Second, since disasters 7 at chemical facilities continue to occur, EPA must 8 not continue to stall life saving measures, weaken emergency response coordination requirements or 9 10 delete community informational provisions. If public meeting requirements -- they are not 11 getting enough people then perhaps better outreach 13 and better services to people that, you know, are 14 impacted, would be a solution to that rather than throwing out the community engagement piece, let's 15 work to improve it and facilitate public 16 participation and not act as a barrier to participation. So, the focus should be on 18 19 prevention, not management of risk.

Third, in the event of an exposure to a 20 21 chemical release, firefighters, first responders, 22 first receivers in emergency rooms, and other Page 84

EPA hearing Page: 22 (85 - 88)

3

4

5

6

8

Page 85

health care providers must have access to relevant information. So, they can share the information with the patient and other providers as needed to 3 4 provide quality care. When a nurse is admitting and assessing a patient, they are required to make certain crucial decisions that can be a matter of 6 7 life and death based on both objective and subjective information. When information is withheld, errors can be made and lives can be at stake, especially when there is a disaster or a 10 severe weather event and they are flooded with the 11 input of patients. 12

It's essential that first responders and receivers have access to chemical information in order to provide that critical care and to protect themselves from potential exposure and harm.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

2

3

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

Rolling back improvements in the disclosure provided in improved risk management plans violates everything nurses and other healthcare professionals are taught about a good patient-provider relationship. If anything EPA 22 should be improving risk management plans under

11 recording, video, audio and photos. We ask that 12 you not cause any disruption to those testifying 13 or observing the hearing. For the members of the 14 media, please refrain from interviewing in the 15 public hearing room. If you need interview space, please ask an EPA press contact at the media 16 registration table. For people here to present 17 18

of Emergency Management. And we have Jon

Counsel. And we also have Vanessa Principe,

Chemical Engineer in the Office of Emergency

Management, and Francesco Maimone, who is a

Averback, our attorney with the Office of General

Physical Scientist from EPA Region 2, and he is on

detail here in the Office of Emergency Management.

9 open to the press. We have members of the media

10 present today. The event is open to any form of

And just as reminder, the hearing is

testimony, it's under your discretion whether you would like to be interviewed by a member of the 19

press. We ask that media members here today respect each individual's wishes. 21

22 So, our next two speakers are Gordon

Page 87

Page 88

the Clean Air Act to provide greater disclosure and protection.

Real plant security does not involve 4 higher walls, brighter lights, or more guards. 5 Real plant security is achieved through safer 6 chemistry which not only protects from weather 7 events and terrorist attacks but protects workers, 8 communities, and the broader environment in an ongoing fashion. EPA has a mission to protect public health and safety and EPA has failed to evaluate the serious harm to public health and safety these proposed measures would cause. Communities need stronger not weaker protection from chemical facilities. Thank you for your time and for the opportunity to comment.

MR. BELKE: Thank you. Okay. Thank you both. We are now going to take a short recess. The hearing will start again in five minutes.

(Recess)

MS. FRANKLIN: Restart the hearing now. 20 21 And for this session, we have -- my name is Kathy Franklin. I am a Chemical Engineer in the Office 22 Page 86

Sommers from Earthjustice and Jesse Marquez, Coalition For A Safe Environment. Okay, I am going to ask Gordon to go first and if you could 3 4 please make sure and hold the microphones close so we can hear you better. 5

MR. SOMMERS: Sure. Hello, my name is 7 Gordon Sommers, here with Earthjustice. We work 8 with a number of groups around the country, 9 communities in particular that are affected by 10 chemical disasters. A long experience dealing with disasters and the aftermath of these 12 disasters.

13 MS. FRANKLIN: Could you hold the mike a 14 little closer?

MR. SOMMERS: Sure. We work with a 16 number of communities around the country that are affected and have been affected for years by 18 chemical disasters of the type that the chemical 19 disaster or the RPM amendments would have been 20 preventing were it in effect now or prevented if 21 it goes in effect. So, we ask that if you 22 withdraw this proposed rule that will rescind all

EPA hearing Page: 23 (89 - 92)

11

18

19

of the prevention requirements in that rule and further delay the few remaining requirements for coordination and other parts of the rule.

3

5

6

10

11

12

15

16

17

18

19

2.2

3

4

11 12

13

14

15

16

19

20

21

I would first like to note that EPA admits that this rule disproportionately impacts communities of color and low- income communities. And unfortunately, EPA has nevertheless declined to have public hearings in communities around the country that are most impacted by this proposed rescission of protections. So, some community members have been able to make it here today. I would ask that you pay particular attention to their testimony and bear in mind the great distance and difficulty with which they have had to travel here to share their stories.

And I would also ask you to consider that there are many many more folks who are very affected by this rule but cannot come here today to testify. And so, we hope that they will be able to submit written comments but that's difficult also. Often oral testimony is much easier. And so, we again urge EPA to considering

Page 89

having a public -- at least one public hearing elsewhere in any affected community.

These communities that Earthjustice represents and that we work with around the country face, what I would call, a chemical 6 crisis. There is a long history of many of these 7 communities, year after year, chemical disasters, 8 fires, spills, explosions, releases into the air, 9 harming people, harming their families, requiring children in schools a shelter in place, and as EPA's own data shows, this has been going on for years.

EPA needs to pay attention to the facts and its records. When EPA developed the chemical disaster rule, it found that over 2,200 of these types of incidents had not been prevented despite the 1996 regulations being in place and despite 18 EPA enforcing these regulations for the past several decades.

My colleagues have spoken about the fact that these disasters continue and this is indeed 22 an ongoing problem. EPA's own data shows at least Page 90

450 more incidents occurred after that period in 2 2014 to 2016. Public media reports show another at least 45 that have occurred just into March of last year while the chemical disaster rule has 4 5 been delayed. And that's just what's been publicly reported. Point is, accidents continue 6 and they continue to disproportionately affect 7 certain communities. And so, it is as important as ever, the EPA improve the existing regulations 10 which are failing to prevent these incidents.

EPA has not real rationale for this 12 proposed rollback especially of the prevention 13 requirements. EPA says it wants to coordinate more with OSHA but at the same time, EPA admits that it did coordinate with OSHA in developing 15 these -- the chemical disaster rule protections. 16 EPA also says it wants to save money -- rather 17 that this rescission will save money for the industries that would be regulated. But, as my colleague, Paul Orum, very well put it, chemical disasters cost a lot more money. Preventing even 22 a few of these would grossly outweigh the costs of Page 91

these regulations which, when spread across the large industries that they apply to, are not that significant. 3

I would also like to note that EPA seems

4 to think an enforcement-led approach will --5 6 rather claims that an enforcement-led approach can 7 be a substitute for prevention regulations. 8 That's just the false dichotomy. You need both. 9 I mean, you need enforcement and you need good 10 regulations to enforce. EPA has had its current 11 regulations in place and has been enforcing them and it has not prevented disaster after disaster after disaster. That has wrought havoc on many 13 14 communities around this country.

Lastly, I would like to note that EPA is further delaying the much needed coordination requirements for first responders. As we saw last 18 year with Hurricane Harvey, those requirement need to be in effect now, yesterday, they need to be in 20 effect because first responders don't have the 21 information they need when they rush to the scene 22 of disasters. Responders got sick at that

Page 92

15

16

EPA hearing Page: 24 (93 - 96)

2

16

incident. This has happened elsewhere where they were unprepared because facilities were not sharing the information -- not sharing enough 3 4 information with them. And so, this needs to change. It needs change now as the next hurricane 5 season is starting already. 6

So, to conclude, I would just like to 8 say that we ask EPA withdraw this proposal and put the chemical disaster rule, also known as the RMP and get it into effect immediately because it's very very needed as EPA itself determined. Thank you.

MS. FRANKLIN: Okay.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

MS. MARQUEZ: Good morning. My name is Jesse Marquez. I am 65 years old and I live in the community at Wilmington in the city of Los Angeles. We are an environmental justice Latino community. And wish to state for the record that I oppose the new changes to the Risk Management Program regulations.

On March 28th, 1969, the Fletcher Oil 22 Refinery in the city of Carson, across the street

Page 93

1 from my home exploded in front of our house. All seven members of my family were burned ranging 3 from first degree to third degree burns. My 4 grandmother was burnt the worst with third degree 5 burns. Over 200 residents and refinery workers 6 were burned and injured during that explosion. 7 Four storage tanks exploded in five to seven 8 minutes. There were no refinery safety personnel, 9 no fire department firemen, no city public safety there when the explosion occurred. 10

We could not escape in our car after the 11 first explosion because the cars on the street were crashing in front of each other. And then a 13 second explosion took place as we were trying to 14 get away. We then held hands and began to run to 15 the corner to escape. And then a third tank 16 exploded. All I could see was a huge white ball 17 18 of flame and smoke coming at our home and at us. 19 My parents yelled at me to help my younger 20 brothers and sisters jump over the block wall, while my father helped my seven-month pregnant 2.1 22 mother and my grandmother over that wall so we

could escape to try to get away from that ball of fire coming at us.

I then jumped over the fence and as I 3 4 was getting ready to escape, I heard a voice. And the voice says, boy, boy, please turn around. And 5 when I turned around, I could see this blonde 6 7 woman holding a baby in its arms. Her face was 8 burnt, the baby's face was burnt, the baby's 9 blanket was burnt. And she said, please, save my 10 baby. She threw her baby over that block wall for 11 me to catch. And she yelled at me, run as fast as 12 you can, don't look back, save my babies life. 13 That way my experience with the chemical industry. 14 There are no hospitals in Wilmington. So, here I 15 am running with a baby terrified. I had to stop

On February 18th, 2015, the ExxonMobil 17 18 Oil Refinery Torrance just a few miles from Wilmington exploded. The electrostatic 19 20 precipitator exploded sending a shower of toxic ash throughout the Torrance residential community 21 22 and public schools. Two months later California

-- two California Senate Committees held a public

and think and took the baby to a clinic.

Page 95

Page 96

hearing there at Torrance City Hall. Standing room only, every TV, radio, newspaper was there. 3 And they asked the ExxonMobil Plant manager, Safety Manager, Environmental Manager, Torrance 5 Fire Department, South Coast Air Quality 6 7 Management, everybody, what caused the explosion? 8 And here it is two months later they said, they 9 did not know why.

Then they opened it up for public 11 comment and I got in line. When I was -- my turn to speak, I told them within one hour after that explosion why the ESP exploded. The Chair of the Committee asked if I worked at the refinery and I said, no. He asked if I was a petroleum engineer and I said, no. He asked if I had worked for any regulatory agency and I said, no.

18 What I did find out within that hour, I 19 used common sense. I used community science 20 sense. I went to this thing called the computer. 21 I went to this thing called an internet. I went 22 to this thing called a search engine. And I typed

Page 94

10

12

13

14

15

16

EPA hearing Page: 25 (97 - 100)

in electrostatic precipitator explosions. There equipment, there is not oil, nothing that can 2 are 20,000 plus refineries all over the world. explode but there are electrostatic charges. So, This is not the first time it ever occurred. What the only way it can explode if an external gas 3 4 did occur and the Plant Manager was correct, there enters it. Which meant a gas leak. And that's is nothing in an ESP that can explode. But when I exactly what had happened. There was a break and 5 6 read the information, if a combustible gas on the there was leaking gas. 6 7 outside enters it, it will explode. So, there was MR. AVERBACK: This maybe a little bit 7 gas leak. 8 nuts and boltsy about the way the RMP works but 8 Was it preventable? Yes. Was it the -- do you have any idea about the source of 9 9 10 preventable in 1969? Yes. A gas detector costing 10 the gas whether the source of the gas --11 2,000 dollars was not installed, could have been MS. MARQUEZ: Okay. Yes. There was a 11 12 installed, and would have prevented these tens of 12 tank that ruptured but part of the reason it 13 million dollars of damages and loss of life and 13 ruptured too is that during the process when injuries for a 2,000 dollar piece of equipment. 14 something occurs an operator has to take over and 14 Best practices is not good enough. Root 15 do some things and there was an 'oops' in one of 15 cause analysis is an accurate way to determine 16 those things. 16 what needs to be done. The gentlemen spoke MR. AVERBACK: Okay. 17 17 earlier about there has been reductions. Yes MS. MARQUEZ: The operator should not 18 18 19 have done this that caused the pressure to build there has been reductions because new regulations 19 take place to prevent the reoccurring of 20 up that caused the rupture. 21 disasters. MR. AVERBACK: And when you submit 21 I was on a toxic tour with the South 22 written testimony, if you could explain the 2.2 Page 97 Page 99 1 Coast AQMD with Board members this Monday, relationship between the covered process, the loss visiting schools and they asked the teachers, does of gas, and the event, it would be useful. 2 3 the school district provide you any information on MS. MARQUEZ: Okay. I will also submit 3 4 hydrofluoric acid or how to prepare for an 4 a copy because six months later, the Chemical 5 incident? And everyone answered, no. It, that 5 Safety Board released a report and validated that 6 electrostatic explosion, a 15,000 piece of and explained in more detail. Thank you. 6 7 equipment came within inches of hitting the MS. FRANKLIN: Okay. The next two 8 storage tank. And if it had erupted and ruptured, 8 speakers Mildred McClain from Harambee House and 9 Say Yang, Center for Earth, Energy and Democracy. 9 it would have killed everyone within two miles. I turned in a document and there is a 10 Okay, Mildred, you want to go ahead? 10 map that shows facilities and industries around MS. MCCLAIN: Okay. Sure. Good morning 11 11 the Valero Oil Refinery that can also blow up as a 12 and thank you so much for allowing me to come all 13 the way from Savannah to share some comments with result of an external factor. Thank you. 13 MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. Any 14 you. I am not representing my organization today. 14 questions? Okay. Thank you, both. I am representing about a thousand families who we 15 MR. AVERBACK: Actually, Jesse, if you work with in Savannah. 16 16 can come back. So, regarding the ESP explosion, I live in Savannah, Georgia, a small 17 17 what you had mentioned that it was your 18 port city of about a 150,000 people. I work with 18 19 understanding or your deduction that flammable 19 three neighborhoods that are geographically gases entered the ESP and caused the explosion. 20 located right near the Georgia port and are 20 MS. MARQUEZ: Yes. When I did the 21 surrounded by 17 industries including 21

Page 98

22 International Paper, Arizona Chemical, and

Page 100

22 research online, there is no gas in that

EPA hearing Page: 26 (101 - 104)

8

9

11

Colonial Oil.

3

4

5

6

10

11

12 13

15

16

17

18

19

20

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

19

We have participated along with thousands of other environmentally impacted neighborhoods across the United States in the work to protect our citizens against disproportionate and negative impacts on our health, economy, ecology, and environment due to major releases, explosion, fires, and accidents at dangerous industrial and nuclear facilities because we live about a 125 miles downstream from the Savannah riverside.

All the work communities have done over the past few years to strengthen the Risk Management Plan rule must be protected and used to assist communities which include people of color, low-income populations, and indigenous peoples who face great risk on a daily basis from chemical releases and explosions at thousands of facilities throughout our nation.

If the Environmental Protection Agency 21 rolls back any of the current measures in the RMP, 22 we believe and that is the thousand families of Page 101

1 residents of Hudson Hill, Clearview, Woodville, and West Savannah, we believe, our health and safety will be severely threatened including 3 property damage, injuries, further compromising our existing health conditions and death as we 6 have witnessed. We have already experienced all 7 of this. We have examples 20 years back, 10 years 8 back, 2 years back, a few months back. Giant chemical and oil companies cannot be more important than the American people.

The mothers and fathers of Hudson Hill asked me to come. They gave me permission to come. I had to request my elders to allow me to come because I work -- is always so, so, so overwhelming. We believe common sense provisions that will help prevent chemical disasters and save our neighborhoods and our local economies must 18 always be our priority.

And we trust the Environmental 20 Protection Agency. We have been working with you 21 for over 30 years. Know it hasn't been an easy 22 ride but we believe that the collaboration between

the industries and government and community is essential. The explosion and fierce fire at the sugar refinery which took many lives, the three 3 4 day burning fire at the Power Dufferin industry that we didn't even know stored chemicals. We had to go to Alabama to get some substances to put the 6 7 fire out.

The fire at the Georgia Ports about a year ago. The death of a worker at the Colonial 10 Oil. All due to explosions constantly reminds us that there is a deeper need for environmental 12 protection as well as environmental justice. With 13 more drastic weather changes coming our way every 14 day, we the people of Savannah call upon the EPA 15 to do the right thing. Listen to the voice of the 16 people, not just the industries.

Our lives matter, our children lives 17 matter, our voices should matter. We represent 18 thousands of voices. If you remember over a 19 144,000 comments were made on the RMP rule. That demonstrates meaningful involvement and engagement 22 of the people in a crucial process. We cannot and Page 103

should not roll anything back. If anything, we should strengthen and deepen what we already have. We must continue to work for policies that favor 3 the people and not the profits. There should be no reconsideration of the 2017 amendments to the 6 Accidental Release Prevention requirements. We want it to stay as is and we need your help to 8 make it even stronger. We need to focus on do no 9 harm through using chemical reform. Thank you so 10 much.

MS. FRANKLIN: Okay. Thank you. Any questions? Okay. Say.

MS. YANG: Good morning and thank you 14 for this unique opportunity to speak at this public hearing on the proposed changes to the Risk Management Program rule. My name is Say Yang. S-A-Y Y-A-N-G. I am the Program Coordinator at the Center for Earth, Energy and Democracy in Minneapolis, Minnesota. We are a member of the 20 Midwest Environmental Justice Network, an 21 affiliate of the Environmental Justice Health 22 Alliance.

Page 104

Page 102

11

13

15

16

18

Page: 27 (105 - 108) EPA hearing

14

18

19

At the Center, we work in collaboration with grass roots communities, policy makers and researchers to conduct research and provide 3 4 community education on important energy, climate and environmental issues impacting low-income, indigenous and communities of color, so that they 6 can make informed decisions about policies and programs affecting their health and environmental conditions, much like today at this public 10 hearing.

In the many communities we work in 12 throughout the nation, a common theme we continue to hear is the need and want for safe healthy viable place to live, work, play, and worship. I believe this is also what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is working towards with the mission to protect human health, the environment, and access to clean air, land, and water for all. And especially in our environmental justice communities who have been historically marginalized from these accesses.

11

13

15

16

17

18

19

21

2.2

1

3

4

6

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

21

I am here today, Thursday, June 14th at Page 105

this public hearing on the proposed changes to the Risk Management Program rule to share concerns around the rescinding of the Risk Management Program rule under the Clean Air Act because when a disaster strikes, we know that every minute counts for saving lives.

As many have heard, there was an explosion in late April this year in Superior, Wisconsin, just minutes from Duluth, Minnesota sharing Lake Superior and the harbor. This was Husky Energy Oil Refinery. The explosion forced massive evacuations, sent several people to local hospitals, and several fire fighters stood by for several hours until it was clear that a dangerous toxic chemical known as hydrogen fluoride was not at risk of exploding.

This recent disaster is just one of many 18 to have occurred throughout this nation as several 19 before me have mentioned today. And each time 20 this happens, we are reminded of the potential risk and dangers of chemical facilities. We are 22 also reminded of the importance in having strong

support for prevention and preparedness activities 2 from awareness raising to field exercises on emergency response; the need for strong robust 3 4 emergency response coordination which includes 5 having immediate well-coordinated and pre-planned response; the need for a capacity to deal with the 6 several simultaneous emergencies in different 7 places; the need for frequent compliance audits of 8 these facilities to ensure the safety of workers 9 10 and communities; and the need to work with many 11 different cultural communities where I am from who 12 may have a different way of handling emergency 13 crisis.

Lastly, there is a need for safer 15 process with chemical management so that these explosions do not happen. Again, I want to thank 16 you for this opportunity of a public hearing on 17 the proposed changes to the Risk Management Program rule.

MS. FRANKLIN: Okay. Thank you. 20 MR. AVERBACK: Question. Say, you had 21 22 mentioned in your testimony that there is a need Page 107

to work with different cultural communities on, you know, going forward on new rule. Can you give some examples of ways the communication would be 3 4 different other than obviously different language communities and what's going on -- what particular 5 rule provisions would improve that process? 6

MS. YANG: Absolutely and thank you for 7 8 asking that question. Maybe a lot of communities 9 don't even know that these chemical facilities exist. And recently, I just learned of the local 10 chemical facilities in the twin cities. Many of 11 12 us we drive by the facilities not knowing what's in it and the risk that we are it if they were to 13 explode. Many of us don't even know all the 14 different types that these facilities are carrying 15 in there. And I think that, you know, there are 16 so many ways in communicating to our communities 17 18 about the risk around these facilities. And if 19 there is something in place already I am not aware 20 of it, the communities that we work with are not 21 aware of it. As far as we know these are just 22 buildings.

Page 108

EPA hearing Page: 28 (109 - 112)

8

9

10

11

15

18

19

22

4

7

Page 109

But what we do know is when something 2 smells bad, when we feel something that is burning our eyes and we start to question, but even then we still don't know what's in these facilities. 4 And I think it's the role of the EPA to work with states, to work with regions, to work with local 6 government and assimilating and explaining to communities what is in these chemicals and the 8 dangers around them.

MR. AVERBACK: Okay.

3

9

10

11

13

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

22

MS. MCCLAIN: I am from the African 12 American community in Savannah and we work with African Americans throughout the country. And one way to get information and to train and empower skill of our community is to work with our faith-based institutions. They have a very deep relationship with them, we are there most of the weak. They have a way of speaking our language, we trust them, we have been in those churches, those synagogues, those temples, those mosques for years and those are respected leaders and experts 22 that can deliver the message and help the

communities with this whole notion of the community right to know, as well as to help engage them in emergency preparedness and response.

MS. YANG: I just want to add one more 5 thing and that is that the communities that we 6 serve and the organization that I work for and our 7 affiliates with the Midwest EJ network and also 8 with the Environmental Justice Health Alliance, we are ready to work with the EPA in partnership to work with our communities around these issues.

MR. AVERBACK: Thank you.

MS. FRANKLIN: Okay. The next two speakers, Octavia Dryden, Delaware Concerned Residents for Environmental Justice, and Ken Dryden, Minority Work Force Development Coalition.

MS. DRYDEN: Thank you very much for 16 allowing us to speak today. My name is Octavia 17 18 Dryden, D-R-Y-D-E-N. And I'm a member of the Delaware Concerned Residents for Environmental 19 20 Justice, an affiliate of the Environmental Justice Health Alliance. 2.1

Just to give you a little bit of

Page 110

background about Delaware, it's a relatively small state geographically with a population of less than one million. It contains twenty- three facilities in RMP programs. These facilities use 4 over 33 million pounds of toxic chemicals in their 5 processes and over 33 million pounds of flammable 6 7 chemicals.

There have been nineteen reportable incidents of these facilities over five years costing over 30 million in property damages.

My perspective today is on behalf of 12 communities of color who are disproportionately 13 affected by chemical disasters in Delaware. We 14 live in fear every day.

An example of the types of fears we 16 experience in our community is having a chemical facility that operates over 150 tanks, each day, 17 all day. We have no idea what's in those tanks. We have no idea what that purpose is.

Not knowing what's in these tanks is a 21 real threat. And based on the previous testimony that I've heard, I think we're in quite a bit of Page 111

danger and don't know it. Not having access to information, plans for most facilities and policy makes us most vulnerable. 3

Without necessary evacuation plans, my 5 family is in a real risk. My children's safety is 6 at risk.

Rolling back regulations that protect 8 communities of color who are most impacted by 9 chemical disasters is just simply unjust.

10 Therefore, we urge EPA not only to 11 maintain the existing protections and regulations 12 but to increase protection policies and fund 13 programs that provide us the necessary 14 information, to have access to the information and 15 for greater protections for our children, family and our communities against the potential chemical 16 disasters. I thank you for this opportunity to 18 speak.

MR. AVERBACK: Mildred? Thank you for 19 20 your testimony, Octavia, my apologies, my 21 apologies.

> Have members of your organization Page 112

EPA hearing Page: 29 (113 - 116)

attempted to access information about plants in your area through the existing provisions of COPRA, through the Local Emergency Planning 3 Committee, or through any other local or the State 4 Department of Natural Resources and been turned 5 down? 6

Have folks tried using some of the existing other statutory authorities that we mentioned in our proposals as making information available? Have folks tried to use them and not been able to get them?

MS. DRYDEN: Absolutely, absolutely. We have a system, a four-year system within our state and when requests are made, they're not responded to and so that information remains unavailable to us. I mean you almost have to really seek legal counsel to get information on these particular facilities.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you.

MR. DRYDEN: Ken Dryden, D-r-y-d-e-n. 21 Foremost, let me thank the EPA family today for 22 allowing us to be here to speak on behalf of Page 113

Delawarians.

8

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

1

4

5

6

11

13

15

16

18 19

When I came today, I looked at this big, 3 beautiful building and while I don't know the mission of EPA, I see that it appeared that no cost was spared for this beautiful building.

And while you may sit there today, and 7 may see me sit here in my suit, and one pair of 8 pants, maybe a few pairs I do have, the folks who 9 I come here to speak on behalf of today you don't 10 see, the ones who badly need you to enforce sanctions or enforce whatever provisions that are 12 allocated.

When I leave here today and go back 14 home, there will be many with many health issues because of the different chemicals and different pollutions that we have where I come from. Many folks suffer, many (inaudible) communities suffer with major health disparities and they suffer from downtrodden communities.

But when I look around here and see no 20 cost has been considered in saving and think about 2.1 them at home where there is a, or appears to be a 22 Page 114

cost saving, it makes me wonder at the time and 2 the days we're living in.

We came here today to ask this panel to, 3 like we've heard from other states, that 4 5 regulations and guidelines may not be being followed. We heard that in trying to acquire 6 7 information as to the different chemicals, when we see these health disparities in our neighborhood, 9 respiratory for which I lost two parents to 10 respiratory, or they say it was, that we, my 11 parents lived in about maybe a two-mile radius of the, once was Getty Oil and now known as, I forget 12 what it's called, but it's an energy's name. 13

But I say that to say this: You don't 15 see these folks. I don't know what you do in this 16 building, but if you would come to my state, then 17 you would see the many folks who are, you may have heard of the DuPont Hospital, Children's Hospital. 18 And there you can go see many of the small 19 children who do cumulative of the problems and they are probably in that hospital. But parents 22 don't, many of them who can't afford proper Page 115

medical.

8

10

13

14

15

16

17

19

And I'm not trying to say that it's not 2 a caring thing but I do ask that you, when I 3 4 looked at your reason for why you were considering amendments and then looked at why you were 6 proposing your proposals, it just made me wonder as to do folks coming really matter. 7

And I ask that you really do consider 9 it. Thank you.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. All right, 11 the next two speakers, Elizabeth Spike, Houston Sierra Club and Stephanie Thomas, public citizen. Elizabeth, would you like to go first?

MS. SPIKE: Yes, please. My name is Elizabeth Spike and I am a resident of Houston, Texas. I am a high school chemistry teacher and I volunteer as the chair of the Houston Regional 18 Group of the Sierra Club.

Houston Regional Group of the Sierra 20 Club is one of ten regional groups across the 21 state. We represent tens of thousands of members 22 across the state of Texas. In Houston alone, Page 116 EPA hearing Page: 30 (117 - 120)

5

6

7

11

15

17

18

3

4

5

6

9

11

12

13

17

there are at least five or six thousand members. I would like to comment on the proposed changes to the assessment of safer technologies or alternatives to the hazardous processes rule of the Risk Management Program. I would like to use my time to primarily address the danger of using hydrogen fluoride as a catalyst in the alkylation reaction to produce high octane gasoline.

3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

3

4

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

Texas has a number of refineries that use HF, putting workers and surrounding communities and the general public at risk for injury and death.

Hydrogen fluoride is a low molecular weight chemical. It is volatile, meaning it evaporates easily, spreads quickly and may travel long distances up to twenty- five miles. It is made of the halogen fluorine which is the most reactive element on the periodic table.

It has a small atomic radius which pulls strongly on surrounding electrons, its own and 21 nearby and other atoms. The high electron 22 activity value allows chlorine to react easily

Page 117

with other compounds both target, in the case of the production of gasoline, and non-target, like that of human cells.

OSHA has assigned an acute toxicity value to HF of three and the National Fire 6 Protection Association has assigned a value of 7 four, meaning both organizations know that HF is dangerous to human health and people should not be exposed to it.

As a chemistry teacher I would never use HF to demonstrate or experiment in the chemistry laboratory. Safer alternatives exist that allow me to make enough chemical product on time and under budget. Thus I make wise decisions on behalf of students.

I expect EPA to keep the Risk Management Program in place because it protects workers and 18 the public, parents and the general public workers, excuse me, from the dangers of HF.

19 The full removal, of requiring 20 21 facilities and the refining chemical manufacturing of pulp and paper mill industries to conduct an 22 Page 118

assessment of safer technologies or alternatives 2 to the hazardous processes that could be used to inflate, reduce the risk of disaster and may fail 3 4 to protect lives.

And I repeat, I would never expose students to such a dangerous chemical. Safer alternatives exist. It's just that chemical and refining companies won't change unless it's 9 required by government and that's what government 10 is for.

Hydrogen fluoride is one of the most 12 deadly chemicals used by industry, ranking as the 13 top dangerous chemicals hazard in many petroleum and refinery and chemical plants.

To date, Texas refineries using HF have 16 not switched to safer alternatives. Too many oil refineries have had accidents, fires and toxic releases in recent years related to the use of HF in the alkylation units. 19

Valero's Texas City Oil Refinery had a 21 toxic release of deadly hydrogen fluoride release 22 in April 2018 due to a major fire. RMP recognize Page 119

(inaudible) that every single refinery that's using HF as a catalyst identifies a catastrophic release of HF as the number one worst case accidental release scenario.

Worst case accidental release scenarios under the RMPs were made public in 1999.

The worst case release scenario is an 8 industrial plant release event where a highly toxic chemical is instantly released and vaporizes 10 instantly or in ten minutes into a vapor cloud traveling slowly downwind under low wind speed conditions.

Low wind speed means that toxic chemical vapor clouds remain more highly concentrated and 14 more harmful as it drifts and disperses under moderate to high wind speeds. 16

Some worst case scenarios could include 18 Coke Corpus Christi West Refinery, 410,000 pounds sudden release twenty- five miles downwind that 19 20 could cause injuries and deaths.

DuPont Ingleside Chemical Plant, 3.7 21 22 million pounds sudden release twenty-five miles Page 120 EPA hearing Page: 31 (121 - 124)

downwind due to a sudden catastrophic failure. And you know the purpose of these is not Valero Corpus Christi Refinery, 210,000 2 merely just to put out the fires. The purpose is 3 pounds sudden release seventy miles downwind to really understand why these incidents happened 3 4 process, sudden release catastrophic failure. 4 in the first place and take key steps to insure Citgo Corpus Christi East Refinery, that these fires, these explosions and these 5 150,000 pounds sudden release fifteen miles deaths do not happen again. 6 downwind due to a storage drum catastrophic So we really feel that these provisions 8 failure. cannot be rolled back in order to insure the 8 9 health and safety of communities. Coastal Corpus Christi Refinery, 85,000 9 pounds sudden release three miles downwind, I also want to talk about the proposed 10 10 storage catastrophic failure. 11 removal of a requirement to provide, upon request, 11 Finally, it is most unfortunate EPA is 12 information to the public on chemical hazards, 12 13 holding this hearing only in D.C. and not in 13 which include substance names, safety data sheets, places like Corpus Christi, Pasadena or Houston to 14 accident history, Emergency Response Program let people speak for themselves on this 15 information and LPC contact information. 15 life-saving rule. Thank you. So in Texas, where I lived during 16 16 MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. Any 17 Hurricane Harvey, first responders were exposed to 17 questions? Okay. Stephanie. air fumes that they claim were hazardous to their 18 18 MS. THOMAS: Thank you. My name is health, and that has resulted in a lawsuit. 19 19 20 Stephanie Thomas, S-t-e-p-h-a-n-i-e, last name 20 So the people who were trying to save T-h-o-m-a-s. So I live in Houston, Texas, and I 21 lives were thwarted by exposure, and if this 21 22 work with the Public Citizen and National Public 22 provision had not been delayed, if this had been Page 123 Page 121 1 in place, they should have had the necessary 1 Interest Organization with more than 400,000 members and supporters across the country. And we information, the safety data sheets that would advocate for stronger health and safety and allow them the necessary information to better 3 3 4 consumer protections. So we really appreciate the 4 protect themselves as they entered into the area opportunity to testify today on the chemical that was impacted by the Arkema explosions. 5 6 disaster rule. So we really need to understand the 7 lessons of Hurricane Harvey and recall its So first I'd like to speak to some of 7 8 the proposed changes and I'd also like to speak to 8 devastating impacts on the Gulf Coast. So these 9 some of the community impacts and some of the 9 flood waters that caused the back-up generator to 10 fail led to explosions of unstable organic larger impacts as well. 10 So it is Public Citizen's opinion that 11 peroxides and the release of the stew of toxic 11 the 2017 amendments were not strong enough. So we 12 chemicals, including an unpermitted release of are not in support of these rollbacks. We believe cancer-causing ethylbenzene. 13 13 that these rollbacks will harm workers, will harm 14 So I want to read a statement quickly 14 first responders and will harm community members. 15 from Houston Fire Department Chief, Samuel Pena, 15 So some of the ways that we see these who was unable to be here today but he sent along 16 16 rollbacks being harmful, the third-party a statement. He says, "The proposed changes to 17 18 compliance audits we feel are really important the Federal Chemical Disaster Rule are 18 19 safety provisions as well as the root cause 19 unreasonable, illogical and in the opposite 20 analyses, as laws for safer technology and 20 direction of where we need to go, especially after 21 alternatives analysis that Miss Spike just spoke the Arkema chemical plant incident during Harvey. 21 22 with. 22 Limiting information to the public will have an Page 122 Page 124 EPA hearing Page: 32 (125 - 128)

8

9

11

16

17

18

20

21

22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

11

13

15

17

enormous impact in diminishing public safety. Emergency response agencies and community residents have a right to know where dangerous and 3 potentially hazardous materials exist. 4 It is critical to have this information 5

in making proper operational decisions during an emergency incident or event. Without the information, it is difficult to assess public health risks or discover what went wrong after a disaster."

6

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

5

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

So based on the EPA's own assessment, these changes will impact low income communities, minority communities and in the regulatory impact assessment, the EPA states that it did not conduct additional engagement activities associated with the rule making because it did not impose additional costs in affected communities.

This ignores the cost of health care, of well being and other costs that may be intangible like living in fear for your life.

So the EPA should not be engaged in this 21 22 rule making that disadvantages low income

Page 125

communities at the benefit of the chemical industries. And while these environmental justice communities are largely left out of the opportunity to testify, industry interests are well represented in the agency, including several 6 administrators and counselors through the EPA who 7 have served as lobbyists and litigators for the industry.

So it's no accident that these rollbacks are being proposed at a time when the foxes are in the proverbial hen house, where lobbyists for the petrochemical and refinery industries have key positions within the EPA.

So the EPA should be supporting the health and well being of Texas communities and American communities, not padding the profits of corporate polluters. Thank you.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you.

MR. AVERBACK: Earlier today, I asked 20 one of the witnesses who had criticized the third 21 party audit provision and some of the, largely 22 based on the specifications for the auditors.

Page 126

You've spoken in favor of the third 2 party audit provision. From your perspective, are all of the qualifications - you can address this 3 in your written comments if you prefer - but there 4 5 is a series of qualifications for third party audits, auditors. 6

If you could address whether those could be modified and still achieve what your objective is in your written comments or write it down, we'd 10 appreciate it.

MS. THOMAS: Yes, I would be happy to 12 address those in written comments. You know as 13 far as some of what I've seen, I know one of the 14 recommendations was to have former employees serve 15 as third-party auditors.

And I'll be honest, at this point, I have some mixed feelings about that because I do have some familiarity with processes but they may have very close ties to the entity that they're 19 auditing.

So I will be happy to address that in more detail in the comments. Thank you.

Page 127

Page 128

MR. AVERBACK: Thanks.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. Our next speakers, Bani Hudson Hines, Earthjustice and Michele Roberts from EJHA. You want to go first, Michele?

MS. ROBERTS: She has a strong voice. MS. HINES HUDSON: I am Bani Hines 8 Hudson from Louisville, Kentucky, and I'm a member of REACT, Rubbertown Emergency Action, which is

REACT is an all-volunteer group of 12 residents under the leadership of Eboni Cochran who lives near or in the fencline of a cluster of Title Five chemical facilities commonly referred 14 to as Rubbertown and is the area's largest source of industrial emissions. 16

10 affiliated with Earth Justice Health Alliance.

I am here today because I am concerned 18 about the proposed rollbacks of the Chemical 19 Disaster Prevention Measures and I'm a grandmother 20 who's looking ahead to the health of my grandchildren. 21

These rollbacks will make vulnerable

EPA hearing Page: 33 (129 - 132)

6

7

8

12

15

16

17

18

19

2

3

5

6

9

10

11

12

17

19

failure.

communities more so, in spite of the current administration's admittance that risks fall significantly greater on those communities. 3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

1

4

6

10

11

13

14

15

17

facility.

Most of the residents live or work in a chemical release danger zone where toxic releases expose them to a half dozen chemicals that could burn their skin, or lungs, or kill them.

And more than 600,000 people, or 67% of Louisville residents, live within three miles of the city's 23 RMP facilities. This is 72% higher than the national rate of 39% of the U.S. population that lives within three miles of such a

14 In Rubbertown, the DuPont plant puts the most people at risk, more than 70,000 within a sixteen-mile radius depending on weather and wind conditions. But the closest neighbors of plants that store large quantities of deadly chemicals

are more likely to be black or Latino. 19 20 Advancing rollbacks supported by chemical companies will further endanger 22 Rubbertown residents. And I offer a few examples Page 129 A lot of these people attribute to allergies.

The cost of doing business should be the 2 cost of operating safely and in a manner that 3 4 values the community, first responders, workers 5 and families.

In 2012, Paducah and Louisville Railway cars derailed with nine of the thirteen cars carrying hazardous materials. Three workers were hospitalized after a butadiene fueled blaze 9 10 ignited and another worry was the stockpile of 11 hydrogen fluoride penned close to the fire.

Hundreds were evacuated. Workers were 13 hosing down chemicals that can cause severe respiratory damage. And the fire burned for several days before stabilization.

In 2011 an explosion at Carbide Industries required fire crews from seventeen departments and left two dead.

The city of Louisville acknowledged that the information system in place did not work as well as it should have and reports differed as to 22 whether there was no danger to residents or if

Page 131

Page 132

of things we've experienced.

In anticipation of rollback, I suspect, 3 in 2017 American Synthetic Rubber requested and was granted the right to ease toxic air requirements, even with its history of air quality violations.

Rubbertown residents dread the industrial domino effect that will be facilitated 9 by the rollbacks and put us at greater risk of disasters.

EPA prevention measures responsive to the thousands of incidences from 2004 to 2013, and the harm they caused, are still needed in Rubbertown.

The company Hexion has had a hundred electrical or mechanical failures that have caused 16 excess chemical pollution in the last three years 18 and has been fined and cited for improper record 19 keeping and reporting. The excess releases of 20 phenol and methanol have threatened residents with irritation to skin, eyes, mucous membranes, 2.1 22 blurred vision, headaches, dizziness and nausea.

residents should shelter in place. confusion.

The failsafe system promised afterward by officials has not happened.

The Carbide explosion resulted from a failure by the company to investigate similar but smaller explosive incidents over many years while 8 deferring crucial maintenance of the furnace that eventually blew up, according to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. It ran the equipment to

The report said the company could have 13 prevented it had it voluntarily applied elements of a process safety management program such as 14 Hazard Analysis Incident Investigation and Mechanical Integrity, thus proving the need for 16 continued and improved prevention measures. Not 18 rollbacks.

The CSB chairman at the time stated that 20 the national standard adopted by industry 21 incorporated into state and federal requirements 22 would go a long way in preventing such tragedies.

EPA hearing Page: 34 (133 - 136)

2

17

18

19

4

11

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

Page 134

Low income communities and communities of color are unprotected. Our rights are not the same as others who can drive in and out and who can escape a disaster if a plant blows up by not being close by.

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1

3

4

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.1

The environmental injustice of rollbacks is clear. Business friendly enforcement of environmental laws which increase the unfair exposure to harmful chemicals to the poor and communities of color will be exacerbated.

The discriminatory zoning and land use 12 practices in those communities that make escape and legal redress difficult will be made more so by rollbacks that privilege profits before people.

And access to information and services after, not to mention before, environmental disasters, will be denied with chemical industries being able to hide dangers from residents who have the right to know what we're exposed to.

These environmental time bombs created 21 by rolling back preventative and protective 22 measures may blow up - no pun intended - first in Page 133

disadvantaged communities, but collateral damage to others is guaranteed by us all living on the same planet.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. Michele? MS. ROBERTS: Thank you. My name is 6 Michele Roberts. I'm the National Co-Coordinator 7 of the Environmental Justice Health Alliance, 8 which is a national alliance of fencline groups and advocates who serve them, many of those groups you've heard testify this morning, along with our affiliate member REACT.

We are here actually to, you know when we've looked at this fact sheet, it makes me want to fall off the chair. We're here to really state the fact that all of these proposed changes to the RMP Reconsideration Rule are actually a slow and impending pathway to genocide for communities of color and the poor.

Why is that? In January 2017, the U.S. 20 Environmental Protection Agency finalized amendments to its Risk Management Plan Rule that 22 was supposed to prevent chemical releases and

explosions at 12,500 high-risk facilities across this nation.

These "modest improvements", these 3 4 modest improvements are what is on the table today to be rolled back. What is important to know is 5 that these modest improvements were developed 6 through an exhaustive three-year process that included ten public listening sessions, two 8 separate public comment dockets that received over 9 10 144,000 comments of small business advocacy review 11 panel, a 147-page regulatory impact analysis, a 12 259-page response to public comments, and two 13 reviews. Not one, two reviews by the Office of 14 Information and Regulatory Affairs. Today, you 15 want to roll all of this back down the hill. That is morally reprehensible. 16

Too many of our communities are faced with health disparities, mortality disparities, forced evacuations, forced migration and we don't even have to speak to the community of Mossville, which has been part of this process up to this 22 point that now as we speak cease, no longer exist

Page 135

Page 136

because they have been overcome by major, major high-risk facilities that have severely displaced them in a very unjust buy-out. 3

The Presidential Executive Order 1289A on Federal actions to address environmental justice in communities of color and lower income 6 populations. And the EPA's own environmental justice policies require the agency to identify 8 9 and address potential disproportionate impacts of 10 the actions on people of color, low income communities, indigenous peoples and provide for "meaningful" involvement of these populations and 13 communities in the decision-making processes.

These are commitments that Administrator Pruitt testified, under oath, at his confirmation hearing in around the questions from then Senator Corey Booker that he would uphold. Unfortunately, what we are seeing today with this rollback is the proposal that it's a complete rollback of what 20 Senator Pruitt, excuse me, Administrator Pruitt testified to his will to protect communities of 22 color, environmental justice communities.

Page: 35 (137 - 140) EPA hearing

2

3

4

5

7

11

15

17

18

19

21

22

3

5

12

14

15

16

17

18

21

22

EPA's process to develop the RMP amendments provided multiple opportunities for affected communities to provide input and 4 influence and develop the rule adopted under this specific element to address disproportionate impacts and hazards.

3

5

6

8

9

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

6

10

11

12

17

Today all of these pieces are subjugated to being rolled back.

In addition to that, as you heard from our many members of our collective, the challenge 10 that they receive in even trying to get to 11 Washington to testify. There's only one public 12 hearing in Washington, D.C. that is not cost prohibitive, excuse me, that is cost prohibitive to our communities.

They cannot come and spend nights in \$400 and four, five, six hundred dollar a night hotels and leave their families to be able to come and share their testimonies, when actually we feel that the EPA should be in their communities such as what they did before.

I'm going to end on this note. We have

Page 137

1 schools, we have children, we have elderly. have the poor. We have communities of color and 3 the poor where we have utilized your data that 4 show that they are in disproportionate impact of 5 being actually there at the fencline should a catastrophic event happen.

In addition to that, we have volunteer 8 firefighters, first responders, first receivers, 9 all whom you've heard that are actually willing and wanting to be able to protect our nation's public should something happen.

The unfortunate part is the lack of the political will in this administration, 13 unfortunately, to show the moral courage to 14 protect what you all call the people of the 15 16 homeland.

We are asking, we are standing here with 18 over 144,000 members and those who are in the 19 shadows and people you have not heard from yet to 20 be able to say that these modest regulations that we were able to receive and achieve under the 22 previous administration should be your baseline

for taking us higher, not lower.

The life and the breath and the well being of the many members of this homeland, the many community people and workers of this homeland are in your hands. We ask, at the end of the day, how well will you uphold the homeland to make sure that each and every one, from the shadows to the industrial representatives sitting at the table, 9 are fully protected. There is no Planet B. Thank 10 you very much.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you, Michele. Any 12 questions? Okay.

13 I have one more speaker. Maya Nye. I'm 14 going to let her say who she's representing.

MS. NYE: Good afternoon. My name is 16 Maya Nye. I'm here today representing People Concerned About Chemical Safety, based in Chemical Valley, West Virginia, and I'm also here representing the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition. I'm here primarily as a former impacted resident.

> I lived within a mile of high-risk Page 139

facilities my entire childhood. Every single school that I went to as a child was within one mile of a high-risk facility. We, in the 1980s, 4 were actually the model, we were the West Texas of creating chemical safety regulations.

In 1985, a leak that occurred right 7 after the Bhopal disaster in our community is one 8 of the key events that actually sparked the Risk 9 Management Programs' initiation. You may not be 10 aware of that. So we've been dealing with this for a long time. 11

And we are also affiliates of the 13 Environmental Justice and Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform and we underscore everything that our folks have said. Our fencline communities are also communities of color and low income communities.

You know I had prepared testimony but 19 how do you sum up in five minutes a lifetime of 20 some of the most unjust things that have happened to you in your entire life.

> When I was 16 years old, a pesticide Page 140

EPA hearing Page: 36 (141 - 144)

7

9

22

facility blew up, the Institute Facility a mile 2 away from my house and that same, exact chemical came into my house. And that same exact unit blew 3 up after Risk Management Plans were implemented. Same exact unit. Two workers died the first time. 6 Two workers died the second time and for the span of time that that happened, we knew for twenty years, that inherently safer technologies existed to be able to change the processes.

They were actually economically viable to other companies, to DuPont, but Bayer Crop Science chose not to implement those; and as a result, we had another explosion that nearly eclipsed the Bhopal disaster, because the chemical that was being stored in our community was the same chemical that was released in Bhopal, India.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1

8

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

21

We stored it, and stockpiled it in 17 twofold what existed in the Bhopal disaster. 18 Twofold. We lived with that under our pillows 19 20 every night. And we could see what the 21 catastrophic harm would be should that happen. So 22 the fear that you live in when you live that close

Page 141 to something like that is pretty spectacular.

I think I said it, I worked for the 3 chemical industry. My father, my mother, my step 4 mother, my step father, we all worked for the 5 chemical industry. So I understand what it means 6 to have such an economic stability within your 7 community.

But when you're faced with this kind of 9 fear and disaster, it's just - inherently safer technologies exist that would make us much safer. And, in fact, a better strategy to preventing terrorist attacks is actually to reduce the terrorist threats that exist. Just as Paul Orum said earlier on.

You know we have no evidence that emergency responders have ever threatened national security, but we do have evidence that Bayer Crop 18 Science, who now owns Monsanto, they're also an 19 active member of the American Chemistry Council's 20 Responsible Care Program. And in fact a number of those facilities have been among the ones who were 22 the worst actors in our community.

Page 142

But we do have evidence that Bayer Crop 2 Science intentionally hid behind Homeland Security laws and actually testified to Congress that they 3 4 did that in order to prevent the community from knowing that the danger of MIC still existed in 5 our community. They acknowledged that. 6

So they refused to provide emergency 8 responders with this crucial information that prevented them from actually responding to the 10 disaster for over forty-five minutes putting, not 11 only the emergency responders, but the community 12 in danger.

13 What else have I not gotten to? You 14 know, your current economic analysis fails to 15 consider the external lives, social and health cost of cumulative exposures within these, 16 associated with these Risk Management facilities. 17 It fails to monetize the harm of the structural 18 racism in poverty that it perpetuates by siting 19 these facilities in predominantly low income communities and communities of color. 21

> No clean company wants to develop next Page 143

to that dangerous facility. Certainly Disneyland doesn't want to. We'd love to have that kind of great economic development in our community. 3 4 Contra Costa County Industrial Safety Ordinance 5 has implemented industrial, or inherently safer technology feasibility studies for years. They've 6 7 incorporated public participation. They have 8 provided emergency responders with essential 9 hazard information for years without it being a 10 breach of a national security threat.

So it's pretty reminiscent that this 11 12 national security threat is being thrown around 13 now, just like what Bayer threw out, just to not 14 be able to tell the community the dangers that exist in their back yard. 15

I have more but I guess I'm going to 17 have to submit it in written testimony. Thank 18 you.

MS. FRANKLIN: Thank you. Well, we 20 don't have anymore scheduled speakers for this 21 session. So we're going to take a short recess. 22 I'm sorry, not a short recess. We're going to Page 144

16

EPA hearing Page: 37 (145 - 148)

break for, well, unless somebody shows up in the next five minutes, but we will go ahead and recess the hearing and we will get back at 1:00 o'clock to restart the hearing. 4

(Recess)

3

5

6

15

16

17

1

2

3

4

6

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.1

22

MS. REGNA: We're going to restart the hearing now. My name is Jean Regna and I'm the panel chair for this session of the public hearing. I'm an attorney with our New York office in Region 2. Joining me now on the panel are Jon 10 Averback, who's an attorney with our Office of 11 General Counsel, and Kim Jennings, who's the 12 13 division director of Regulation Implementation Division. 14

Our first two speakers will be Patrick O'Connor and Alexandra Romero. Patrick, would you like to begin?

MR. O'CONNOR: Sure. Thank you very 18 much. Good afternoon. I'm Pat O'Connor. I'm 19 here on behalf today of the International Warehouse Logistics Association. The acronym is 22 IWLA. We appreciate the opportunity to

Page 145

participate in this public hearing on the proposed revisions to the RMP standard.

Our member companies are warehouse-based third-party logistics providers. They act as distribution centers for their customers. They offer warehousing, inventory, and supply chain 7 management capabilities, as well as a broad range of value-added services.

We have a Chemical Council within our membership. The members of the Chemical Council store and handle chemicals and other hazardous materials from manufacturers and wholesale distributors. They take possession and provide care, custody, and control of these materials for future shipment at the direction of the product owner. We do not own the product. We do not sell the product. We are simply an intermediary in the supply chain.

The majority of our Chemical Council 20 members are closed-container warehousing operations. While others may repackage chemicals, especially liquids from both tank, truck, and

railcars into drums, totes, pails, et cetera.

We've had a long history with EPA, with 2 the RMP. IWLA worked with EPA back in 2000 to 3 4 develop a comprehensive implementation guidance 5 document for chemical warehouse operators, "Risk Management Program Guidance for Warehouses." I'm 6 7 pleased to say that that document is still available on the Internet, on your website. I was saying to someone earlier today that probably 9 10 merited some updating.

Our members also participated as members 11 12 of the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel, or 13 SBAR, under the SBREFA process. We were unhappy, to say the least, though, that EPA ignored its obligations under SBREFA by submitting a proposed 15 rule to the Office of Management and Budget before 16 the SBAR panel had completed its report. That is 17 one of the reasons we feel that the revisions and 18 review of the RMP standard are warranted because 19 the Agency, to a great extent, overlooked the concerns that were raised during the SBREFA 21 22 process.

Page 147

In 2017, we did join with other 1 organizations in asking EPA to reconsider the 2017 rule. One of those reasons, of course, was that 3 4 the impetus for the 2017 RMP rule grew out of the tragic explosion of the ammonium nitrate 5 fertilizer facility in West Texas. That explosion 6 was considered an accidental chemical release. It was later determined to be arson, an intentional 8 9 criminal act.

While there may be support for the 11 overarching goals of the RMP, and I, again, would reiterate that we worked with the Agency back in 2000 on a guidance document because we saw the benefit of the goals of the original RMP, we had several significant concerns with the RMP as finalized by the Agency in 2017. We appreciate the fact that many of these concerns are addressed in the revisions that you folks released in May.

Just to highlight a few of those 20 concerns, we feel the RMP rule overlaps and 21 conflicts with other federal programs designed to 22 promote safety and security. EPA's RMP rule will Page 148

Page 146

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

EPA hearing Page: 38 (149 - 152)

6

8

13

be duplicative and add regulatory burdens and 2 likely additional -- likely inconsistencies. In particular, EPA's expansion of the definition of "catastrophic release" to include releases that only produce onsite impact conflicts with OSHA's statutory authority over such releases.

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

2.2

1

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

22

We're concerned with the numerous inadequacies of a proscriptive inherently safer technology analysis. Those inadequacies have been well documented in response to similar proposals from other agencies and are not any more suitable under the RMP program.

The RMP rule's requirement of third-party audits is infeasible in certain circumstances due to the high cost and lack of availability of qualified third-party auditors, which have not shown to provide an improvements in safety in comparison to self audits. The third-party audits are likely to introduce unnecessary complexity, burden, and hardship that are not warranted.

> As EPA has previously acknowledge, the Page 149

monetized benefits of the RMP rule are likely to exceed the monetized benefits (sic). An appropriate cost-benefit analysis would further underscore how costly this rule would be in comparison to its benefits.

Thank you for consideration of these 7 comments. And I'm sorry I didn't beat the red light.

> MS. REGNA: Thank you. Any questions? MR. O'CONNOR: Thanks.

MS. REGNA: Thank you. Actually, before we continue there's a statement I'd like to read. For everyone's awareness, this hearing is open to the press and we have members of the media present with us today. This event is open to any form of recording, video, audio, and photos. We ask that you not cause any disruption to those testifying 18 or observing the hearing.

For members of the media, please refrain 20 from interviewing in the public hearing room. If 21 you need interview space, please ask an EPA press contact the Media Registration table. And for

people here to present testimony, it is under your 2 discretion whether you would like to be interviewed by a member of the press, and we ask 3 4 that media members here today respect each 5 individual's wishes.

Alexandra?

MS. ROMERO: Good afternoon. My name's Alexandra Romero. I'm an attorney with the law 9 firm of Arent Fox and we represent CRA, the Corn 10 Refiners Association. I'm here today to provide 11 CRA's comments on the proposed RMP reconsideration 12 rule, and we appreciate the opportunity to participate.

14 Corn refiners produce sweeteners, 15 starch, bio products, corn oil, and feed products 16 from corn components, such as starch, protein, and fiber. CRA consists of 4 leading member 17 companies, with 27 domestic processing plants 18 located in 11 states. CRA members process 19 approximately 11 percent of the United States' corn supply, which accounts for 8,000 jobs and 21 impacts an additional 259,000 jobs. CRA and its 22 Page 151

predecessors have served this important segment of American agribusiness since 1913. 2

CRA's members support the RMP 3 4 reconsideration rule which rescinds many of the amendments about which CRA raised concerns in the written comments that it submitted in May of 2016. 6 CRA's members believe that the original 1996 RMP requirements have been and continue to be highly 8 9 effective in minimizing the risk of chemical 10 accidents. Based on EPA data, the number of accidents at RMP-covered facilities has decreased 12 by approximately 60 percent from 1996 through 13 2013. A very small number of RMP-covered 14 facilities are responsible for the majority of reportable accidents. Ninety-two percent of 15 RMP-covered facilities had no accidents at all 16 between 2004 and 2013. 17

And the corn refining industry is 19 particularly safe. RMP incident data indicates 20 that for the 10-year period from 2004 through 21 2013, only 0.9 percent of incidents, 22 of 2,291, 22 involved in facilities within the NAICS codes Page 152

Page 150

EPA hearing Page: 39 (153 - 156)

15

16

17

18

19

21

7

8

9

11

13

14

16

17

19

21

22

under which CRA's members mostly operate. 2 Accordingly, CRA supports the rescission of the amendments relating to third-party audits, the 3 4 requirement that owner-operators conduct compliance audits for each covered process, the 5 requirement that owner-operators conduct a root 6 cause analysis as part of their incident investigations, the provisions requiring safer technology and alternatives analyses, the information sharing requirements, training 10 requirements for supervisors with process 11 operational responsibilities, the provisions 12 expanding the scope of process hazard analyses, and the provisions pertaining to the updating of process safety information. 15 16

While safety and the environment is a top priority for CRA's members, as it is throughout the entire industry, CRA believes that these amendments would impose enormous costs with very little, if any, corresponding safety or environmental benefit.

17

18

19

21

2.2

1

8 9

10

17

As the Supreme Court has clarified,

Page 153

rulemakings initiated under the Clean Air Act must address the costs of the proposed actions on the public, as well as the likely benefits. Here, 3 4 however, CRA's members believe that the rulemaking record for the RMP amendments was fundamentally 6 | flawed because it shows that the Agency failed to 7 consider a number of important factors that bear on the cost of the amendments and failed to quantify the anticipated benefits of the changes in the rule.

Of the major changes, EPA's cost-benefit 11 analysis falls particularly short with respect to two, which are illustrative of the deficiencies in 13 the other amendments. First, EPA's proposal to 14 require third-party audits is infeasible and 15 appears to be premised on the assumption that 16 third parties are more capable, more credible, and more objective than a facility's own employees. CRA's members disagree with that assumption and 19 20 did not find any evidence in the record that the third party audit requirement would result in any appreciable safety or environmental benefit. 22

Second, there's no data in the 2 rulemaking record to suggest that requiring an STAA analysis provides any measurable benefits or 4 reduces the frequency or severity of incidents. 5 In New Jersey, which has required facilities to conduct an inherent safety technology analysis 6 since 2008, a review of EPA's 10-year accident history data shows that the number of reportable 8 incidents has not decreased since the 9 10 implementation of that requirement. And, in fact, there have been more reportable incidents in five 11 12 years since the rule when into effect than the 13 five years prior. Retaining this amendment will likely have the same negligible effect at great

In summary, CRA believes that the lack of evidence in the rulemaking record regarding the specific benefits that may occur as a result of these amendments confirms that the original RMP requirements have been and continue to be highly effective. Accordingly, CRA believes that 22 inspections and enforcement of existing

cost to covered facilities.

Page 155

regulations that are targeted towards the minority of RMP-covered facilities that are repeat offenders would be a more effective way to 3 4 decrease chemical accidents without burdening facilities that have never had an accident with the proposed amendments. 6

Thank you for your time and consideration.

MR. AVERBACK: Thank you, Alexandra.

10 MS. ROMERO: Sure.

MR. AVERBACK: You mentioned the 12 accident rates in New Jersey since the implementation of I guess what they call ISD, we call it STAA. Have you compared the rates there to a comparable state with a similar mix of chemical handling facilities, regulated facilities, like Delaware or perhaps parts of 18 Pennsylvania or whatever? MS. ROMERO: Yes, we have looked at that

20 and compared New Jersey's data with other states. I don't have the specific off the top of my head.

MR. AVERBACK: No.

Page 156

EPA hearing Page: 40 (157 - 160)

1

2

3

4

5

6

9

11

18

19

6

11

13

14

16

MS. ROMERO: But we did not see any appreciable difference. MR. AVERBACK: Yeah, when you submit 3

5

8

10

11

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

4 your comments because, I mean, we did have sort of a specific request for information on accident 6 history, teasing out a lot of them. You know, our identification of the STAA codes were based on accident history.

Are your facilities, the corn refinery facilities, subject to STAA under the 2017 rule or are you outside the magic (inaudible)?

MS. ROMERO: I believe that they're 13 primarily outside of that requirement, outside of the coverage of that requirement.

MR. AVERBACK: Outside of it. And as long as you're still up there, Patrick, Alexandra mentioned the accident history of her members' facilities. Do you have any information on accident rates at warehouses?

MR. O'CONNOR: You know, I do not, but I 20 21 made a note to myself to get that and we'll 22 include that in our written comments.

Page 157

MR. AVERBACK: Okay, because you would 2 be subject to the incident investigation and I guess the third-party audit are both triggers on incidents. So that information's useful to us. Thank you.

MR. O'CONNOR: Okay, we'll provide it. MS. REGNA: Thank you both. Our next 8 two speakers will be Malin Moench and Jake Tyner. Malin, would you like to begin?

MR. MOENCH: My name is Malin Moench. Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment consists of some 430 physicians and other healthcare professionals. We offer our expertise to improve public understanding of the intimate connection between environmental health and human health.

FEMA recently concluded that earthquakes are Utah's most serious natural threat. The main 18 reason is the Wasatch fault. Nearly 80 percent of 19 Utah's population and 85 percent of its economic 20 activity is located in harm's way within 15 miles 21 of this fault. For better or worse, Utah has put 22 nearly all of its eggs in this very geologically

risky basket.

Seismologists tell us that the odds are 43 percent that an earthquake of magnitude 6.7 or greater will strike the Wasatch front in the next 50 years. Such an earthquake would damage a majority of the region's building foundations. It would rupture chemical storage tanks, as well as gas, water, and sewer lines. Fatalities and serious injuries would exceed 10,000, and economic 10 damage would reach 35 billion.

The infrastructure most at risk is 12 Refinery Row that lines Salt Lake City's northern 13 escape route. These five oil refineries were built on top of the fault line. They rest on soil 15 prone to liquefaction. More than 70 years old, these refineries were never engineered to 16 withstand a major earthquake. 17

When it comes, experts anticipate natural gas-fed fires and explosions, loss of 20 electrical power to operate safety valves and switches, and loss of the water needed to cool 22 pipes, extinguish fires, and tamp down toxic vapor

Page 159

clouds. VOCs, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and acid aerosols can be expected to pour into surrounding neighborhoods and, depending on 3 4 prevailing winds, into Salt Lake City whose downtown is six miles away.

These refineries are public health time 7 bombs. They border residential neighborhoods, 8 commercial districts, and elementary schools. 9 They are waiting to be detonated by a major 10 earthquake.

Worst of all, if a magnitude 6.7 12 earthquake struck tomorrow, it would likely expose thousands of Wasatch front residents to the chemical from hell: Hydrogen fluoride, or HF. Breathing it swells the lungs, fills them with water, and soon causes the victim to suffocate. At high concentrations brief exposure is lethal. 18 When released, HF forms a toxic cloud denser than 19 air, that hugs the ground and can spread for miles 20 without losing its ability to kill. Because it 21 quickly damages human tissue of all types and 22 dissipates slowly, large HF releases in urban Page 160

EPA hearing Page: 41 (161 - 164)

19

21

22

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

21

22

Page 162

Page 161

areas can inflict mass casualties.

Only 50 of the nation's oil refineries continue to rely on HF, but they have experienced 3 131 HF releases or near misses. Three of Salt 4 Lake's refineries still use it. As far as safety is concerned, Utah's oil refineries essentially 6 self-regulate, but not effectively. Over 10 years they have averaged one fire, explosion, or chemical release every 9 days. Although most of these incidents did not involve HF, high overall 10 accident rates like this are the best predictor of 11 whether a refinery using HF will eventually spill 12 13 it.

Regarding chemical accidents, there's a regulatory vacuum in Utah. It's Division of Air Quality says that it is not its job to regulate accidental refinery emissions or to plan for an HF-related disaster. Utah's OSHA counterpart says that it will investigate accidental emissions only when they injure refinery workers. Otherwise, it will not monitor accidental emissions, not inspect 22 how HF is stored or used, and will not plan for an

If a magnitude 6.7 earthquake strikes 2 the Wasatch front its residents will pay a heavy price for repeal of those essential safety 4 regulations.

MS. REGNA: Thank you. Jake, would you 5 like to speak? 6

MR. TYNER: Sure. Good afternoon. My 7 8 name is Jake Tyner and I'm here on behalf of the 9 U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber is the world's largest bidder -- business federation 10 11 representing the interests of more than 3 million 12 businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. The Chamber supports the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposal to 15 16 rescind or modify certain provisions of the amendments to the final Risk Management Program 17 rule. 18

The safety and security of facilities, employees, and communities are extremely important to the Chamber and its members. The Chamber's members conduct risk management planning,

Page 163

Page 164

HF disaster.

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

In January 2017, the EPA issued its chemical disaster rule. It would have required 3 Salt Lake refineries that use HF to evaluate switching to less hazardous alternatives, to find 6 the root causes of accidents, to help first 7 responders device accident response plans, and to 8 disclose its use of HF to workers and residents who are in harm's way so that they could better prepare for HF releases.

There are 1.6 million Utahans living within the maximum risk zone of a refinery that stores and uses HF. It is urgent that we implement the accident provision measures of the chemical disaster rule described above.

The EPA now proposes to drop them. Its motive is to save the oil refineries, what we call 18 pennies on the disaster dollar: Saving an individual refinery a few hundred thousand dollars 20 while risking the billions of dollars' worth of 21 harm that a major release of toxic chemicals like HF could inflict on our region. 22

investment security, and believe that supporting an ongoing partnership between businesses and federal, state, and local officials is critical to 3 4 ensuring facility safety today and in the future. However, the Chamber's long opposed the 2017 5 amendments to the RMP rule that EPA's proposal 6 seeks to now change because they were 7 unreasonable, unnecessary, and adopted under a 8 9 flawed process.

EPA first issued the RMP rule amendments on January 13, 2017. To that end, the Chamber 12 joined a number of other industry associations known as the RMP Coalition in petitioning the EPA to reconsider the final RMP rule amendments in February 2017. The petition focused on how a number of procedural deficiencies related to the RMP rule and concluded an effective notice and comment rulemaking in violation of the 19 Administrative Procedure Act, as well as 20 previously unknown purposeful and criminal circumstances surrounding the West Texas incident that motivated the amendments.

EPA hearing Page: 42 (165 - 168)

14

17

18

19

20

21

2

3

4

5

6

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the incident was no accident. Notably, the incident inspired Executive Order 13650, improving chemical facility safety and security, which serves as the driver for the amendments to the RMP rule.

3

4

5

6

11

13

15

17

18

19

3

8 9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

21

22

reside.

Over the course of spring 2017, EPA 8 delayed the effective data of the RMP rule amendments a number of times in order to give 9 serious and due consideration to the procedural, 10 substantive, and security concerns raised in the reconsideration petitions. Ultimately, on June 9, 12 2017, EPA acted to delay the rule's effective date for 20 months until February 19, 2019, in order to consider the serious issues in the petitions for reconsideration of the rule and take future 16 regulatory action, which could include proposing, finalizing, or revising the RMP rule.

The Chamber supported the EPA's delay of the RMP rule amendments' effective date because it was a prudent course of action given the 22 deficiencies it the rulemaking process for the RMP

Page 165 1 rule and the many concerns raised by stakeholders in their comments during the rule's promulgation.

Chamber noted that provisions included in the RMP rule amendments were unnecessary, too costly and 6 that the changes in the amendments would not lead

In written comments submitted in May 2016, the

7 to safer outcomes for the chemical industry, its workers, or the communities where these businesses

Specifically, those provisions overlapped and conflicted with other existing federal programs designed to promote safety and security, included an unjustified alternative analysis requirement, created security risks through public disclosure requirements and other measures, required unfeasible third-party auditing requirements, failed to be justified through the appropriate cost-benefit analysis, and did not comply with the Small Business Regulatory 20 Enforcement Fairness Act, and address the many

Administration's report and other advocacy Page 166

issues raised in the Small Business

communications by the SBA. 1

2 The proposal addressed today would rescind the amendments to the RMP rule related to 3 4 technology and alternatives analysis, third-party 5 audits, incident investigations, information availability, and several other minor regulatory 6 changes. The proposal would also modify 7 amendments related to local emergency coordination and emergency exercises, and change the compliance 9 10 dates for those provisions in order to address 11 their shortcomings and make them effective and 12 efficient at advancing emergency preparedness and 13 response.

The Chamber supports the overarching 15 goals of the Risk Management Program under the Clean Air Act, finds that the performance record of the existing RMP rule is efficiently advancing the safety and security objectives of these goals, and believes that the proposal appropriately addresses our concerns and removes unnecessary, overlapping, and overly burdensome requirements 22 without jeopardizing safety or security.

Page 167

Thank you for your time and consideration.

MS. REGNA: Thank you both. Our next two speakers will be Richard Pavlak and Sydney Colopy. Richard, would you like to start?

MR. PAVLAK: Good afternoon. My name is 7 Richard Pavlak. I'm speaking today on behalf of 8 the Chemical Safety Advocacy Group, also known as CSAG.

CSAG is a coalition of companies formed 11 specifically to improve EPA and OSHA's actions to amend the regulations of the Risk Management Program and Process Safety Management Program, respectively. CSAG members collectively possess the experience of dozens of RMP and PSM facilities and decades of work advancing best practices in RMP and PSM, and the refining oil and gas, 18 chemicals, and general manufacturing sectors.

CSAG actively engaged in every phase 20 leading up to the issuance of the January 13, 21 2017, amendments, filing extensive comments on the 22 proposed rule, and accompanying ICR, initiating Page 168 EPA hearing Page: 43 (169 - 172)

8

10

16

17

18

4

5

6

9

10

meetings with OMB to discuss our concerns and offer meaningful alternatives, filing a formal petition for reconsideration to explain our 3 continued concerns, and filing a petition for 4 review of the amendments. CSAG has approached this new RMP rule proposal with the same 6 dedication to risk management and process safety excellence and offers the following oral comments to accompany our formal written submittal.

10

11

1

3

4

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17 18

2.1

22

CSAG supports EPA's decision to reconsider aspects of the rule and believes that the information needed to support the majority of 12 13 the proposed changes is already in the record for the 2017 amendments. CSAG appreciates that EPA 14 was under a tight timeframe to finalize the 15 amendments by January 2017, but also assets that 16 the seven-month period from the close of the 17 comment period to publication of the final 18 amendments was simply too share for EPA staff to 19 adequately consider and address the extensive information provided in the comments on the 22 proposal. As a result, the amendments did not Page 169

adequately respond to the overwhelming information in the record that laid out where the continued problems were and how to fix them.

In addition, the amendments retained provisions counterproductive to the RMP goal of 6 safety and environmental protection by way of a 7 strong performance standard. Industry has already implemented and developed mature programs and best 8 practices pursuant to the current RMP rules' performance- driven provisions. Indeed, EPA repeatedly confirmed on the record that the RMP rules in place since the early 1990s have been successful and highly productive -- protective, and I quote, "effective in preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in the United States and protecting human health and the environment from chemical hazards."

Rather than showing a need for more 19 rules, the concerns with the RMP program are a 20 result of inadequate implementation at a facility and enforcement of outliers by the regulators. As CSAG explained in its reconsideration petition, a Page 170

major problem with the 2017 RMP amendments is that 2 they provide no quantifiable benefits relative to -- excuse me one minute -- relative to their high 3 4 compliance costs. Fundamentally, they focus on the wrong things relative to the goals of 5 preventing catastrophic releases and mitigating 6 their consequences. 7

For example, the safer technology and alternatives analysis provisions were extremely costly, yet provided no benefits and were being 11 driven through procedures that EPA acknowledged 12 are poorly suited to such analyses CSAG believes 13 that the alternative technologies are already being considered as new processes are being 15 designed and that the expensive analysis in STAA provides no meaningful benefits.

Another example is that third-party auditing provisions delegated enforcement and inspection authority to private parties. Further, 19 the 2017 amendments created new harms to the public and environment that EPA had not intended. 22 CSAG and other stakeholders, including federal Page 171

security and law enforcement agencies, raised serious concerns with the security implications of the 2017 RMP amendments. 3

The amendments compel disclosure of security- sensitive information with no means to keep it out of the hands of terrorists or other criminals. CSAG was gratified to see that EPA 8 acknowledged these harms and has now proposed revisions to address these dangers on which we will submit written comments.

CSAG looks forward to providing further 11 12 comments, supporting documentation, and alternative ways to address the environmental and 13 public safety objectives in the newly proposed RMP 14 rule. CSAG remains concerned with the resource 15 constraints and the coordination and exercise 16 provisions, timeframe for holding public meetings, 18 and issues related to near-miss, supervisor training, and compliance audits. It is important 19 20 that these statements in the final rule and this 21 proposal be precise and meaningful in the 22 regulations on these points.

EPA hearing Page: 44 (173 - 176)

7

8

9

10

15

17

18

19

20

21

22

5

confused.

We thank you for the time allotted to testify today. MS. REGNA: Thank you. Sydney, would 3 you like to speak? 4

5

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1

3

4

5

6

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

MS. COLOPY: Good afternoon and thank 6 you for the opportunity to speak today. My name is Sydney Colopy and I'm here to voice my strong opposition to the EPA's proposed reconsideration of accidental release prevention requirements under the Risk Management Program.

The EPA's proposed rule would reverse critical improvements to chemical facility safety standards that protect workers, neighborhoods, and communities. It is extremely important that chemical facilities to examine solutions that are less dangerous to their workers and local communities, yet the EPA's proposing eliminating the requirement that the most dangerous chemical facilities assess safer alternatives.

The proposed rule would also put workers and communities at higher risk by removing the compliance audit requirement and all requirements Page 173

for independent third-party audits. Communities, residents, and workers deserve to have an unbiased and independent assessment of safety failures if a chemical disaster occurs. And third-party audits demonstrate a business best practice.

In addition, EPA's proposal to remove

7 requirements for root cause analysis, 8 knowledgeable investigative teams, and 9 documentation of investigations shows completely disregard for preventing future incidents. Vulnerable populations are at an even higher risk

if these safety standards are eliminated. Low-income communities and communities

of color are disproportionately affected by weak safety standards: 135 million people live in vulnerability zones and 20 million children attend school in vulnerability zones. And they deserve the protection from dangerous chemical incidents that the 2017 RMP rule provides.

The 2017 RMP rule also requires that facilities provide emergency planners and first responders with information needed to safely 22 Page 174

respond to and mitigate a chemical disaster, but 2 the EPA proposes removing that requirement. We should be pushing for better coordination between 3 4 responders and facilities, not putting responders, 5 workers, and nearby residents in danger by eliminating these requirements. 6

The EPA has power under the Clean Air Act to implement chemical release regulations separate from OSHA and, as California's stricter chemical facility standards show, the economic 11 benefits of fewer disasters outweigh the costs of 12 implementing safer practices. Strong chemical 13 facility safety standards are good for American workers, communities, and industry. I urge the EPA to abandon the proposal to reconsider and to instead uphold the 2017 RMP rule in order to fulfill its mission of protecting human health.

MS. REGNA: Any questions?

Thank you.

MR. AVERBACK: One aspect of your comments was directed towards the proposed changes to the emergency coordination provisions. That's Page 175

one section where we're proposing a set of modifications rather than a full rescission. Is

your testimony that you're opposed to the 3 4 revisions that we're proposing? I'm a bit

MS. COLOPY: My testimony is that we 6 stand by the 2017 RMP rule. And so I can look 7 into that further and include it in my comment, 8 9 but I'm not sure further than that.

MR. AVERBACK: Yeah. And just as a 10 11 general matter, even on some of the provisions 12 that we're proposing to rescind, we're soliciting comment on various options or short of full 13 rescission, so this causes much fervor. Everyone 14 when they submit their comments that we're 15 interested in their views in all of the comments 16 and solicitations in the proposal. 17

MS. REGNA: Okay, thank you both. Our 19 next two speakers will be Miles Donovan and 20 Michael Overton. Miles, would you like to begin? MR. DONOVAN: Sure. Good afternoon. My 22 name is Miles Donovan. Thank you for the Page 176

18

EPA hearing Page: 45 (177 - 180)

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

9

15

opportunity to offer comment today.

I am a member of the League of Conservation Voters and I'm here to strongly 3 oppose the EPA's proposed reconsideration of 4 accidental release prevention requirements in the 5 Risk Management Program. The program, which was 6

updated in early 2017, is crucial for improving the safety of chemical facilities, protecting 8

first responders, and reducing exposure to

vulnerable communities, particularly low-income 10

communities. The Risk Management Program was 11

updated in part due to the 1,500 reported 12

13 incidents that occurred at RMP chemical facilities

between 2004 and 2013, 500 of which had offsite

impacts. In total, nearly 60 people died and more 15

than 2 billion in property damages resulted. The 16

EPA's new proposed rule would cut vital 17

complete safer technology alternatives

improvements to chemical facilities and add to 18

these troubling statistics. 19

20

1

3

8

11

13

Perhaps the most essential provision of the 2017 RMP rule that EPA has proposed removing 22 is the requiring of the highest risk facilities to

Page 177

assessments. These imperative assessments determine whether such facilities could avoid 4 future disasters by adopting better technologies and processes, ultimately saving the industry 6 money in the long run and greatly reducing the 7 risk of harmful and deadly incidents. This is widely regarded as the best method in furthering

9 safety on potentially harmful sites. Additionally, the EPA's new plan will 10

eliminate the requirements that facilities coordinate with emergency planners, first responders at least annually, providing details on

the chemicals they are working with and how to 14 deal with them in the event of a crisis. This 15

will place a lot of the first responders and

16 others in even greater danger. EPA's proposal 17

18 would also make valuable field exercises carried

19 out by facilities at least every 10 years

20 non-mandatory. Both of these changes would

drastically hurt the effectiveness of first 2.1

responders and of the facilities themselves when 22

Page 178

handling a critical disaster.

2 Worst of all, some populations bear an unequal proportion of the risk when it comes to 3 chemical facilities, the true extent to which the 4 EPA's proposed rule refuses to acknowledge. The poverty rate around these facilities is 50 percent 6 7 greater than the U.S. average. In fact, low-income children of color are more than twice as likely to live within one mile of these 9 10 dangerous facilities compared to those above the poverty line. 11

In total, around 20 million school children who are more susceptible when exposed to toxic chemicals attend schools in the vulnerability zones at high-risk facilities.

I strongly urge the EPA to propose the reconsideration of this rule. The EPA must not ignore its core mission of protecting our health and the environment by placing industrial interests above human health and safety. Thank you.

MS. REGNA: Thank you.

Page 179

MR. OVERTON: Good afternoon. 1 Michael Overton, and I'm from Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Thank you for this opportunity to 3 4 comment. I'm a member of the League of Conservation Voters and I'm here to speak out 5 against the EPA's proposed rule to change the chemical safety standards of the risk management program. 8

The January 2017 Chemical Disaster Rule 10 was the previous administration's response to more than 1,500 reportable incidents at RMP covered 12 chemical facilities between 2004 and 2013, incidents that caused 60 deaths, 500,000 13 evacuations or shelters in place, and more than \$2 14 billion in property damage.

Among the most important components of 16 the 2017 rule, the first update to the original 17 18 RMP since 1996 was a requirement for regularly 19 scheduled compliance and third-party audits of 20 chemical processes at facilities. Yet, EPA's proposed changes would strike these proactive 21 22 requirements in favor of follow-up audits Page 180 EPA hearing Page: 46 (181 - 184)

MR. AVERBACK: The third party -commenced only in reaction to multiple accidents 1 or demonstrated regulatory violations. This 2 MS. REGNA: -- the third-party audit. change would both reward bad behavior and MR. AVERBACK: Yeah. The third-party 3 3 4 undermine the EPA's duty to promote industry best 4 provision was only with -- I believe was only 5 practices. post-accident. 5 When it comes to the health and safety MS. REGNA: Right. Only under certain 6 6 of both workers as well as the general public, circumstances. 7 there is no such thing as being too cautious. MR. AVERBACK: Right. 8 Since the EPA first delayed the January 2017 rule, MS. REGNA: Okay. 9 10 at least 46 incidents have occurred across the MR. AVERBACK: The incident you 10 country. One of these incidents occurred when 11 mentioned near where you live, what -- do you know 11 12 both the fire and chemical leak broke out at the what chemical was involved and what type of plant 12 13 house of Rayford Plant in Mocksville, North 13 had the incident? Carolina, just a few short miles from my home in 14 MR. DUERTON: I don't recall off the top 14 Winston-Salem. Only by luck and timing with the 15 of my head the chemical involved but I can include 15 leak occurring in the middle of the night were that in the written comments. 16 16 injuries limited. MR. AVERBACK: Thank you. 17 17 Both incidents like this occurring MS. REGNA: Thank you both. Our next 18 18 19 regularly, even now, it's wholly responsible for speaker will be Ean Tafoya. 19 MR. TAFOYA: Hello. So my name is Ean 20 the EPA to eliminate instruments like the safer 20 technology alternatives assessment which works to 21 Thomas Tafoya and I'm here representing the 22 ensure chemical facilities adopt inherently safer 22 Colorado Latino Forum. We're an organization of Page 181 Page 183 technologies and processes without enacting thousands of Latinos in Colorado, predominantly in 1 similarly robust policies. Without these the metro Denver area. 2 safeguards, we can expect more incidents like that I'm here today mostly because I've been 3 3 4 which occurred in Mocksville or worse. doing a lot of environmental justice work around EPA's proposed rule would be a major Suncor Energy. It's been specific as the one 5 6 setback in chemical safety and is one which our 6 industry that has had the greatest impact on 7 health and well-being cannot afford. I strongly 7 Latinos in the community. 8 encourage the EPA not to go ahead with the rule In the last few years, it's had several 8 9 explosions and releases of gas, most particular 9 changes and instead, to fully implement the January 2017 rule. Thank you. 10 sulfur dioxide, although hydrogen cyanide permits 10 MS. REGNA: Thank you. One question. 11 were just approved. It is especially dangerous 11 12 Did you state that the rule would strike the 12 because it's adjacent to three highways, two regularly scheduled compliance audits? Is that 13 elementary schools, a new transit line, and a 13 what you seem to be saying? 14 river, which it had leaked benzene in for nearly 14 MR. DUERTON: The third-party audits. six years before it was finally brought into 15 15 MS. REGNA: Oh, the third party. The compliance. 16 16 existing -- the proposed rule would maintain the Now, I'm not here to say today that land 17 17 requirement for regularly scheduled compliance 18 use patterns are your issue; they're not. They're 18 19 the issue of me and people in my community to 19 audits every three years? MR. AVERBACK: Yeah, it would block out. 20 fight for better fence line monitoring and all the 20 MS. REGNA: But it -- yeah. But it 21 things that are associated with that. Also, the 21 22 would not, as you're saying --22 removing of schools. Page 182 Page 184

EPA hearing Page: 47 (185 - 188)

11

14

18

19

21

22

I'm also not here today to tell you that 2 I think the chemical industry is bad. I can't 3 paint anybody as bad or good. I realize that I 4 enjoy many, many products that are produced and created around chemical industries.

5

6

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

8

11

13

What I am here today to say is that there are parts of this rule in your proposal that I like. That you intend to keep parts of the emergency response coordination, although I don't 10 believe they should be weakened. I believe -- I was an educator in my earlier career, and I 12 believe the more you train for problems, the easier it is to deal when they happen.

I'm not in favor -- I am in favor of this public information requirement where you actually are trying to strengthen the notifications to the community after a disaster. Thirty days is better than 90 days from my point of view. 19

20 In regard to a majority of these changes and rollback for the Chemical Disaster Rules, my 22 organization strongly opposes this rule change,

Page 185

whether it be technological advancements or 1 third-party audits. Especially third-party audits. Anybody who is put in charge of making 3 4 their own decisions about whether they're doing something right or not, and profit is based on 6 that, you have to say that they're going to err in 7 the favor of profit. I wish it wasn't so.

Now, as far as root causes and near 9 misses, how do we expect to learn and to get 10 better if we don't actually report when there are near misses, drive technology to help them, and

12 figuring out what the problem is? Now, in the last 10 years, there have 14 been over 1,500 incidents to the tune of \$2 billion in damage, 58 deaths, and nearly \$17,000 15 people injured. Now, when Scott Pruitt issued 16 this announcement, he made a claim that \$88 18 million in savings would be had. While I was 19 doing my research, I found that the National 20 Association of Chemical Distributors who oppose 21 the previous rule from 2017, claims nearly \$31 22 billion in sales annually. If you couple that

with the other industries, \$88 million pales in comparison to the costs of the lives and for the 2 community. 3

4 I guess I'd really like to close by saying, you know, failure to plan is planning to fail. And in the first moments of an incident, 6 all will be glad that practice was put before profits. Communities have the right to plan effectively to prevent and to respond to 9 10 disasters, period. Thank you.

MS. REGNA: Thank you very much. We 12 have no more speakers at the moment so we'll be 13 taking a brief recess.

(Recess)

MS. REGNA: We're going to restart the 15 16 hearing now. Our next speaker will be Michael 17 Wilson.

MR. WILSON: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Wilson. I'm the national director for Occupational and Environmental Health at the BlueGreen Alliance.

> On behalf of my organization, our Page 187

national labor and environmental partners and the millions of members and supporters they represent, I urge the EPA to stand up for industrial workers, 3 first responders, and fence line communities by reversing its proposal to rescind crucial 6 amendments to the risk management program. I'm familiar with the risks of

8 industrial hazards because I had the privilege of 9 working for 13 years as a professional 10 firefighter, paramedic, and EMT, during which time 11 I responded to about 10,000 emergency calls. I 12 worked in a city with heavy industry centered 13 around agriculture, so there were many facilities that used chlorine and ammonia and other 14 agricultural chemicals. Responding to an incident 15 at one of these facilities meant grappling with a 16 lot of uncertainty because the facilities weren't 18 required to invite us in and involve us in 19 planning or training for an emergency. In general, these facilities relied on 20

22 reluctant to help us improve the safety and

Page 188

21 us if they had an emergency, but they were

EPA hearing Page: 48 (189 - 192)

5

16

17

18

19

9

10

11

effectiveness of our response. Without a doubt, emergency response is a necessary aspect of chemical safety, but it's an indicator of a 3 4 failure. It's a measure of last resort where thoughtful planning and prevention have broken down. EPA reported this year that most serious 6 chemical accidents are preventable if the 8 necessary precautions and actions are taken, and yet, serious industrial chemical accidents continue to occur every two and a half days across 10 our nation. 11

Last year, EPA estimated that about 177 million Americans live close enough to an industrial facility to be affected by a chemical accident, and that these risks fall disproportionately on low income and minority communities.

12 13

15

16

17

18

19

2.2

1

22

The Chemical Disaster Rule, finalized in January of 2017, included improvements to the RMP that required companies to take steps to prevent chemical releases, fires, and explosions, while also working with first responders to improve

Page 189

emergency preparedness and coordination.

We are very concerned that the US EPA is 3 now proposing to substantially weaken the rule by 4 rolling back most of is key provisions, including 5 all of its prevention requirements. These include 6 requirements on training and coordination between 7 emergency responders and facilities, learning from 8 mistakes by looking back at accidents or near 9 misses to assess how to prevent them in the future, sharing information with communities on 10 hazards at the facility and preparedness and 11 evacuation procedures, ensuring that incident 13 investigation reports are completed effectively within 12 months, training of workers and 14 supervisors at certain facilities, conducting 15 independent audits for serious chemical accidents. 16 And finally, for the most dangerous subset of 18 facilities, to assess the applicability of safer 19 technologies and practices so that if a problem occurs, whatever the cause, fewer people will be 20 killed or injured. 2.1

> EPA's proposed changes will endanger the Page 190

lives of my former coworkers in the U.S. fire 2 service, and they will endanger workers and millions of community members and their families 3 who live around our nation's chemical facilities. 4

The State of California, the third largest refining state in the country, has taken 6 the opposite approach. After five years of effort, the state adopted a sweeping new safety 8 regulation for oil refineries last year, which was 9 10 motivated by a flammable vapor explosion at the 11 Richmond Chevron refinery. That incident created 12 a 100-square meter vapor cloud that ignited and endangered the lives of 19 workers and caused some 15,000 downwind of the plant to seek medical attention. 15

California's comprehensive new regulation is informed by the industry's own best engineering and management practices developed over the last 20 years. These include nearly all of the provisions that EPA is proposing to remove from the Chemical Disaster Rule. The rule should 22 be retained in its original form, not weakened or Page 191

delayed as the administration has proposed. can and must prevent chemical accidents. I urge you to reverse the proposed changes. The result 3 4 will be fewer explosions, fewer injuries and deaths, and a far more resilient industrial 5 infrastructure. Thank you. 6

MS. REGNA: Thank you very much. As we 8 no longer have any speakers, we will now be in recess for a while.

MS. GIOFFRE: Good afternoon, everyone. 12 We're going to restart the hearing.

Before we begin, let me take a moment to 13 introduce our next panel. My name is Patty 14 Gioffre. I am the deputy division director for the Office of Emergency Management's Regulation 16 Implementation Division. Joining me on the panel today is Jon Averback. He's an attorney in our 18 19 Office of General Counsel; Kathy Franklin, who is 20 a chemical engineer in our division; and Greg 21 Wilson is our timekeeper for today, and he is a 22 physical scientist in our regulation division. Page 192 EPA hearing Page: 49 (193 - 196)

6

15

16

17

18

19

21

Before we get started, let me take a moment to read our media statement.

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

11

13

14

15

16

17

19

21

For everyone's awareness, this hearing $\mathbf{4}$ is open to the press and we have members of the media present with us today. The event is open to any form of recording -- video, audio, and photos. We ask that you not cause any disruption to those testifying or observing the hearing.

For members of the media, please refrain from interviewing in the public hearing room. If you need interview space, please ask an EPA press contact at the media registration table.

And finally, for people here to present testimony, it is under your discretion whether you would like to be interviewed by a member of the press, and we ask that media members here today respect each individual's wishes.

With that, I'd like to call up our next speaker, and I apologize if I get the name wrong. I have Yvette Arellano. And I'd like to remind speakers to spell your name before presenting your 22 testimony, please.

Page 193

MS. ARELLANO: My name is Yvette Arellano. I'm a research, policy and grassroots advocate with Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Services.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak on the proposal to roll back and eliminate the 6 7 protections for my community in Houston, Texas, 8 that are part of the EPA's 2017 Chemical Disaster 9 Rule. I am disappointed that the EPA in its rulemaking has chosen to only hold one hearing in 10 Washington, D.C., making it difficult for voices like those in my community, but I'm relieved that I can bring my experiences to this hearing.

My name is Yvette Arellano, and I work for Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Services. We're a nonprofit working on educating and mobilizing communities in Southeast Houston, a 18 city that is home to the largest Petrochemical complex in the entire nation, second largest in 20 the world.

We have a high concentration of chemical 22 facilities that the EPA is required to regulate Page 194

effectively under the RMP rule. This exposes our 2 communities, which include significant communities of color that are low income to more toxic 3 pollution and disproportionate harm to chemical 4 disasters. 5

As illustrated too well from Hurricane 7 Harvey, too often we experience a flood of toxics on top of the threats we already face from 9 hurricanes and heavy rains. That comes on top of 10 disparate health and safety impacts we already 11 face around the year because the EPA's refusal to 12 do its job and protect us from the frequent toxic 13 releases in pollution, these facilities send across the fence line. 14

At Hartman Park, which is in the center of Manchester, a community on the east side, is Valero Refining. They produce over 154,000 barrels per calendar day. The community has painted a mural reflecting all the pollution surrounding it. Valero is only one. Contanda Chemical has 87 sealed carbon storage tanks with a 22 full capacity of over a million barrels. And Eco

Page 195

Services, which is a sulfuric gas plant, the largest one at its founding, the children now when they see this every day on their way to school, 3 from school to home, on the weekends when they're playing soccer across the street from Eco 5 Services, the sulfuric gas plant. Communities in 6 7 Manchester never know when an incident requires 8 evacuation or a shelter in place. They hear the 9 sirens and they have no idea. The lower reps have 10 stated that the sirens are only meant for internal 11 use but people live in constant fear of releases 12 or incidences while children are playing outside 13 or once hurricane season starts. We're in 14 hurricane season again.

No one should have to shelter in place 15 due to a hurricane or a toxic chemical that floods 16 their homes, wondering what they should do or 18 which facility down the street let it off. This 19 happens. This is a worry. This should be no 20 one's worry. Moms shouldn't have to worry about 21 the air that their children breathe when they're 22 playing in the playgrounds at the nearby park. Page 196 EPA hearing Page: 50 (197 - 200)

The Chemical Disaster Rule contains important safeguards that would help communities like mine and those across the country with common 3 4 sense provisions. Most importantly, for overexposed communities, we need this rule to go 5 in full effect now to require facilities to take 6 preventative action. To prevent fires, explosions, and other disasters, including by ensuring they actually look for safer ways to operate before disaster starts. 10

It also would increase the availability of basic information we need to know, like chemical safety data sheets and emergency response contacts so communities can try to find ways to protect ourselves if a serious incident happens. Community members should get information from each incident they're exposed to without delay and it's essential for facilities to do real investigation reports, that they cannot ignore in planning to prevent future problems.

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

22

I want to highlight that the rule was 21 22 finalized in 2017 and came after years of work by

Page 197 1 EPA and after over 100 groups working with TEJAS,

also supported it. As disasters were happening around the country and people in Washington, D.C. 3 4 didn't seem to be paying attention, it also provided for better coordination through 6 information sharing for first responders' needs 7 and ensuring practice notification and exercises 8 happened to prepare without delay. EPA can't 9 justify repealing all of the prevention and weakening of the important requirements and it has 10 refused to face the fact that it's taking away 11

protections meant to save lives and prevent harm,

especially to communities like those right across 13 the fence lines from chemical facilities. 14 These rollbacks don't come without 15 community costs as fires and toxic releases around 16 the country on this administration's watch, 17 especially those in Arkema and Crosby, Texas, after Hurricane Harvey. First responders on the 19 20 scene had to evacuate and receive medical treatment for inhaling dangerous chemicals from 2.1

the blast, and community members are still dealing

with the aftermath of chemical debris which is visible in their lawns and cars. The Valero refinery and other nearby facilities released 3 spikes of benzene and other toxic chemicals, but 5 most important of these were missed because EPA and the state turned off all of the end monitors. 6

I urge this committee to consider the impacts on my neighbors, on my friends, family 8 without critical protections like these and the 9 Chemical Disaster Rule, and ask you to call on 10 11 President Trump and Administrator Pruitt to drop 12 the hazardous plan that EPA has been considering 13 which would revoke lifesaving protections for 14 communities all across. I urge you to consider communities like Manchester to have to shelter in 15 place or evacuate in temperatures that can reach 16 115 degrees in the summer. I urge you, and I 17 trust that you will do the right thing in 18 regulating these facilities by creating the 19 regulatory programs by adding dual languages to information sharing requiring the implementation 22 of safer technologies in those facilities to Page 199

mitigate a future disaster and consider the cumulative impacts of the exposure to multiple chemical facility sources. Our communities feel 3 4 powerless in the event of a chemical disaster, and I hope that this committee works to restore the 5 power and the protection to the people in our 6 communities. Thank you. 7

MS. GIOFFRE: Thank you very much for your testimony today.

So at this time we do not have any other 11 scheduled speakers. I'd like to take a moment for anybody -- one more? Okay. I'd like to invite you up to speak.

That's fine. Okay. On their way. All right. So right now we don't have anyone at present, so if there is no one in the room here ready to speak then we will recess until our next 18 speaker arrives.

Thank you to everyone who has provided 20 testimony thus far.

(Recess)

MS. GIOFFRE: Hi, everyone. We're going Page 200

Page 198

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

19

21

EPA hearing Page: 51 (201 - 204)

to reconvene the panel. We have another speaker who has arrived. For the speaker's benefit, let me just take a moment to introduce myself. I'm 3 Patty Gioffre. I'm the deputy division director of the Office of Emergency Management Regulation 5 and Implementation Division. Joining me on this 6 panel is Jon Averback with our Office of General Counsel, Kathy Franklin, and Greg Wilson, also with the division that I work in.

I'd like to take a moment to invite up Alana Byrd, who is with the BlueGreen Alliance. And Alana, if you will spell your name before providing your testimony, please.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

9

10

11

21

22

MS. BYRD:: My name is spelled A-l-a-n-a B-y-r-d. And I'm speaking today as a representative of the BlueGreen Alliance, a coalition of the nation's largest labor unions and environmental organizations collectively representing millions of members and supporters.

20 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I want to urge the Environmental 22 Protection Agency to stand up for industrial

Page 201

workers, first responders, and fence line communities by reversing its proposal to rescind crucial amendments to the successful risk management program (RMP).

The Chemical Disaster Rule, finalized in 6 January 2017, included much-needed improvements to 7 the RMP requiring companies to take steps to 8 prevent chemical releases, fires, and explosions, while also working with first responders to improve emergency preparedness and coordination.

Just over a week ago, we were reminded of the need for this role when on June 3, 2018, in the 45th publicly-known chemical disaster since 13 this rule has been delayed, an equipment failure 14 resulted in the deaths of two employees from steam 15 burns at the Jeffrey Energy Center in St. Mary's, 16 Kansas. Not a month prior to the St. Mary's 17 18 incident, in Pasadena, Texas, a fire broke out at the Kuraray America plant, leading to the 19 20 hospitalization of over 20 employees for burns and other treatment.

In fact, just since the beginning of

Page 202

this year, 19 known chemical disasters have occurred, resulting in death and injury that might have been prevented had the Chemical Disaster Rule 3 4 been in place. Because this rule has been 5 delayed, more than 12,500 industrial facilities have been allowed to continue operations without 6 7 being required to take concrete steps to prevent chemical disasters that place $\mbox{\it Americans}$ at risk 8 every year. And if this rule was rescinded 9 entirely, workers, first responders, and the 10 millions of Americans who live in the 11 vulnerability zone of an industrial chemical 12 release will remain at risk. 13

Today, at least one in three school children in America attends a school in the 15 vulnerability zone of a hazardous facility. At 16 least 50 percent of students in the states of 17 Utah, Rhode Island, Texas, Louisiana, Nevada, Delaware, and Florida are in these danger zones. 19 Too many Americans have had to evacuate, shelter in place, or race to pick up their children from 22 school as an industrial fire burns or a chemical Page 203

release heads their way.

It is not just our children who would be 2 affected by this deregulatory indiscretion. The 3 EPA reports that over 175 million Americans live in the worst case scenario zones for chemical 5 6 disasters. Among these populations, the percentage of African-American living in fence 8 line zones, around 3,433 of the most dangerous 9 facilities, is 75 percent greater than for the 10 U.S. as a whole. And similarly, the percentage of Latinos in these zones is 60 percent greater.

It is clear from the scores of 13 publicly-known chemical disasters that have occurred since just the delay of this rule that the protections we have on the books simply aren't sufficient. Even the chemical industry itself recognizes that the existing RMP regulations are 18 deeply lagging behind advancements in industrial 19 process safety that the industry has made since 20 the regulations were first adopted 25 years ago. 21 The industry professionals who understand process 22 safety recognize the need for reform. The modest Page 204

12

14

15

16

EPA hearing Page: 52 (205 - 208)

revisions to the RMP rules were developed with industrial workers, communities, and our nation's extensive input from many of these experts, and 2 infrastructure by reversing the proposed revision they reflected the industry's own interests in of these important improvements. Thank you. 3 3 4 broadly improving process safety. 4 MR. AVERBACK: Alana, you identified an While the revisions were intended to 5 incident in St. Mary's and an additional incident 5 protect the safety of workers, first responders, in Pasadena right prior to that. What types of 6 6 and communities, there is no question that they 7 facilities were these and what were the chemicals that were involved? If you don't have it -will also help insure the integrity and operation 8 MS. BYRD:: Yeah, I don't have the of the nation's critical industrial 9 infrastructure. Moreover, the review process for 10 information readily available. 10 these crucially and modest amendments was MR. AVERBACK: When you prepare your 11 11 extensive, including a stakeholder consultation 12 final written comments, and this goes for other 12 13 people who are in the room and going to read the 13 process conducted jointly with other agencies, transcript of the hearing, when incidents are including the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Labor. This process also cited, it's helpful to identify, if possible, the 15 15 included public listening sessions across the chemical that's involved and the provisions --16 16 country, a public request for information, a small MS. BYRD:: Absolutely. 17 17 business advocacy review plant panel, and a two MR. AVERBACK: -- that the incident is 18 18 month public comment period where thousands of relevant to. 19 19 MS. BYRD:: Absolutely. I will add that people weighed in on the merits of this rule. 20 21 After so much consultation, input, and to my written testimony. Thank you. 21 MS. GIOFFRE: Thank you very much, demonstrated need for such requirements, it is 22 22 Page 205 Page 207 confounding that the agency would abandon these Alana. 1 1 common sense amendments. MS. BYRD:: Thank you. 2 2 Finally, it should be noted that we are MS. GIOFFRE: Do we have any other 3 3 4 here debating the utility of the Chemical Disaster 4 speakers today? Okay. Until our next speaker 5 Rule less than two weeks after having marked the arrives, we're going to recess for the moment. 5 6 official start of the hurricane season. And as we Thank you very much, everyone. 6 7 know all too well from the example of the Arkema 7 (Recess) 8 plant explosion near Houston, Texas, last year in MS. GIOFFRE: Hello, everyone. We are 8 9 going to reconvene the panel. We have a new 9 the wake of Hurricane Harvey, the frequency and magnitude of industrial chemical releases and the 10 speaker. 10 threat of fires and explosions increases during I'd like to invite Nicky Sheats up. 11 11 12 Nicky is with New Jersey Environmental Justice hurricane season in the gulf states where many oil refineries and chemical facilities are Alliance. 13 13 concentrated. The damage inflicted on the first 14 And Nicky, if you don't mind, please 14 responders and fence line community in the wake of spell your name for the court reporter before 15 15 the Arkema explosion could have been prevented or giving your testimony. Thank you. 16 16 MR. SHEATS: So my name is Nicky Sheats, mitigated if the Chemical Disaster Rule had been 17 17 18 implemented prior to the last hurricane season. 18 S-h-e-a-t- s. I'm here representing the New 19 Jersey Environmental Justice Alliance as you said, 19 Now, as we enter the 2018 hurricane 20 season, it is time to strengthen the laws we have 20 and Thomas Edison State University. So I work at 21 on the books, not weaken them. We request that 21 Thomas Edison State University, where I run a 22 you take action to protect first responders, 22 small policy center called the Center for Urban

Page 206

EPA hearing Page: 53 (209 - 212)

Environment. It's part of the John S. Watson Institute for Public Policy. I'm also a member of the New Jersey Environmental Justice Alliance. 3

4

11

17

18

1

3

4

8 9

The Alliance is the only statewide organization in New Jersey that focuses on 5 environmental justice issues, and even though we 6 are well integrated, we are also the only statewide group in New Jersey that addresses 8 environmental issues, which is a majority of color in both its membership and leadership. 10

And we are concerned. New Jersey Environmental Justice Alliance is concerned about 12 13 the proposals that EPA is making to what we see as a weakened Chemical Disaster Rule. We think that 14 the proposed changes will result in chemical 15 facilities around the country being less safe, and 16 that's because as we read the rule, it will reduce or eliminate safety assessments, reduce or eliminate compliance audits, reduce or eliminate 19 analysis of incidents, and reduce or eliminate investigations of near misses or incidents that almost happened. Disasters that almost happened. 2.2

Page 209

And obviously, this is of concern. think this is going to result in more chemical incidents, more chemical disasters, and we have enough of them already. I think EPA has recognized that there are over -- the number is at 6 my fingertips -- over 100 a year. Certainly, I 7 think all of us would agree there are too many incidents now, and we think this is moving in the wrong direction.

We also think that the proposals EPA is 10 making to the rule will make it more difficult for 11 first responders to do their job and will make it more difficult for communities to be prepared for 13 chemical disasters or incidents because it's going 14 to cut down on the information that chemical 15 facilities share with both the first responders 16 and the residents. And if you're a first 17 responder, the less information you have, the more 19 difficult it is to do your job. And if you are a 20 resident, a community resident, of course, if you don't have information, it's hard to prepare for 2.1 good or bad things that might happen. 22

And so this is a concern for all 2 communities. We think the rule will detrimentally impact all communities because of the potential it 3 4 has to produce more chemical incidents and the reduction in the information the community is going to receive. But, we are an environmental 6 justice organization, so we are especially concerned about environmental justice communities. 8 When I say environmental justice communities, I 9 10 mean communities of color and low income communities. These communities -- because we 11 12 think the rule is going to disproportionately 13 impact those communities because these communities are already particularly vulnerable to the detrimental impacts of chemical disasters and 15 incidents. That's for a number of reasons, 16 because these communities tend to have more 17 pollution in them already, tend to have more 18 disease, incidents of more disease, tend to have 19 less healthcare, and have a harder time -- the residents have a harder time escaping from any

happen, and have a harder time recovering from any incidents or disasters that might happen. So we are very concerned about disproportionate impacts 3 the rule will have on environmental justice communities. 5

22 instance that might happen or disasters that might

Page 211

And I have to say, coming from New 7 Jersey, we are concerned that the rule is going to 8 have a disproportionate impact on New Jersey because New Jersey is a state that has extensive 10 chemical industry activity. So we think it's 11 going to impact New Jersey more because we have 12 more chemical activity, you know, to impact, potentially, again, more incidents and more disasters in New Jersey than other states.

That's the message. We have these concerns. I'll close by saying that when we look at the rule, we see two disasters, or two possible 18 disasters. We see the rule itself as being a 19 possible disaster, and then, of course, we see a 20 chemical disaster that could happen after that. 21 So we see a disaster before the disaster, and we 22 really want to urge EPA to rethink the acts of Page 212

Page 210

9

13

14

15

EPA hearing Page: 54 (213 - 216)

MR. SHEATS: And who said that? this proposal, not repeal any of the rule, not 1 weaken the rule, and really need to strengthen the 2 MR. AVERBACK: It was representative -rule instead of weaken it to protect environmental who said that? 3 3 MS. GIOFFRE: Alexandra? 4 justice communities. Thank you for the 4 opportunity to comment. MR. AVERBACK: Yeah, I believe it was 5 5 MR. AVERBACK: Nicky? the Corn Refiners Association. 6 6 7 MR. SHEATS: Yes. I'll sit down now. At any rate, you know, we're interested 7 MR. AVERBACK: Excellent. Make sure about, you know --8 MR. SHEATS: And so the comment was that that the mic will pick up your answer. 9 10 the rate of incidence has gone down since When we originally developed the rule, 10 at various points we pointed to the New Jersey 11 implementation of the rule? 11 chemical accident, TCPA, toxic chemical accident MR. AVERBACK: The comment, and the 12 12 13 -- catastrophe, thank you -- as an example of a 13 record will reflect, it was something to the effect that there wasn't an appreciable difference state program that implemented some of the same 14 things that we did. When you submit your -- in between the accident rates in New Jersey --15 15 particular, New Jersey has had something analogous MR. SHEATS: There was not? 16 16 to our safer technology and alternatives analysis MR. AVERBACK: -- after they instituted 17 17 (STAA) program. I think there they call it the inherent safety requirements. 18 18 inherently safer technologies. They have an MR. SHEATS: So the comment was that 19 19 experience with that. So if in your comments you 20 after New Jersey implemented its inherent safer technology, the number of incidents did not go could compare what's in this rule to what your 21 22 down? experience has been under New Jersey's and where 2.2 Page 213 Page 215 1 it adds to what New Jersey is having, where it MR. AVERBACK: Relative to the country, 1 would take it away, that would be helpful I believe. 2 information for us. MR. SHEATS: Okay. 3 3 4 MR. SHEATS: Okay. I think, so let me 4 MR. AVERBACK: But information on 5 say a few things. I'm not an expert in chemical accident rates. 5 6 security. We are following the league of the MR. SHEATS: I'll see what I can find 6 7 Environmental Justice Health Alliance, and they 7 out about that. 8 have a lot of expertise in this. But having said MR. AVERBACK: Yeah. A lot of our 8 9 proposal discusses and solicits comments on 9 that, I'm an air pollution, climate change guy. Having said that, within our umbrella, as New 10 accident rates. So what you've got would help us. Jersey Environmental Justice Alliance and the MR. SHEATS: And give me the 11 11 partners we work with, there are people who are organization that said that again? experts in that and have followed the rule that MS FRANKLIN: It was the Corn Refiners 13 13 14 Association. The Corn Refiners Association. you're talking about very closely. So I will 14 consult with them, and I will try to put something MR. SHEATS: Corn Refiners Association? 15 15 in written comments that may help address that. 16 Okay. I'll see what my people have to say about 16 MR. AVERBACK: Yeah. In particular, that. 17 17 18 earlier today another witness represented 18 MR. AVERBACK: Okay. That's it. Thank 19 something about the rate of accidents in New 19 you. 20 Jersey since it's instituted safer technologies 20 MR. SHEATS: Yeah, no, thanks for posing versus the comparable rates around the country. 21 the question. 2.1 22 So --MS. GIOFFRE: Yes. Thank you for your 22 Page 214 Page 216 EPA hearing Page: 55 (217 - 218)

```
testimony.
             MR. SHEATS: Thank you. Thank you for
   the opportunity.
3
4
            MS. GIOFFRE: Okay. Before we take our
  next recess let me just reach out and see if we
5
  have any other speakers in the room.
6
             All done? Okay. We are going to recess
8
  for the time being. Thank you, everyone.
                  (Recess)
9
             MS. FRANKLIN: Okay. Okay. This is
10
11 Kathy Franklin of OEM. It's 6:30 p.m. We haven't
12 had any more speakers that have wanted to speak
  for the last hour, so we're going to adjourn the
14
  hearing.
                  (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the
15
                  HEARING was adjourned.)
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
                                           Page 217
              CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
1
             I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby
2
  certify that the forgoing electronic file when
3
4 originally transmitted was reduced to text at my
5 direction; that said transcript is a true record
6 of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am
7 neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by
8 any of the parties to the action in which these
9 proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I
10 am neither a relative or employee of any attorney
  or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
11
  financially or otherwise interested in the outcome
12
   of this action.
13
14
             /s/Carleton J. Anderson, III
  Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of
15
16 Virginia
  Commission No. 351998
18 Expires: November 30, 2020
19
20
21
22
                                           Page 218
```